Voices in the Wind: American Opposition to the Korean War by Slater, Joseph E.
Oberlin 
Digital Commons at Oberlin 
Honors Papers Student Work 
1983 
Voices in the Wind: American Opposition to the Korean War 
Joseph E. Slater 
Oberlin College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors 
 Part of the History Commons 
Repository Citation 
Slater, Joseph E., "Voices in the Wind: American Opposition to the Korean War" (1983). Honors Papers. 
648. 
https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/648 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For 
more information, please contact megan.mitchell@oberlin.edu. 
VOICES I N THE WIND: 
AMERICAN OPPOSI TION 
TO 
THE KOREAN WAR 
Joseph E. Slater 
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Very little has been written on the peace movement during the 
Korean war. Historian Joseph Conlin assessed the period and con-
cluded that "when hostilities with North Korean troops commenced 
in 1950, the American antiwar movement stood at its nadir." Law-
rence Wittner's fine book Rebels Against Wa~ is devoted to the Amer-
ican peace movement from 1941 to 1960 . yet out of this book's 300-, 
odd pages, less than three concern the movement during the Korean 
war--and most of this discussion is focussed on those elements in 
the movement which supported the war. This is typical of the ma-
jor secondary sources on the ·American peace movement. 1 
It is certainly true that the Korean war met with surprisingly 
little public resistance , especially initially. Republicans j oined 
Democrats in applauding Truman's decision to intervene. More sur-
prisingly , a number of traditionally pacifist individuals, organi-
zations anq p.eri"o.dioals endorsed the war , including some that had 
' f;' 
not supported world War Two. Prominent in this category were Nor-
man Thomas, the Socialist Party, Dwight MacDonald and the Progressive. 
Opposition to the war in the mainstream press was practically 
nonexist9.nt. In July, 1950 Time magaizine gave its position, which 
would remain fundamentally unchanged throughout the war, in an ar-
ticle provocatively titled "In the Cause of Peace": "The communist 
i nt ention to de~troy What order existed in the rest of the world had 
been plainly published and implacably pursued, " they began. Time ' s 
conclusion argued that "the road ahead of the U.S. was going t o 
be harder than any it ever travelled ... if they could strike back 
at communism ... if they could prove their power and purpose in Asia, 
ii. 
the U.S. and the free world might win through peace. " Newsweek 
echoed these sentiments in articles with titles such as "Angry 
U.S. Girds for Rough War," and "Call to Arms Against World Aggres-
. 2 Slon. " 
A final indication of the absence of opposition in the main-
stream press was the number of antiwar advertisements taken out 
in the B~~ xork Times: in the entire course of the Korean war, 
only two such advertisements appeared, one from the American Friends 
A 
Service Committe,- and the other from an individual; in comparison, 
in the single year after the inception of American bombing raids 
on North Vietnam in February, 1965, twenty-seven antiwar advertise-
ments appeared in the Times from tw·enty-fi ve different organizations, 
collectively containing 9,476 signatures. 3 
But, as opinion poll data collected by John Mueller shows, 
American opinion was never a monolith of support for the war. 
When q Gallup poll survey in August, 1950, asked the question, 
"Do you think the U.S. made a mistake going into the Korean war 
or not?'·, they found 66% of the respondents favored the war, 19% 
were opposed, and 15% had no opinion. This question wa~ repeatedly 
asked throughout the war, however, and neve!: again would support 
of the war be over 50%--in 1952 , support dipped to 36%, with 46% 
opposed to the war. 4 
Opinion polls can yield deceptive results, and great discre-
pancies can be created by subtle shifts in wording. For example , 
thi s result from early January, 1951: 
" Question--Now that Communist China had entered the fighting 
iii . 
in Korea with forces far outnumbering the United Nations troops 
there , which one of these courses would you, yourself, prefer?": 
pullout of Korea as fast as possible. 66% 
25% 
9% 
keep troops there to fight these larger forces. 
no opinion. 
Compare this result with the following, also asked in J anuary , 
1951 : 
now, 





we try to stay on as 
,pull troops out. 
try t? ~taY5on 
no oplnlon. 
long as possible z": 
Overall, though, the data suggests a sizable minority of Ameri-
cans did not support the war . The following question was introduced 
in October, 1952: 
" Question--As things stand now , do you feel that t he war in 
Korea has been worth fighting or not? " In late October, 1952 , 
only 31% answered this question affirma'bively, with 56% answering 
"no". For the remainder of the war, the antiwar response to this 
question remained above 50% , and the "pro" response never exceeded 
39%.6 
Even ques t ions with wording that tended to produce heavier 
pro-war results revealed significant opposition : 
"Questi6n--On the whole, do you approve or disapprove of Presi-
dent Truman's action in sending American troops to stop the Com-
munist invasion of Korea?" In August , 1950, 75% gave the pro-war 
response , and 19% gave the antiwar response. In September, 1953, 
when the war had ended , support had dropped only to 64%, with 28% 
opposing . But in the middle of the war, in March 1952 , only 50% 
iv . 
answered "yes" to this somewhat leading ques tion, and 40% answered 
7 "no" . . 
There seems to have been a noticable section of the American 
population which was firmly opposed to the war. Mueller concludes 
that during the war, about 15-35% of t he American population ac-
tually favored withdrawal from Korea, and that starting in 1952 , 
this figure settled in to around 30%--approximately one third of 
the American population. Mueller even argues that the Korean war 
and the Vietnam war were "supported to much the same degree, " and 
also that " th~ sentiment for withdrawal for the two wars was roughly 
the same." Mueller's implicit thesis is that opposition to the 
Vietnam war was not as widespread as was popularly believed , i.e . 
in this sense no greater than opposition to the Korean war. But 
this argument cuts both ways.S 
In fact there was a peace movement during the Korean war. 
Although Conscientious Objection will not be a focus of this pa-
per, it is worth noting that the number of classified Conscientious 
Objectors in the years 1951-1955 was a slightly higher percentage 
of living registrants than in the years 1941-45. There were 15 , 000 
" classified C.O.s in the Korean war period ; Zelle Larsin argues 
that if one includes noncombattants , those who refused to register , 
and those who went to prison, there were in this period "21,000 
draft-age youn~ men with conscientious scruples against war.,,9 
Moreover, although pacifist and peace organizations would 
never have a profound impact on daily American life during this 
v . 
period, they- were often active and articulate critics of the war. 
These groups were capable of insightful and intelligent critiques 
of American foreign policy as well as moral opposition to war. 
Pacifists were joined in their opposition by a number of prominent 
black commentators. And in a much more cautious way, " left" liberals 
grew increasingly critical of the war as the war went on. 
This paper will not argue that the Korean war provoked massive , 
resistance, huge demonstrations, or a popular renunciation of Ameri-
can motives . But this paper will try to docum~nt and describe the 
ideas, principles and actions of a heretofore ignored minority 
viewpoint in American history: the antiwar movement during the 
Korean war . 
Notes on Method: the first two chapters of this thesis are 
meant to provide background. The first chapter is on t he history 
of the American peace movement, with a slight emphasis on the move-
ment during times of war. The second chapter is on the Korean 
war itself. This chapter provides a chronological sketch of the ~.\!ar 
for reference, but mainly focusses on the origins of the war--spe-
cifically, the period of the " liberation" of Korea, 1945-50. It is 
important to address these origins not only because they provide 
a more complete picture of the war , but also because many of those 
who opposed the war referred to these origins in formulating their 
antiwar positions. 
The bulk of the opposition to the Korean war came from pacifis t 
and "near pacifist" groups , and hence chapter three , which discus-
vi. 
ses this opposition , is the l ongest. Chapter four looks at the re-
sponse of the " left" liberals, and s h ows a very different kind of 
criticism. This chapter also serves to show the limits of debate 
with in the mainstream, for the "left" liberals were the most radi-
cal fringe of the mainstream at this t ime. Finally , a strong and 
different kind of opposition is shown in the chapter on black opinion. 
Twa types of thought will not be looked at in d~pth: criti-
cism from the radical left and criticism from the radical right. 
These and other categories will be discussed near the end in a 
section on why certain segments of the peace movement did not exis t. 
It will be argued that opposition from the le,ft was not signifi-
cant, and that what has sometimes been referred to as right-wing 
" oppositiori" to the war was in fact not opposition. 
Finally ; I.F. stone, a prominent critic of the war, will not 
b e examined in depth. stone ' s book, 1h~ Hidden Histor;y ~f .!he 
j}orea!:! Yiar p written in 1952 , challenged the official explanation 
of how the war began , and raised a number of questions about the' 
origins of the war which remain unanswered. stone remained a critic 
of the war to its end. But stone also found himself completsly 
isolated during the Korean war:, his journal , the Dai~ Compass , 
collapsed in November, 1952 (his famous !~ekly would not begin publi-
cation until after the war); he had enormous difficulty finding 
a publisher for The Hidd~!:! History ~f !he Korea!:! Yi~, finally hitting 
on Leo Hub erman and Paul Sweezy of the left-wing Nionthlx Review 
by accident; and when the book came out, it was only reviewed in 
Americ a by the Nation and the New Republic-- two " left" liberal 
vii. 
journals. Equally importantly , a thorough treatment of stone during 
the Korean war already exists in Norman Kaner's essay, " I.F. Stone 
and the Korean War", published in .,gold War Critics (Thomas Pater-
son, editor ). 
Acknowledgements are due to: Steven Fine , who gave me valu-
able advice, and whose thesis was very helpful to me in putting to-
gether my own; the Jerome Davis Committee, whose gran~ helped fund 
my research at Swarthmore; members of the staff at the Swarthmore 
Peace collection, especially J. Richard KYle, . who were helpful 
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to . 
lVIy adviser , Clayton Koppes , deserves special mention. Without 
his encouragement, guidance and support , this paper would not have 
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"A ~Jeace movement 'I:d thout tb e pacifists \\Iould be an. 
-- Ja~nes Sbot\'iel11 
The history of pacifist and peace organizations in 
America has been filled \'lith a wide variety of differing, and 
frequently conflicting, viewpoints. Sectarianism, ideological 
debate and truly important differences in philosopby, 
strategy and tactics bave marked this heterogeneous movement 
since tbe 1776 Revolution. T'nroughout, bowever, there bave 
been a number of broad, distinct scbools of thought which 
have influenced the various p eace vTOrkers up to the Korean 
\jar, and indeed tllrough to today. In a nUJilber of cases, 
ideologies have overlapped. But vitally different ideas still 
pushed and pulled in very different directions. }~acb of these 
schools has its strengths and ,</eaknesses, '.'lhicb can be shown 
in an oV3rview of tli e bistory of tb e peace Elovenent in America 
UTI to th 2 I(orean :'!ar. 
Or'G;Ci,luzed peace activity at the time of the n.evolutionary 
~ '. ~-'1 
" "d. was aluost exclusiVely a religious activity, pril'1arily 
coming out of the Historic Peace Churches: The Society of 
Priends, the Brethr()n, and the rIennonites. War was seen as 
a rnore/r81igious issue: il l'Jar, considered in itself, is the 
p;CSEledi ta.tad and cl. Gternin:;d Q!=struc tic)i} of hU:':!8.n b e ings, of 
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'-~uaker }\.ntlwny Bcmezet in 1778. Tbese groups sbowed 
c)posi tioD b ;' refusing to pay Vlar taxes, accept payment for 
seized goods, or take loyalty oaths. The Mennonites offered 
conElutatiol1 fees in lieu of service, but t he Utcpian Shakers 
and the :DretlJren vievJed tllis as passing one f s duty on to 
anotber , and did not allo\'l it. Tbe enormous popularity of tb e 
Revolution however, especially wben it was over, made all tbese 
groups, an:l the idea of peace organizations in gen'2ral tem-
2 porarily unpopular. 
:i3ut 8.. feVi decad.es later, '.'l~l en the U. S . plunged back into 
"Jar with Bl'i tain, oppo si tion beca."l1e quite widespread . It could 
'3c-~sily be argued that the 1:!a1' of 1812 was tbe most unpopular 
','far th e l ' • .3. ever to cl~ part in: th 2 declaration of viar only 
l)CJ.ssed by 3, 19":'13 vot e in t he Senate, and 79-49 in tbe House; 
" ~'l e Vial' J:"!partrllsn-c could never 1;lan the arr;:y to more than balf 
its authorized strength; Oongress provided for 50,000 re6ruits 
[-}.nd got o!.!.ly 10 ,000;- ~·:ais88ic.11.D_8setts , gov"ernor C8ileb stron.g 
,~~.lled io~'.:' a public fast of 8:tonement for l:u:!erica f s attack 
!lupon tb e nation frO E'l ,vbicb \,18 ar e descended!:; rJortheastern 
:C'i ,1ancif~Y's eonsist s11tly refus ed t o subscrib03 t o 'V/3.r loans; 
~)()I' t, "~2,:;;J . , 8.tt ,:?mp-csd to fr ee a group of 3ri tish prisoners 
" '~~'i ti S!l gSlic:: r2.1 to tl7 t o discov8T \,ll12.t D:J:'itisb J: 2action would 
", '\j " f.:~:C ~~ 1."1. '3 -trl t?] G S 01 Importantly, tbouglJ, 
- 3 -
wb entba war had ended, a new mood took over: 
took ir:l~18nse satisfaction in tbe feeling that they bad mail1-
tain3Q tlF~ir national h onor, I.1 \'Iri tes historian Charl8s 
:D ;!.Jcnedetti, lIa nore full-bodied spirit of nationalism 
swept the country. " The peace mOv8@ent was learning a lesson 
J ohn Haynes Eolmes would point out a century later: that 
the irony of war was that "through its very effectiveness, it 
propagates itself. n3 
Soon after the war, a number of n ew, secular peace societies 
b egan to crop up. Ille most significant of tbese \'Jas the P..meri-
can Peace Society, founded in 1828 out of the New York Peace 
So ciety allcI the =·~;~)·3saC(mSGtts Peace Soci,sty. ~he APS became 
;:tb'3 fi:cst secular peace so ciety wi tll national aspirations. II 
~lS AP3 also included a large number of women; the imnortance . .. 
of ':v'O:i:;2TI in th c; b istory of the Arr:erican peace movement cannot 
be over-emphasized. Tlw j~P3 debated tbe issues of "absolute !! 
IJacifiso,ancl I!defensi ve if wars, and gradually enlarged its 
t'.embel1 s11ip. But tbe APS, and indeed the entIt:e U. S. peace 
:JOV2UGntwould soon be shattered by another of the traditional 
oDstacJ. (; S to pacifist ideals : tll ~ belief in th 8 11 justness II 




the greatest dread of military sunre-_ v .. 
n::;.c=n :":;-1,; J. ~1G. VI3 becoInG so despera te wi tll bope-deferred , th at 
e:'-:::'.-r·ry out (~oc:. ' s la':18 ••• I am cO.Ylvinced that tc1is is tbe great 
~, d' ~, . ., d .lly 19. ~;n l.L .. 
- 4 -
Child \vas not the only former nonresistant to give a + v 
least SO L,8 endorS8t!lent to the Civil Har. Forner · cdi tor of th e 
anti-war, anti-go\rern!nent Liberator, Uilliam Lloyd Garrison wrote 
a friend j!ZTow is no time for minute criticism of Lincoln 
':--L<~public anism ••• for they are in.struments in the bands of God 
Jco carry i'orlvard and help achieve the great object of eman-
cipation ••• the war is fearfully to scourge the nation but ••• 
grand results are to follow.!! The . conversions continued: 
nyou see bow warlike I bave become,!! wrote forner nonresistant 
and feminist AngeIiYla Grimke, lIO, yes--wa.r is better than 
slavery. l!. ~2b e AP3 backed tb e war: "A stranger, unapprised 
of the purpose of tbis meeting would have supposed it for the 
vindic8.ticn of the 'dar, rather tban tbat of peace,!f remarked 
one Eierao ,?r. Viol<3l1t feelillgs even ran high i"i.1 one man who had 
formerly accepted imprisonj'-~i3nt rather than serve intbe 
ridli tia: BTl:; ese lUssourians are not men. llhen I live with 
men made in God's image I will never shoot tbem;but these 
~/CO-Sl8.V cry ~'Iissourians O.1"e demons from the bottomless pit 
- 8.nc. me.y ba sho t v!i to ii~1punity. I! Finally, even fl1e..ny of those 
\'ibo cluYlg to tbe fi?~i tb ad;'li tted feeling an iPlpotence remarkably 
1ike th8': ,,/ : ic'n \'wuld , be expressed b7 pacifists during 'do rIel 
;·?1' II. '.·rot2 Gh8.rJ,eS K.rl1fpple: 
J_ stilJ_ ho16 in reGard. til<':: unjustifiablenes,s of i;Jal' •• • 
J.esc;lutely d-':;-GerTnined not to fight myself, and con-
tinl).1Jl :;; firFl ill -[:;118 position of advising no OTIC; 
c:ls -; ~~O fish t, I y l3 t rc cogi1i Z G -tIl:; fact that if 
~ , ~ J". '..L I t -'1 ~ 
SCI! ':'~: .. :)') y do s::..: no G Ilg'.1 iJ "'Co prev81!" G,]S SUCC!CSS OI 
-""].~ ,::'ia·'7r.>1101.i ·,·-" ", +1-1 ,Yi " "Till q-uc",a.p"! "nd b-('iil'''' -:-1.1 . ..., i.J :,. .' . _, _ _ 'Ii "-' ~ , • 0 " ;" • • ' __ I_' ~ v l ... .. . ..1 , . _ __ r....; L.. OJ ... ... L~ <""'!.o_ _ __ "-_, ~ ',J 1._ ', . 
"J1'J'::' ~' , :; nation UDder -ttl c: opi.:ratioli of tll e slav'e system. 
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A serias of violsi1tdraft riots marked protest to the \"Jar, 
blrt these Here, far removed from the traditional peace move-
rll~l1t, wbidl Vlas agonizing over means, ends, and n justifiable !! 
\'iolcmco. :Despite tll,? protests, and despite the existence of 
1 ,500 consci::::ntious o-iJjector~ to tbe war, the Civil l.iar 
movement . II 6 
After the 'Vial', the APS began slowly to rebuild itself. 
"'" 'lore radical group, tbe Universal Peace Union, was forr:1sd 
in 1866. Significantly, tbe UPUwas one-third female, and 
featured S'ltch p:corninent members as Susan B. Anthony, Lucretia 
~:'ctt, BelvL Loch:v!Qod and Lucy stone. Althougb by the 1890s 
J(~} e UEt] would beco;:ne !:tl1 e 1!10 st visi ole cente]:' of non-sectarian 
~j.?,cifist action in tllO country, 11 even in this period Htb e 
l·':,i::'·:loe:cship of tll e U:2U renained. snaIl and its influence mini-
l~1s..1. u StiJ.l, 11 elred prOTJote a wider nDn-violent ideo-
1Jgy th an that of the APS. It stressed Christian love, opposed 
c;",!)i tal punislrment, opposed military drills in educational 
i:'lStitutioi1S , atJd op};y:Jsed co~C'por81 punisbmej1t botb in tbe scbool 
- <'\1"1:1. bomiC;. .Al trJOugl1 it ",JaS skeptical of socialism, th eUPU ,,·ras 
uf :p8rsonal a.nd natio118,1 aubition , prefe:cr'1ent or pride, and 
~~l-!;:; mutil;"tion , tOTture and death of men from the lower classes 
i8 less an object of consideration than the ElO11;:;Y required 
~:;J:' their o::':'-nLi-pn2nt and. support. as soldiers .!l7 
- 6 -
L)'~o COUIUSlon dUl'ing the Civil \[8;r, tbis consciousness allovlsd 
· Jc1,:r'l to see tb e S·'Janisb-Ar!1eric3.l1 Viar and tb 3 :?ilipino-American 
:.!c:.r wi tb greater cla:('i ty. Opposition to tb e forrwr ... "ras . fairly 
U111Jopular; Tj?U leader Alfred Love was burned in effigy over 
b is organization's d ,enounciation of the war, and the UPU 
never completely recover~d from the ensuing attacks upon it. 
But protest of the :i!'ilipino Vlar was more successful, and soon 
tllereemerged a broad-based ~nti-imperialist movement. 8 
The movement emerged in the spring of 1898 in reaction to 
reports tl]2.t Anerica was planning to annex the Philippines • 
. " 
::::'tle coalition which opposed this included traditional peace 
groups, fe~ninists, mugvrumps, black activists like Booker T. 
~:8.sb ington, Vlhi te supremacists like Be.TI Tillrn~, and labor 
leaders IE: ,:: Samuel Gompers. Needless to say different people 
involved themselves for very different reasons. Still, eruption 
of the war nade the Anti-imperialist League a national move-
ment of over 30 , 000 members, the largest anti-war organization 
p':?r capita in U. S. history. In 1899 -- previewing things 
tbat woulO. CODe in later years, -- ?ostmaster General Emory 
3Cli tb orde:::'1c~:l the r emoval of Edward Atkinson's anti-imperial-
iet ':lritLl::';s fron mail s8nt to tht~ Philippines. Th e ensuing 
outcry was S'J great, however, tbat the government had to back 
dYlm. Unic,x--'cunately, the contradictory forces wi thin th e 
.,.cv::-!vmt pulled it apart. In the 1900 electiol1s most anti-
h:;:;,;eriali3ts supported W.J. Bryan but the. conservatives, in-
,::lw~~ing (; :~.r;j ~gi8 c1ist:cL<.s t sd and opposed bi!:l.. Also, by this 
- 7 -
t i ill2 thB U. 3 . Aruy had more or less crush e d th e i nsurrection. 
B~ t\'12en 250,000 and 600,000 Filipinos died because of th e 
\" ~ 'i' , 0:; ', _ , 
eas:,/" 
but th e U.S. lost only 7, 000 men , and I-I cKinley won an 
re-el ection. 9 
In t'n e early years of th e T','lentieth Century , a new element 
ent ered the movesent: large, sometimes heavily funded, con-
servative and legalistic peace organizations. The origins 
of th ese groups VJ ere in th e Nineteenth Century Arbitration 
Leagues . In the decade before World l,r{ar I, 45 peace societies 
ivs r e esta::.'l ished, including those wi th names like the !merican 
3cci e ty o f I n t ernatio!1 8,l Law,and the American Society for 
oTuc5 i c2.al :)st tlenen t of International Disputes. Less obviously 
l1 a~ ,;e G. , but in t-il e SCl!'rJ. e i d eologica l ballpar~ were the American 
:3CClOo'l Peace Lea.gue t he ',J ew York and Chicago Peace Societies, 
and, rJC3,ny o t ll ers 0 In 191 0 , the l{orld Peace Organization was 
cJ~/:; at ed 8.:}O_ lf han dsomely :orovide d for " by publisher Edwin 
Ginn , and i 'J 1910 and 1914 respectively, Andrew Carnegie did 
th2 s a']? :C.] :::, t b:::; Carn egie }:njownlen t for International Peace, 
an d the Cburcc} Peac e Ll1i'},[1 . ~hes e groups were more cautious, 
;:-m d S9:':1 tlL3"l.3el v ,: s as being more !!practical!l than previously 
~]XL3 :~ 2. '-1 ~ .~') ' :,e C~ or gal1 i z::;.-t i ol1s. ':21; e~! desi r ed to move pe ace 
v/ ;: r:. : J::o:'ail 1~:>'; ~!-tL,-< s l1 taJi -C:;T to rationality. 'f One ~;12asure of this 
- 8 -
10 
S c>r>-u'r"'u-1 f! ....... v . ~.... • 
i\.epresenting another equally "practical il and elitist school 
of thought were the rising nwnber of groups whicb favored 
formal world organizations as the best plan to ensure peace . 
This category can be broken down into two subdivisions: the 
truly federationist groups that favored international governing 
bodies with police powers, and the legalists, who merely 
called for a World Court and more formally codified inter-
national law . Tensions and· differences existed vd thin and 
between these groups, but they were often smoothed over in 
favor of stressing similarities. And similarities abounded . 
1bese groups tended to sbare a Progressive (in its contempor-
ary m ,~aning) political ideology, believed that .Alnerican insti-
tutions cou'ld and should be adopted for the world system, and 
had· a vaguely naive faith in man's progress. People in this 
category also tended to come from a narrow social base . 
Usually, they were Wlli te , urban, Anglo-3axon, protestant and 
professional. Elitist to the core, they avoided mass CaL'l-
paigns, as well as contacts with socialists, immigrants or 
labor groups. ,AI thougb World War I put a momentary damper 
on t'Ij ei::::, r,lOVG!11?11 t, tll ey would soon reap-pear to back the IJeague 
ofi\!s.tions, and they a,nel tbsir ideological descendents would 
r'eLlai~l an important part; of the evolution of the U.S. peacG 
maven :;1:1 ~c . 11 
!.: . 3 . e11 ·tI~~.r i n to 'dorld ~·;ar I in ll.pril , 19 17 , splin tared 
tbt:: P38.C(; mOVGI!12nt . In 191 Ci, antirdli tarists lJ8.d formed 
AUAr·! v.,as a pro-
- 9 -
gressive, social reform group. They declared toat their rigot 
to protest wa.r ca.me from unemployment on tbe v!8.terfront, toe 
misery of ci ties, . and financial depression. There WBre limits 
t o their radicalism, ho\·vevsr. Toey announced that if the U.S. 
lncame invo1ved in tbe war, thGY VJould cea.se protest of it. 
Ideally, they wanted to the U.S~ to act as a neutral mediator. 
n.s. entry into the 1.var split the AuAil into the Civil Liberties 
Sureau(wl1icl1 beca.me tbe ACLU in 1920) and the Committee on 
IT::;tbing at All, whi ch, in 1918 becam e th e J.Jeague of F:L'ee lIations 
Association. Other progressives joined the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation (Ame:cican chapter founded in 1914), a reli-
gious absolute pacifist organization. Along those lines , the 
~;' ;; :iJrican l"i'riends 3ervice Com:ni t'~ee was formed in 1917. Legalists 
found a home in tll e newly-created \'lorld Oourt IJeague, and in 
a :r1ore fea.e:cationist style was theI;eague to 3nforce Peace. 
'.Hlsn th e dust bad settled, the groups opposing th e war were 
the l"OR, tli8 CLJ3, tlle AFSC, anti-war socialists, some independent 
Tadicals, and a faction ofth e ''lomen' s Peace Party (formed in 
1915), ~hich split on the issue. Supporting the war, not 
mJ.rprisiDgly, was ' tl:! e Carnegie Found2.tion, \/OOS 8 slogan was 
".P2ac2 tl1rOlJ.gh VictcryH: IITbe most effectual means of pro-
u; o ting ::1 ch;.r.:lb1e international P"0ace,:I tl1S'y wrote, !lis to 
"9:::0 s,:~cut ;:; tll e Vlar a ~:ainst tb 0 Imperial G(~r:rnan gov'2rnm ~:m t to a 
.nne;.l v.ictory for d ·2Ctocracy. 1I Joining the Carnegie ]!'oundation 
in supnor-'c \'lS're tb e CPU, ttl e APS, and the LE? .:~;ven within 
this position t l1 ere were differences. ,!!'or exar:1ple, tb2A?S 
of the latter in-
- 10 -
cluded provisions for economic and military sanctions. Tbe 
APS felt this was going too far. Others felt the L~P did not 
go ~ , 12 Iar snout;n. 
If this splintering, in-fighting, and war support among 
peace groups was not already bad enough, tbe peace movement 
soon L;und itself under unprecedented repression. On June 
15, 1917, the ;:;spionage Act was passed, which made liable to 
confiscation any literature which "Would cause "insubordination, 
disloyal t~r, or rnutiny" in th e military, which opposed draft 
or enlist1;lcn t services, or which m ~ ght tlembarrass or hamper 
the govcrnr:1c?l1t in conducting the war." J~ven before this act 
had pass ed , mail had been censored and several people arrested 
for lIpub1ic criticism of the ?resident" on the basis of a 1917 
statute wbich applied to written or spoken threats of bodily 
barm to tb8 Presicient. A COl~lmi ttee on Public Information Vias 
set Ul) tC) control tbe press and public opinion. The Secretaries 
of 3tate, \','ar, and Havy were on the Committee. The CPI had 
.foreign and domestic brancbes, and div-isions covering news, 
films, indu3trial r clations, civic and educational groups, 
and even state fairs. The chair of the CPI, George Creel, 
.:;x-plai !ii ilg t;'nat t1h'.) Pr8sident had said, "th ere could b,3- no 
':",lC~'l tld .. ·I'~~ , tCl2.t it "!as insanity ." 1'/i1son, sounding a l10tS 
1.-;'h icl ! b::"8 2c':'oed in eV'3r~i decac.ls up to the present, referred 
t;J tll r.: P rJ 8',," intri8u'::? , tll e intrigue for peace lt b eing conducted 
"tb:: ,c1-g':'::rts 8nd cJ.uIJes of tli s Imperial GermangiJV8:cmnc-;nt. ,,1 3 
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Anti;:Jar and antLlili tarist journals, neivspapers, and 
ma,:;azines were banned f~om the mails. Cen sored DublicatioY:s 
included: lTasses; the Vomen's International League for 
reac,::) 8.nd Freedom.' s Four Itights; th'2 Apneal to R::;asol1; the 
the -r'ation (for criticizing Sam Gompers); the Freeman t s Journal 
(for reprinting Thomas Jefferson's writings favoring Irish 
independen6e); the Irish World (for writing that Palestine 
would not beco ~rle a J3\'/is11 state) ; the iJorld Tomorrow (a reli-
gious pacifistE1agazine edited by Norman Thornas); and a C:LB 
pamphl -2t \'1[1io[; ori ticiz2d mo1) . 14 vlolence. 
Tll 2 j",.U.i1J'T "J8S ilnestigated in 1917 over two pamphlets. One 
of these was by ]oger 3aldwin, and included a request to 
consci entious objectors that tC]GY send letters to the Secreta.ry 
of ~ar stating t h eir position. Ultimately t h e Justice Depart-
'fie nt rulsd bot;] parrlphlets legal. In _ October, ?ostmaster G-:meral 
Albert }3urJ.son announc'd the criteria for censorship: publi-
cations viouJ.d b <:; censored if they implied "tbat this governrlent 
got int·;) tlJ.?~ v/2r \'Jro~lg, that it is in it for the wrong purposes, 
or al1ytlJins tr.8.t will impugn tlle motives of the Government :for 
( 
. , 
' ·1:::: -~. r-!...L- r· , 
ty '-"~ _ '-' '-' ~ • tbis govern-
::mnt is 8. tool of ~'/8.l1 3treet or the muni tiOllS mal(ers. That 
kind 'J --'" I . 
;::l-!.1 i.1 b::co::: ·::ls ;.;~ 3:9iri t of o. isloyal-l:;y t11rougllOut tbe country." 
" .. 15 
.: ·8 . '-.:! _ " 
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?Grmer Ambassador LTames Gerard '.vas quoted as sc,-ying 11 . ,'(:: 2hould 
hog-tie every disloyal German-American, feed eve~y pacifist 
y:aw If!Sat, and hang every traitor to a lamp post to ins0,Y.' '-:: 
success in tlJiswar. 'l E'ugene D?os got a ten 'ysar serJi:; -; ::v-:o 
for an an tiwar speecb in Can ton, Ohio. I!l~' a do zen A~ :::':-ci can 
ci ties II wi t'c:in three mon th s of ij. S. en try in to th e war, peace-
ful asserl1blies of citizens were 2ttHcked by mobs of soldiers 
and sailors. Some of the violence had ugly racist overtones. 
Not only were German-Ar:lericans attacked, but -in ~;:ast st. 
Louis blacks were beaten, drowned, burned and lynched. Over 
60 people were banged or burned to death by mobs during ',;orld 
'::ar I. - "In travelling about your country it dces not seem to 
me that you 'nave a surplus of democracy, " commented 8.n .~nglish 
l"iFF member, lIcertainly not enougb to warra,nt e xporting any of 
it. 1I It is little wonder that tbe CIJB was created "to main-
tain something over bere that will be 'Hort}} coming back to wb en 
- 16 
the weary war is over." 
"The pacifist during the period of the war ••• was sick at 
heart ••• " wrote ' Jane Addams, "No one knew better than we how 
feeble and futile we were against the impregnable weight of 
public opinicll,tbe appalling imperviousness ••• t h e universal 
confusion of a world at war." In the same vein, HIr:e years 
of 1917' and 1918," wrote Jobn Chambers, "represented mth 
the peak _ of c13dicatiol1 by a relative h8.ndful of pacifists 
and tbe nadir of the scope and impact of tbe ~eace movefJent 
as it wi tb 8red under ttJ e forces of alienation and repression. H 
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~oe peace mo vement, which had always experienced internal 
rifts and weaknesses , had now been sub j ected to a mil itarized 
public and a repressive government. It would not be the last 
ti r'l8. 17 
Heanvll1ile, at Oberlin College in 191 7, a studen-'c named 
D-:;vere Allen had founded and edi ted an antiwar journal called 
the Rational Patriot. Allen would go on to become an editor 
of t1Je ';iorld,help edit the Nation far a year and in 1933 , 
start tIle Vorldover Press, an antiwar news service that could 
cJai~ t o reach millions. The ~orldover Press remained active 
through tbe Korean ~'var, and Allen became one of the most 
important figul~es in the movement, adding a socialist per-
sp8ctiv2 to his pacifist analysisc 18 
Altllougb not everyone ha.d such long-lasting success, 
t~e majority of tb e interwar ;yaars were, at least superficially, 
a tr~mendously successful period for the peace movement. Of 
gr8at i mportance was the massive disillusionment wi tb 'dorld 
' : 8.-;: I, VJhich set in soon after, the "'far end (~d. Increasingly, 
it c:<3.me to be seen as having been an utterly senseless slaughter . 
i\ variety of antiwar 1i terature came out during and just after 
t '(j p 1;} t=> S ,L c>rn '1?'YOO"t1 t" 'ov __ ' _~~ ' .• _ L..,~. ..I_...t..,L. J ~:;ric'n Remarque ; 
::]1 :? " ~nor·!'!;)lJ.s 1001'1" by e. '3 . cUEmlings; ' Three So1diers by 
.:Phn Dcs ",lassos ; and li12 i:l Y oth ers. T1uni tions mak9rs tODk a 
;~')~ci al lJc ating i n Iron, Blood and Profits; 'Pl1 e Profi t f3 of "Jar; 
r3,nci ;': erc1"J~1:tts of D,~ath: .Qrl§. Hell of a Business, whicb became 
:: "D '::S"t s 'oll;::.~ for tl~s ?>ook of the lIont'n:!}ub. 'li'in31ly t'nere 
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\'. 31.'e boo ~\:s 01 picture s, sncb 2.S The Horror of It. Pacifists 
~ere sudden ly being joined by a large section of society 
in bemoan ing the awful, futile .. . ,.. 1
0 
ln Justlce OI ",ar.. J 
I:e mn.;h ile , Devere Allen and others continued t o add a 
socialistic analysis to their pacifism. Kirby Pa.ge, the 
f!?acifist historian," along witb Horman Thomas -- the original 
executive secretary of tbeFOR, and later Socialist Party 
PresidentiaJ candidate -- argued that the social structure 
crsatedby unrestrained economic competition made internationalism 
practically :impossible. Th e socialist and pacifist president 
of the HD": Republic argued that " capi taliS1f1 lies bebind the 
nati onalis~ , that the intereSts of the capitalist are what pro-
dUC8 t he insistent, insidious, persuasive, automatic propa-
ganda all th s th:s that our cOlJ.ntry is better than others and 
the.t we bav: to enforce our superiori ty in some wayan tbem wi tb 
aili tary strengtl1. H (ther pacifists argued that war could only 
1)2 avoided \,/ i ttl li th e reorganization of our whole system on 
ttl S basis of production for use and not for profit, with the 
'!}" <:?cl s of ·;~1·l S world and not of particular nations in view." 
_ ';ven tbe ?CR. was sufficiently influenced b;y all tbis to question 
". ,<!y tll":.ir ~}tand Dn indu:3trial struggls Has so equi va cal: "per-
w",; s n el l of eli vid ends, fl sugg,?s tecl one member . 20 
?olitic:.=J,l:_Y-l'! indcd pacL,:'ists a'Yld intern'::l.tionalists in 1927 
_>:C::i~ci 2.n :" fI ti-i:n.p 'co rialist coalition on tb e issues of 
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of Congress sbocked the CoolidgE administration inte sof~0nl~g 
i ts position en rf ic:a.ragua, and sasing its dSFlanos 00 : ' r:~x i(; c. 
PS':W8 workers 'had for on ce successfully applied pre'l C"Ji ti ve 
d .. 21 me lClne. 
Anotter outgrowth of this increasing politicizGtibu was 
a questioning of the religious basis 0: pacifism. ~I hold t~ 
a religious view of life, 1I argued Devere Allen, I'But I 
have Ii ttle Gent toward official Cljristiani ty ••• and it seems 
to me that this continuous Jesus emphasis is justly offensive 
to equally fine people of other faiths, and, moreover, leads 
to a perilously close :reliance on Jesus in B,n autrwri tarian 
sense." Allen led an ongOing battle to have th e subtitle of 
the i:forld Tommorrow -- ,·!hich always meationed ~;esus or 
Christiani ty -- dropped, and eventually su cceeded. ;~gain, 
surprisingly, this debate even spilled over into ~e lOR. 
Their youth section, the Fellowship of Yeuth for Peace, split 
from the parent group because 0 f the younger organization' s 
less religious bent. Ultimately, in 1929, the FC~ exe cutive 
committee proclaimed "that the limitation implied by the use 
of the word Jesus in the Statement of Purpose tends to make 
the Fellowship exclusive and sectarian. " ,::) oon the .7CR began 
recruiting J evis, Ca.tbolics and generall:, i!broadening tb e 
basis on which the Fellowship rests. ,,22 
~ithin this wing of the pacifist mo vement debates continu~d, 
not only about ii1e theological bases of pacifism, but on 
national iSSUGs, such 8 .S th e increasingly violent 1200r strtJggJ_"? 
at borne, and international issues, such as the Civil W8r in 
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striking coal u iners in rarlan CountJ , ott ~r, di ff ?r p~ t 
thBse other groups sal·v t"L<:;rnselves as r::-for ;'~ C'rs, tl ; ':: .ir i r>?::-
mo re radical counterparts. Increasin gly, these no r ~ ccn~ ?r-
vative groups came to oversh ad ow , at I'cast publi c ly, other 
pacifists. 
In this category were many of tbe sa~e s orts of org2~izati on8 
that bad existed before th<:; war. ~he J 2IP, th e A?S, and t t s 
American Society of International T,2\'j all s upported int0:::':lati o':1&l 
legalistic and/or judicial forms. Absolut e J_y not r s i'ori;ist 
or "idealistic, " these goups feared internation al class-
based ideologies and actions, and wor%e d to upbold ttjS status 
!l.£2. of state systems and property rela.tionsbi ps ~ r' ore !'re-
formist" groups concentrated on mo ral sv t~ority, a~ ~ , r ogr e ss 
along U.S. lines, with U.S.-styled institutions, infus e d with 
U .S.leadersbip. :[1h ese groups were tradi tionally outiHlistic 
about tbe future: "Women won suffrage , wooe:'] wo n prohibition. 
Now women are putting through the outlawry of war, 'I boasted 
the :",romen' s Peace Union. Eo derates vii t'b in tb e FOR and >TL?P 
were also attracted to this moral , bptimistic, utopian, natio~-
alistically cl'l 8uvinist platform. Finally, 2. number of groups 
arose to back the League of Nations, includi~g th e ieagae ~c f 
liations Non-?artisan Association, the ?ore ign Policy ~ssoc i at iGn , 
an d th e "!orJ_ d r-s 8.c e Foundation . TheS e groups ,vanted t c r8-ti~~·.n-
aliz8 , or, as th ey put • .J.. l G, "defini tize I, vlOrld order. 
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social cbange \rlould bave to com,'j, but t;-,is cbang2, 2.nd tb·:; 
resul ting world order, was to 0e run by 2/:pcrts. '!:2": S s \!Crd 
'V'Jon't do the job any more,!1 wrote:; histori2.Tl CrJ<".:rles """'2rd , 
sovereignty, riglits of man, dictatorstJip of t'he !)rr)lct8riat, 
triumphant demccracy ~d the like is pure bunk. It will not 
run trains or weave cloth or hold society toge:;tbsr. " .·\g2.i.n, 
Arr:erica was seen as playing a major leaderShip role. ;.rthur 
Sweetser, a prominent official in the League Secretari8.t, wr,Jte 
that America I",as "the grestest co.heoive TJolitic.s.l unity i.n 
existence, the ricbest nation, tLe J:'lost highly organized, II 
and that America's Hideals and principles;~ flourisbr::d best by 
"showing them fu the whole world and urging other nations to 
follow. II ::l:b ese groups, the legalists, and. tll e reformists a1J_ 
rejected what they called the !1sentimentB.l internatione.lism" 
of the pre-war era, as well as th e more r2.dical stal1 ce of 
other p8,cifists of 'beir own period. These groups were 2.ble 
to weather the defeat of the League of Nations, and remain a 
strong force both vJi thin and outside th e pacifist COTilFlUni ty. 23 
The apparent strength of the pacifist uovement in t'ne 
19308 was overwhelming. As late as 1940, Franklin Roosevelt 
was still able to tell the American people tba.t <'I am a 
pacifist. You my fsllow citizens ••• are pacifists too. 'I In a 
1937 poll, when America.Ds were asked "If another vl8T like t he 
~'Jorld:'!ar dev(~lops in:<urope, should America take part again? " 













'tncourage its readers t CJ refuse Vi 8 T ~-iG'rv i en," saici .i .: 1:'~ rt 
?'?deral Coun cil of Cburcb es resolved in 1929 that ":;:~ ) ": 
rturcbE~s should condemn resort to th e war-sY8ti.'3~n as El f! and 
s'noulcl bencefortb refuse ••• to s2mction i~ , or to b0 u::j<?d as 
agencies in its support." A 1931 poll of Protestant cdnister s 
found 12,076 out of 19,372 agreeing that tbe Cl'lUrcri sr: ould 
never again sanction any war, and 8., poll ta!: en thre e J '38,rS 
later found even more ministerial ~acifisIIl. In 1935, 8. canv 2SS 
• 
of tbe Central Conference of Arllerican Rabbi fJ on the question 
of whetber it should arecommend to its lTIsHlbel's tbat they 
refuse to support any war in which tbis a:untry Elay :::m gage in" 
received in repJy 91 !lyes fI·.ivotes, 31 ilyes" wi tb reservations 
votes, and only 32 "no It votes. S:h e (' en tral Gc; nfererl ce, th e 
lTatio'nal Council of Jewish Women, and t11e IJati::nal ?r~de :r:'ation 
of ?emple SisterhooQ.s belonged to a mili tant peace o:C'ganizati ~) n 
until the late 1930s. 24 
Th e feeling spread toa wide v~riety of the population. 
In 1933, a poll of 21,275 stUdents in 65 colleges found 8,415 
pledged to absolute pacifism, and another 7922 1 wbo W'O'uld only ' 
bear arms in event of an invasion of the U.S. Cn April 12, 
1935, 60, noo students across the nation participa ted in a 
" strike:! aga.inst war, and a Hovember demonstration in 'Yew York 
alone drew 20,000. In 1936, approximately half a ~illion col1 0g~ 
and high sch ool students were reported to have left th eir 
classes and IJarticipated in pro-peace demonstration s. In 193,"·, 
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96,000 farFlers within tbree weeks. At its 1934 C01Jv i? [!tion, 
t h e Socialist ~arty adopted a resolution dccl&ring i ts o p poci-
tioD to "mili taTisr:! , imp8ri. alisr~, a n d war. " 
pr0:paredness for \f-lar'! could !Iue tolerat e d. by s 0c i ali s ts" ',ino 
the form of lI a general strike." Pacifist groups gained strerlgtb 
dramatically: the ;i.rII,PF, for exanple, SciW i tS "jcrpb'·:rsbi~) 
increase to 13,000 members in 120 bran che s . The Historic 
Peace Cburcbes were also very strong: in 1936 tr;8 u.s. had 
114,337 Mennonites, 93,697 Friends, and 188 ,290 Bre tt ren. 
J~ven tb e Communi sts go t on tb e p2ace banc.i'.\'agon, "mel. en jOYf?d 
brief coalition SUCC2SS . t~ th ' . -\12 () .2 I'.rnsrlcan _',sagup. j~gainst 
and Fascism, until their partners tired of their tactics and 
left. Overall, pacifists were able to reach out in t h e 1930s 
to beb·,reen 45 and 60 million Americans. 25 
But things were not as good as th ey seemed. ~rl1 e invasion 
of Manchuria shook the movement deeply. The National Peace 
Conference was created as a coordinating body, out it was 
soon taken over by the :2;mergency Peace C8.mpaign, \AJ'n i ch was pri-
marily run by tIl e FOR and the AFS8. Th eSe groups ca':, 8 to lo ok 
more and more to the political c enter, as the l e ft f ell in-
creasingly into disarray. The Communists had succes~fully 
aliena.ted nea:r-ly everyone else in the AIJA\JF, and tb A Socialist 
Party \'las rid.dled vii tb factions. IIest Ylotably, fro:'n tbe pacifists 
peint of view, was the S2's attempts at intervention in t h e 
Spanish Civil War. Th e 3 PC called for n eutrality, economic 
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cO:Jp:::r2.tion, and. strGYlgth 2ning del'1ocracy at b Olile. 3ut tir'12 
waB moving against tbem. 
'''''CT'a~Sl'na''T t'c)P antiwar forces found tr1':~msGlves v/it'b .J..u _ ,~c:t· .-b . .J.." , _ 
political bedfellows. National Council 
for t~L:' ?:cevention of idar, a liberal group, and tb i~ l'1I.LPF 
worked with t h e reactionary isolationist bloc' in tbG Senate 
in passing tbe Neutrality Act. A more conservative mood was 
hitting tbe country. Since the 1920s, pacifists bad been red-
bai ted by sucb groups as tb e :tCey men of America (dealing wi tb 
radical and subversive movements), the Military Order of 
florId. '.:81" I, tte 1\:'18rican ::..J ,~gion and otl18rs. In the 1930s 
i -i:; got vlorse: ilimyol1s vlilling to pursue the ••• lists of 
Conmu:1i :3t orga.nizations and leaders named side by .side· wi th 
!'Peac8 H organizations and leaders, as cooperating and official 
supporters of such communist-organized and controlled affairs 
as tb '; v a rious Congl'8sses against war •• ~ cannot doubt tbat 
tl.1:; lXlCifist and Revolutionary l'l:Jvements are linked together 
\'ii tb b o o ps of stssJ ~~ vlJ:'ote :::;li~abetb :Dilling in ' .!he Red 
~(;atrictdc J:'11i8 was ironic, as t(18 Spanish r;1vil \'lar, increas<:)d 
In fC'..ct, Lh :J ~H? tlJc::,t l'2:.El.i"(}:::d in antiw8,T groulJs soon fo und 
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wh ich would bavu r8quired a national 
order to dec:la.rc \'l£:.r. Al thougb 8CT~!e li1)(.;r81 p8.cii'ist:c; ~,~ 'rd ~;C ' : " 
socialists united iTl the anti-',var "Keep Imeric8. Cu~; c. :~' W<;T 
the war": tb2.t honor i'J'ent to a group called Amsrica 
America First was a rif::l}t-\ving org2.n izaticn 1tli t~) neo-
fascist and racist t~ndencies thc'..t called for lfa.n i .'.;;pJ:'cgn able 
defense fur l:..merica fl as opposed to fighting in ~urope. KAC), ';C; 
ultimately bowed to tbe greater popularity of this theMe witb 
tl1e public, \:'lhic'h soon caused the li'CR and AI'S::; to l:;;.cw e Ie/,C;; ' ;, 
and ..L.' IJrJe ~RL left soon after. In creasingly, th2se groups 
sbifted resourc e s away from poll tical lines hl order to pro-
vide for relief work and C.O. support. The VIIPF stayed in 
KJ-;.C'JC, rJut noted that it was !Ideeply concerned by a spirit of 
isolationism ••• narrow and bard TIc.tionalimn 0 • r8.cis!'! ••• ~ ~!ili tar-
ism." KAOWC soon went bankrupt, and upon TJ.3. entry into 
the war, America First disb2,nded !lin favor of victory!!: 
only t'ning to do now, :: said isolationist ,~enator Burton 1!lJ eel cr, 
l!is to kick the hell out ·of them.!' ./~gain pa.cifists l earnod 
tbat desires for certain social goals may conflict with the 
desire to avoid war, and that the desire to avoid war is not 
enougb to hold together groups that have very differan t 80ci&1 
28 goals. . 
In creasHlgly, as during tll e Civil ';:ar, U ;.., Cl' ''''l' ro · L.~, .L. c:1 .L Q vb Degan to 
question th8iT doctrine. Reinhold Hiebubr renounced -o2.cii'is::l 
as i1 s i;"lply n. vcr3ion of Christian perfectionism,!l andoppOS8d 
mandatory neutrality l egislation in 1937: 
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:C'2Iusa1 to take rif31:s only if we b,~lieve tbat peetc:: is al~vays 
prcferabL0 to the exploitation of the weak by th.::: strong. n 
Albert =~instein admj_ tted that !!':2h eexisteDce of t-dO great 
pmvers with definitely aggressive tendencies (.:;'el\·'~any and 
';?l)an) GCJ.;<: 8S an imrnediate realization of mOV'eIt1sut tovlards dis-
armament i8practical. The friends of peace must concentrate 
thair efforts rather on achieving an alliance of tbe military 
forces of the countries which have remained democratic. " 
S~erwood ~ddy, 8. leading religious pacifist regretfully C011-
eluded that !i ~Tothing ••• could stop them except tbe use of 
fo rce.!: n.abbi Judah ~~c"gnes, a former pacifist, declared sorrow-
fully tbe.t al t'nougb '!Iar Vlas im:noral Hv/e do not kIlO\'! what else 
+0 0'_0." r;H},":> C.' OCl·~"'ll·"' · '- iJa-("-J--,i l"'::>.'il·"inea' OI"-fl"Cl"aJ1"iT uro-ncu·.L.ral1"+y OJ ._l.v U .I a_ ~ ,,:)u -. ~--t.,v" _ \.~~ . (""~_ _ _..J.. ... ..... i ........ l., __ v, 
b-llt the p a rty was Seriously split over the \\'ar, "lith Horman 
::;:110 ;-:18.S \'Javering bet\"Jsen !I extrer:1e suspicion " of th e Allies f 
E:otives, and llbigbly criticEl support of the war.'; The Com-
mUDists \'Jc~re pic1{eting tbe 'Jhite House with their front group 
°A.ll i3rica.n ?eace rIobilization" cmd V!ere busy making plans for 
a ~~8:tionaJ. Peace~J8ek 011 June 21, 1941, the ver:I day Germany 
invaded R~s3ia; of course the C? promptly re-reversed its posi -
-'_.j r -1 be" rn' rabicUy pro-war. i-, __ Jl,' 0 In} __ Generally, the real pacifists 
'!j::~'e feeling t1}f; ir i:1potenc8: :' It is not wi thin ."LY personal 
1' (;'."'2 ):- to l! u.J.t -Cbs fl']od of p::3rsecl1.tion that rushes on its 
cl';vasto:i:,ing C01.JTSe t"Grm.1.gh Ge:C !:lallY, Austria and Cz ·-.;choslovakia,!1 
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~he dile~ja worsened for p~cifists as 
at one time or B.Dot·ber in tb sir lives hS.d vO'Vled n8V8:(' tQ 
fight again a:nd then wi tbtbe first trur~rpets fcund 1:''08.80ns 
as to why this war Vias different, I: wrote t i'jO I.l2.cifists. In 
Poli tical and. reforT;}ist pacifist groups increasingly saw tl1r;i:c 
zations g;rew apace. :f'11e li'OR inCI'2aSed its ; :lembe1..~shiI) :.Crom. 
4,271 in 1935 to 12,476 in 1941, with 4,000 of the new membErs 
prollortionate success. On the otl")er band, tbe lTCI":! a:ld the 
WILPF declined I:Jrecipi t0l1s1y, tll clatter lO$inE t'do-t11irc1s of 
its gre-war TilCiGOersl1ip by 1946. r ~l'n e :;?OR mlQ ':::,:11 8.ctu8Jly 
gained I:lemb8rS during -'cbe Vlar. ~Lere vTere9,OOO actj_v~ ?OR 
members in 1941, 2.:nd Just undsr 15,000 at the war's G,old. The 
1"lRL grew frorl! gOO Inembers in 1939 to 2,300 i11 1945. :~' (: C~ 
strength of tlJGse groups was in tt eir ability to "turn inward-
ly~! 'and accept thei:r status as a ,non-poli tical isolatsd minor-
ity. "Trusting in God, we meet tbis hour without disDay. 
De8pi te th3 l"ll~>ic:m fo~~· li~"'llmess and sin 1.1bicb IIl2,rk us all and 
bave sundered i:'.S into 'J2.rring TIe.tions, V18 c,reall cl"JiJd::cen of 
thG one )'8.tbe:.c, ';/ho is eternal God 8.nd 1;/008e narne j_ S "I.eve. 
love B.nd joy.'; I-1:sse ~:7ou'ps neittf5I' offici8.1J..y sup'~ort'2d nor 
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to YJ.:'otect and ' provicle cOI'lpa nionsbip f oI' tlv;FJselv8s :::::'1(1. ott, c,:,~: 
too e omLlon fe81ing of isolation -- in tl1~,; co:wnmi ty p.;nJ. in 
':!n 
, ..l -,-, ' " -'- L' l' ~\..i gro Ul)S may l1ave ClonG' lIl) S' Des (, v(] ey COlLel. 
non-interventionist, es did a numb8r of individual pacifists, 
and, significantly, a sizable chunk of American blacks. Still , 
the popularity of tbe war made serious inroads on tbs pacifist 
cOi!!fimni ty.. J:lu'ee cuarters of all Q-uakers drafted refLl.88d 
c.o. status. In fact, only .3 of 1;i of t1Je 3L~ millic "(i ~:jl10 
registered in '.!orld \!8,r II chose C.O. ste.tuS. '::1epre ssion of 
pa.cifist grouIJs ' .'J2-8 mild compEu~ed to ~·: ,:~.rld ',.'?'J:' I, 8.1 trJougb 
tbere'\'las a crackdmm on iJ8.cifist -teachers, end tba I~.li11ois 
:Bar denied entry to a pacifist lawyer. C'Tsrs.ll, it V1G.S not 
repression, or even the usual internal differences and weak-
nesses of the peace mov ement that plagued and hauntp,d pacifists 
during durld'·;'clI' II; 1" -'-_v the old dile:m:l8. of a 
.,, ~ 
if J"ll C! + II \.',.-, '"(' ;> I 
'-IV ~<o,_. 
n:rhe proble!".l is nDt ho\'l to get rid ef toe 2!lOJny , " VTcote 
iiiccclo J:ucco ill 1945, ffbut rather ho\·., to g e t rid of tl:H~ last 
victor. For '\\:llo.t is a vj.ctor but one \'100 b8.s 1e2.rnsd tbat 
viol ence: '.Yorks? '.n:JC viII tsacb hiD a 
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at ~Tew York ' [; Gi ty College, pl'Gviously 2. [JO tbed of 2ntiwa!::' 
'appeasement" rapidly becarnc sync ncmous 1:1i tr1 "paci f ifJr;r. Ii !l i:> e 
Vincent Peale remarked in 1944 t hat 
against war we a llowed ourselves to get i n to ~uc~ ~ pcsiticn 
t 02. t we vJere totall~T unprepared, thus giving thE: Gf~ r,nans an 
opportuni ty to make tlJis war. ~i33 
Significantly, .the U.S~ bad come ou t of t'b s '::fEU' comparatively 
well. Of the SO million casualties in \~rld War II, only onc, 
million of th ese '.'Jere American . American battle de a ths were 
roughly three times tb e number of auto fe,tali ties during the 
same period. The war helped the U.S. finally pu11 itself O'Ll"t 
n.L' D . --,.., "'--p. "940 " ~!l ' • ., l . , " 01 voe epreS ;:llon: U.0. LT1J l.TI. J viaS;~;;Iv Ol._L_l ()~'J, emu l't1 
194 " ".L . II· l. v had r eached 2200 billioD. ./lIn n ~ i C elil 
8.1'o2i t o:ci efly -- unprecedentscJ econQ]!li:~ opportv_'-·;itie s . 
Slzty-ninE; perccn t of ,,\:.sric8:(l s polled i.n /tugust 1 ?;[~3 said t 1Je,t 
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anxious , nors cormd tted to tbs usc of pbysic&l violf?j'lc~ for 
Slowly, pacifists tried to regain soms ~easure of rsspec-
tabili ty and acti vi ty • At first th ere \Jere sOi<1.e 8:0 ccu:caging 
signs: 
of -Cbs ~JIL?}!', and in 1947 it went to tbe ;";.)',3; . JJSCJil1c::S in 
tbs Llsmbership of tbs FCR and 1;/:"lL from tbeir \>!Srtime Ligbs 
can probably be best interpreted as a resl1.:. t of re12xinE 
t,sl1sions botb in the world and tte peace eOLu:mni ty. ;:(C:,dic:alisr:r; 
':Jas reintroduced into tbs })8.cifist LIO'Jement, in goed l)&rt due 
to tbe return of tbose vJ"bo b ad stayed -- and oecoue pcli ticiz(~cL 
in tbe CPS camps. Advocates of direct actiOl! suel as ~.J. 
38,Y2.rd Rustin h,=:lped push the WP.L into adopting a p:ccJgran 
favoring ltpolitical, economic and social revolutier; by YJOTI-
'liolel1t :meo.Yls .!l Dellinger and oth ers pronlOted direct Gction 
mediate result was tbe forwaticn cf the Conmittee for ~on-
;,:2.1·:ers took c), Gandbian approcwh , calling for nOrl-ccopero,t ion, 
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RicJ.:) H C:'Gainst segregation in interstate 
Another kind of pacifisill was catching on 2S w~ll . ~b8 
in 19 L:-7 
was 17,000, in 1948 it was 45,000, and in 1949 it WRS 45, 080 . 
an internatio112.1 police forc o, 8Xld by 1949 17 st2, t·;:. S' Gislatl..D~': -' s 
had passed resolutions favoring world government . ~ypifying, 
in t11 e words of Jon YoG.er, !ftb2 tl'c.di -'donal ,'rays in ':i(Jict1 Ame ::ci-
can ~dGals as suspended 'for tb e duration' of periods demanding 
'ree,lism, 1,1 tn e i.T-rg I'JaS plagued by all t':J ,'; 11 a'lls prss·2D.t in 
its ideological ancestors. An d despite its temrJO l'o,r:T popu-
lari ty, even its Hrespe ctable 11 conservati V8 ste.ncc v!ould no t 
save it from what was to 
~r 
)0 come. -
In 1947 , the peace movement r eached tte peak of its power 
;;!hen it b elpeci d:30i'e8.t the LJniversal Eilitary rrrainil:c; bill. 
A.tT _ >:uste described tbe campaign as "tbe only case vJbere c;. 
rec,lly effective coordination of pacifist forc es and Y),"')ar 
pacifist \'laS 8.cbieved. t! But tl'J e spirit of th e a Ge \'!8,8 cbangiD ::.:;, 
and a Cold ~ar beginning in sarncst . In 1943, the -~12rgency 
C;or.L;i ttes of A'l:oli1ic Scientists (vill ich -incJ.uded Sinstcin, Earo l r:. 
t'::ce~r, Fans Let~,.:;, .:?hilip I' io rse, Linus Pau ling, Leo Szilard 2.nu 












t 'o :J Soviet ~-. .,37 LD1o n •.. 
1• '_" 19 /17, +'(1 , 0) T ~,' . ~. d t' - TI" , , • -u - v _0 • ~ 8..l1YlounC G -(Je '~_'rU!n8.n .uOC"GTlue, 8XiCL c.cccrQ1nG-<1 
backed right-\'ling fOl'CGS in Gr;?c,:::e, 'J:url:<" o.n(l C~d_·r' ;:.::.. : 
Soviet , Union tigbtcned its grip on casterr) : ~ urop2.' -s (:: eYl ~-;lOst 
c.r8Jnatically in its engin88l~ing of tbe coup of C'z (;cboslov8..ki8.~-
and attempted to blockade 3erlin; in 1949 tbe GJSR exploded l~S 
first atomic 
finally took power in China; and nine months after that the 
ror an "'ar b -a 38 A e . \1 eg 11. 
Pacifists did not fare well from this. In 1942, the New 
-:tcrk Sun cbarged the 3ulletin of the J'...tc yn ic Scientists ':!itl] 
['1avingcommunist connections, and bad to 0 8 to.kerl. ·:to court 
to be forced into retracting the charge. Poacetihl 2 conscrip-
tion V18.S opposed unsuccessfully in 1948 0 :~lso, tLJe 1948 elccticn 
s-p1i t the 'Osace moveJJ1snt between Eenry' '.1o.l12.ce 8.ild I:o:cTTIan - - , 
Thomas, 'With tbe majority supporting the latter, IYLlt -iii t b 
both recording disappointing totals. Interestingly, some 
pacif:i_sts, i Dc:luding such :T1ovement stalwarts as Dwl.2:';bt 
: =acDcl1ald found 
t o be tbe strC:;i;.J that broke their pacifist will: ;':8, cDon2.1c. 
1I1ost faith:! in pacifisu oecause ni t -could no t solve tllC proble:.: 
of tile I'll e ~2TIergen cJ Co In!'.'li ttst:; r"-. -P' \J..!.. 
L toruic Scientists :(:)11 in to inacti yi ty in 1949; and in ::: ; a'l!:C s ~; (; ? 
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:.' i ttnsr 18 , \,ft~ rO.S 
pa .. cifisfJ . u }1oy l(eple:c, Pea .. CC~nl a}:SrS Ol~88,n.iZ e r, J_[l.rn~~·(} ~.~;::d. tl1a't 
"tbere are practi (;8.l1y no ?es.c0!.1akcrs I gr':nll)S i'u.-n ctiOil i ng 
outs "d on ..L't1~ ('lJl'~ ~r"r-, ("11-:; \ -'..h c>-", .", leI u c; j U d. <;:;0, ••• , a ._.I~) ULJ \...1 .• ;:. are relativ31J f sw 
activities being carried out by individuals which are 
memberships of tb c JOlt and tb e \lrU, ~l umrnc:tted. !II' '12 b egun 
to fee1 at tl-Jis :point, simply to get pec ~[Jle to kno\", t 1.1 2.t tb c 
\'lord pacifism exists is no me2.n accoI'lplis11ment~ I! lanentocl a 
VlRIJ coordinator in 1950. J~ven the conser'vativ8 mrB' \'las not 
spared: it split with its equally conservative Studcl1 t vling, 
tb en sav! all its previous i'JOrk undone as state aftc:J:" state: 
repealed their endorsements of ','ferld goverYJ.JDents -- 16 bad don e 
so by 1951 ~ !:It a:ppeared ~ '!orld Jovernment l,'lould entail tbe 
surrender of n8.tio:nal sovereignty, II rei:1.:l::."'keu. tlJe Vi1'ginia 
General Assembly. In 1952, the Senate Appropriations ~ommitte e 
approved a bil~l_ denying funds to any organization w11 icb !!directly 
or indirectly promoted one world government or citizensbip. " 
Th e UWF hung on through the Korean Har, but in a much weaker 
posi tion. Former m'lF leader Cord r.:eyer Jr. left th 2 lLJF in 
1951 to join the CIA. All im all, the mood of tbe peac8 illOV8-
ment as it entered the 1950s was best summed up bi Roy ~epler 
who spoke of :le~ kind of despair among pacifists VIlJicL leads 
to inaction in ot1-: ~~c t112,;.1 little fellowship gr01..11)s of ;·mtu8.1 
~o 
('o·'-")'"(ll· sar~..Ll· <'. " "nr'! ''''~''r n)::;I ..., J. .' ... . ~ .l \. .... O. v u lJ u. s. . ~:.. J.. 'JC' • 
It was in this general condition that th e peace movesen t 
- 30 -
:::'c,r ourplJ.rposss , it is us eful to eli vide paci:f5 .. :~~, ': n :>T 
sb8.re of too history of t'n e peace fnovern. ont, 8.nd tbb:i~ '.re 1).leI 
go ...... _y .; + ;s '.':"os:-:;"o.'1_Lc> .LtJO' ~""" (-~-"e v· r l' cl '1'" -L ".,' r ~v ~ ~ __ -L ._ G~~ v. d 1 ana ~18~lncv SUOU1VlSlons, 
and 0 ccasionoJ_ly, SO :Fi8 organizo.tions and indi'Tidua1fs _ .. , ~ .. d .• J • 
Euste, for exa:nple -- cut across thes e clc!.fJsificctticns. ?ut 
the four basic schools of tbougl1t tbat had infJ..ucTl(;r:-;cL 8!"Jd 
v!ould con tinned to influen ce tb e 'p·~ ac Gl rnov .=;Llent fro L tll 2 
Revolution to tbe Kor ean War were these : 
1 
(1) Heligious and absolute ~ifism: People 1.'ii "t'nin 
tbis grouJ.: simply found W2:r: to be incompatible vIi tll t>ei:c 
deeplJ'-hel~ religious or ethical beliefs. ~'eace \12)3 see ll 2.8 
bound up with ends: n:rhere is no way to peace, U saL: t·be 
FOit, :Tpeace is tbe way.!! These pacifists tended to bang 
auto their beliefs more tenaciously tban any other grou.p, a.nd 
frequently found themselves to be practically t11 '3 only ones 
opposing a 'dar after the shooting had actually sta:ctecl. .'-'..s 
th eir doctrine was based on morality, th ey tended t o try to 
be 1iberal, Dutin general tbey W9:ce politically V8.gU2, c.nd 
usually prei\?rred individual vvi t n ess, small group support 2.nd 
p:c'otection of their o':m to political strategy or geals. In 
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involved with the sD8cifics of aGJ particu2ar war, h~t rather 
opposed wars in general. ~~'xamplS's of this sort of g:coup 
include the \'fRL, the :;:'0.2., and the AFSC. 
(2) World Fedorationist/1egalist pacifism: Lg~l~, 
mefmingful diffl?rences can be feunel 1.,Ji tbin -'-eLis g:CCUj), bV.t fo:~' 
.~" . 
', ." ilS group . 
includes all organizations that wor}:ed prir:1ELrily for BOEj,;? forll 
of international go ve::Cr1fCion tal or legal institutions 28 a 
method of settling international conflicts sbort of war. 
These groups attempted to be more ilrealisti8 i1 tban otber 
pacifists, and in fs,ct did enjo:/ sorne SlJ.CCE~SS in in:tluS'ncil1g 
large sections of public opinion, an dperl1s'ps even go v (=;rTI:::len t 
policy -- after all, there is today a Uni ted I:ia,tioTIs, 0, "Jorld 
Court, etc. Unfortunately, tbese groups he,d a number of 
serious internal flaV!s: see tba .. t .L' ~t1 e 
measures they advocated codified existing relationsl)i~)s, tl1us 
upholding the status quo ineQualities that frequently figured 
heavily in causing wars; along these lines, people of this 
school were unprepared to deal VIi th the idea of internal revo-
lution, the most notable example in tbis Deriod of course 
being tbe U.JT.' s refusal to seat Red Cbina; they were uns.ol2 
to see that the rest of the VJorld did not necessarily want 
A~ieTical1 values and institutions forced upon it; and they 
Vlere unable to see how a '\!orld Federation, like th c l7. ~T. could 
b e manipu18,ted by ttl e interests of one bloc of countries 
8;ga5_nst a:not11er -- v;hicli v1Ou1d raise auestions 8.bout the 
!i justness!! of VieTS or i"ailitary sanctions conducted by sucb an 
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type were shocked by how easily -'T ,.., U. :,;. public opinion 
turned against tbeir ideas. 
Of tll s groups in tbis catogor:r, t1v~ U';::? 1:18.S t;b (: .:;0 ut Sl(;-
nificant in tbe ea~cly 1950s. 
'~) ~.? Social Activist uacifism: Ti'rom tll e aboli tinnL:.-ts te: 
overlap of rS.dice.l 2.ncl lJacifist causes. .., . T .,ven li. '- • 
a fling wi tb ='rotskyism. People vii tbin this °TOUD tClicled to _ (;) .. 
oppose war from tbe basis of a political, social and economic 
analysis, 2.S well as for ethicaI reasons. Altbough t'nese groups 
and individuals by and lcn~ge had the mOBt accurate and coherent 
political analyses of the causes and n8:ture of th~:: weTs, and 
t'[JUS ina certain sense i:lere tbe most i'realistic, 'I tb eLe very 
c01')cern wi tb oth9r for;ns of oppression cansed tbem ireqLl.::mtly 
to end up advocC';.ting violence as being Ilnecessaryl'. in certain 
given circumstances. If war was the price to be paid to end 
slavery or defeat Hitler, then war it must be. Increasingly, 
however, with the Cold 'Jar dividing the . world into ~ftV!O armed 
carnpsl1' the lines of what a 'ljust vlar" was bacmae more and 
more blurred. r'lcmy sinceroly anti-totali tarian social-activist 
l)acifists found tbemselves swept a'way into supporting th !~ 
rath er dubious iljustn ess Ii of Ameri can in terv'entioll in fa:::-off 
places such as ~orea. 
Tbese groups 
are quite distinct frou the rest. Isolationists tended to have 
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of G.S. involvementovarseas. Although tbey were believers 
in a strong defense, these people tended to question more 
over·tly inperialistic wars, such as.the debacle in the 
2.' hilip}Jines, and thus were frequently involved in the anti-
iDp eriRlist groups formed·in the period we have looked at. 
Occ3.sionally these groups l1ad racis t or neo-fascist overtones, 
such as t bers were in ALlerica First. Isolationists and other 
right wingers were also distinct from other tendencies within 
th2 peace ~oveillent in that they almost inevitably backed the 
u.s. to t1Je bilt when it actually entered a war. 
Tbe most articulate spokesman for tbis point of view during 
tbe Korean :oJar Vle.s Senator ~~3.ft. But isolationism \'las never 
+' Line sahe afts2:' World ;'!ar II, and Taft ' s posi tioD "JaS highly 
a::-:1biguous. 
7inally, the continuing acti vi ty of "JOI.'lcn and women's 
orgal1izcd~ions of va:cying ideological persuasions should be 
noted, as tbe se groups toot on a special .prominence during 
2e.(;ifists have tradition3.1ly bG ,?n faced \vi tt) numerous 
o,ivisiV G and probler'latical issuss: "just wars"; "defensive 
wars"; external repression of tbeir movement; a militarist 
,;,ubli c; qU'3 stions of 1:ihetb ·3r th ey should coni;ern th emsel ves 
.,, ' . ~ t'1'" s '! r~..!.. 'I1"'" "" ll" a-nd, _"LI" so, '['1, 0',·" '·IJ·_+'[]O'UT.'J s~ ''''c -; ;-L"Cll C~Ll,~16In;.:, ['~ ......E~o..) . ~, \ v ~LJ 
, . . fl" l ~ l"~' ~,'(" _rd +'(1P. o'J.d, ·P'L·',."'ble r·"._ OI~ +l-J "<> ·~ .L;"I"" ·::>.C'+I· V:::>YI~ss~. of '.: Ion In G ' ,.I :::; 1 C 0;, ~ u " .J 11 V _ - .. u ~ II -
- 34 -
tions i n ;:len]] pacifists '. minds, including lITany of the social 
a ctivists in th e p eace mov ement. ~h e rise of post-war 
::iili taris11 ~, mjd tll en ~·IcC8.rtllyism made tb 8 Kor'3an ~lar period 
a ·,l Gxa:JP1 :~ of t he next two problems as ',\.' 811. Groups that had 
[joel. to ::turn iw"rardlyH during iflorld \!ar II barely bad a chance 
to turn outvoJardly b efor e to ey were forcGo. to turn inHard1y 
.3gain . '::Cle l'l e ssoDs'? of 'dorld vIar II sgeflled to provide the 
1.11tinat s sxa;:-~p1e of tl1s "effe ctiveness of ':iar, II its occasional 
n ecessi t~r , andtll '':; in s ff (3ctiven ess, if not downright danger, 
o f pacifis:'i. :?i~l allJ , t he \1or1d Federationists and other 
pacifis·t 2 [Ho.d S ;:; 8Tl th sir dre 8.lTI come tru9 in tbe creation of 
tilS F·]i t ·Set L:ations c .And t b 2 l.llli t ed ] ations \iaS just about 
to decl~r e wsr i n Kc raa c 
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Chapter :2 
This chapter is not intended to provide an in~pth discussion of the 
Korean War in terms of its military history, its status as a UN war,'or of its 
"limited" nature. It is not intended to be a general discussion of the 
war. It is meant to provide three things: (1) a history of the origins 
. .. 
of the Korean war; (2) a basic chronological framework or . the war; and 
en a brief attempt at setting the war in its historical context. The 
bulk ot the chapter will be concem-ed with the first of these, because the 
facts involved are much less weH known than those concerning the war itself, 
and because a number of anti-war groups and individuals referred to this 
history of Korea from 1945-·tCl 1950 to wpport. their opposition. 
When the Korean war broke out on June 25, 1950, the act was nearly 
universally hailed in the U.S. as a detestable act of Soviet-inspired com-
munist aggression against a tlfree" and democratic sovereign stateo "That 
this may mean lifar on a global scale is trueo .. (but) when all legal and 
moral right is on our sideJ why should we hesitate?1I asked John Allison~ 
director of the Dirlsion of Northeast Asian Af.f'airs. A slightly less' 
extrezr.a version 01' this analysis dominated most of American thoug..ltt through-
out the waro Surprisingly, many of these assumptions still remain funda-
mentally unquestioned by many Modern historian&o.f' the Korean waro Admittedly, 
rome important questions--.sueh as wre ther the invasion was directed by 
Moscow--cannot yet be definitiVely answeredo However, to state unequivi-
cally that the attack was certainly SOviet-inspired is to be operating 
under some fairly rigid prior assumptionso What is most disturbing about 
certain accounts is what questions they choose to frame. The type of answers 
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one gets, as always, depends in great part on what questions one asks, and 
on what asswnptions are behind those questions. Historians of the Korean 
war frequently begin their story with the attack. '!he story is then told 
with the additional assumption-.o.either implicit or explicit-that no matter 
what was happening in South Korea, it was still "free", whereas North Korea 
was definiticmally aggressive and totalitarian. What is left is a his-
tory that is itself a product of the cold war assumptions of the period 
~ 
it studies. Another major f1aw in many sources is the tendency to -judge 
American actions solely by the efrect these actions have on America, as 
opposed, say, to third parties like the Koreans. '!his chapter will look 
at some of the aspects of the U.S. playing cold war politics in Korea, 
and what the re sul ts were. Specifioally, it is cruoial .. to analyze the 
first few years of the .American occupation, looking both at American policy 
and at the internal poli tieal, economic, and social forces in Koreao 'lhesa 
are the origins oftha Korean war. l 
One of ths important problems wi. th the standard thesis is whether one 
could really consider North Korea and fuuth Korea to be two separate 
nations at this point. Korean nationalism was constantly being given great 
importance by all contemporary observers of thesi tuation. "The tact 
seems to be that all Koreans want their country to themselves in their 
life time and will not have any form of foreign tutelage (in order) to 
attain an alien standard or nation", said William Kangdon, a State 
Departlrent advisor, and the literature on this period is filled with such 
observations. The 35 years under ,Japanese occupation had obviously greatlj 
whetted the Korean appetite for its previous independence-as a united 
na tiono Koreans were extremely wary ot the prospect of foreign rule or 
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interrerence. Geopolitical cQftCerns of' other nations, however, were about 
to descend. 
2 
Korea was divided in the classic post~'12 manner of belonging to 
that nation which could occupy it. The f'act that the Soviets wou1d be in 
Korea Ct.l\lsed the U.S. to hastily devise a dividing line for occupation 
forces. '!be 38th parallel was chosen, in the words ot two ot the choosers, 
Bonesteel and !ask, "even though it was :fUrther north than could be realis-
tically reaChed by the UoS. forces in event ot Soviet disagreement" because 
"we felt it was important to haw the capital in the .American zone.'! Vhen 
the Soviets agreed, Ru.sk was "somewhat surprised." 'Ihe American "liberat-
ing" troops arrived on September 7, 1945. A crowd of' Koreans gathered to 
stage "an enthusiastic welcome" at Inchon tor the troops. Japanese troops 
:f'ired on the crowds, killing two and wounding ten. American General Hodge, 
in command ot the forces, commended the Japanese. It was not an auspi-
cious beginning.3 
T1)e Americans hardly entered a political vacuum, -although they 
may have wished or thought they had. In tact, the infrastructure ot the 
resistance movement had given rise to an organization ot local coMmittees, 
called People's Committees. By August 31, 1945, these committees maintained 
law and order and distributed Japanese property in 145 cities and villages. 
The resul ting government was called the Korean · People' s Republic (KPR). 
1he Russian aI7T1" allowed these groups to retain control in the lbrth. How-
ever the Americans refused to acknowledge an authority-in ~he South but 
their own. "The assumption by the Koreans themselves of the responsibili-
ties and functions ot a free and independent nation ••• will of' necessity 
require time and patience" said Trttman. Thus began the American occupation 
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a period marked by raciSM, oppression, and specifically' suppression ot the 
political Left.h 
"The background to and touchstone ot American policT making in Korea 
in the fall of 1945 was 'a .st~ong Le-ft that; as the weeks progressed. appeared 
to thrive rather than weaken under the occupation" argu.es historian Bruce 
Cummings ~ "Fla tly' stated, one of our mission s was to break Clown this 
Communist government (the KPR)". An American orficer in Korea explained 
tha t "when we came here we found the Korean People I s Republic in control. 
'!his was in violation of orders to let the Jap officials staY' in their jobs. 
, 
So we broke it up." Moderate historian Charles Dobbs argues that the 
Americans "had never decided whether they were liberating a captive people 
or occupying part of Japan's inner empire'J; increasingly the U .8. behaved 
like the latter.5 
Hodge announced in 1945 that Koreans who committed acts "hostUe to 
the Allied forces" would "surf"er death or other such punishment as the 
court maY' determine". "Take no chances, be warr or Oriental favors, and 
on the alert for the doublecross," Hodge s.y.mpathetically' warned his troops. 
Major General Hilldring at the State Departmmt actually classified Korea . 
as "occupied" category rather than "liberated." Soon a popular Korean 
- comment was that t~ "only real difference between the former overload 
and the present one was in skin pignentation." For his part, Hodge opined 
that "The Koreans are the same breed of cat as the Japanese~" 'Ibis sort of" 
racism was typical: I. gook" was the standard .American name for Koreans. 
Also, there was racism in the implication that the Koreans--who as a peoPle 
had:a longer hiStory of self-government than allY' North American or ~pean 




This sort ot thinking can easily infect t~e 
historian.'orexample,Dobbs makes the following argument: in repriMand-
ing Hodge at a certain point, Washington ncommitted a crucial error ••• in 
appearing responsive to Korean ptlblic opinion. Korea was held toga ther 
by the glue of authoritarian rule, and the attend~n~ use of force, vio-
lence, and repressive measures. :atpecting a continuaticn of such rule, 
Koreans found Hodge weak and undeserving of the ldnd of respect they had 
accorded Japanese commanders". Considering the strong resistance move-
mnt during the war, and the continuing attempts by Koreans after the 
war to crd~te~ a unified democratic gove~nt--e.ttempts that would be frus-
trated by the U.Sc and U.S.S.R.--this is a particularly poor rationaliza-
tiono7 
Meanwhile, according to historian Gabriel Kolko, liThe entire stra-
tegy of mill tary occupation and trusteeship was based on the assumption 
that the Left had power and that the United States forces were to prevent 
it from organizing in the Southlto MacArthur's aides claimed that the pri-
mary missi'on of the occupation was " •• 0 to form a bulwark against commu-
nism" 0 It was just a short step for Americans to see indigenous radi-
calimn as SoV1et-inspiredo "Communistic activities are reaching point where 
they may gain control unless positive is taken. Am sure most radical 
elenents are Russian instigated but cannot get positive proof" reported 
Hodge to Mac~lU-thur in November, 1946. Hodge advocated a denll."1ciation of 
the KPR--not even allowing it status as a, 'partyo "This will constitute 
in effect a declaration of war upon Communistic elements in Korea, and 
may result in te~ra:w disorders," he warned. Leaders of Peoples! Com-
mi ttees were arrested on trumped-up charges and replaced with right- wingers. 
Still, the popularity of the Left proved .difficult to repress, and the Left 
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remained by far the strongest force amongst the peopleo Modera te Historian 
lfilliam Stueck, refers to future South Korean leader Syngman Rhee in 
1947 as "the head of the strongest group in South Korea wi t.1. the possible 
e~c~ption ot the _c.2f!!MUD.is,ts..!," (emphasis mine). The latter appeared fI to 
have the support of at least a third of the popula tion lt until this sup-
port "dwindled substantiallylf due to "police efforts and a counter-propa-
ganda campaign.IIB 
, 
The Left was syste!l1'l tically excluded by the Alooricans from any degree 
of power. The Advisor,r Council had a 9-1 ratio of Rightists to Leftists, 
which "virtually reversed the actual distribution of poll tical ~nfluence 
and popular support .. 0 in the South.," The ratio on the Representative 
Democratic Council was 45-1. And Cununings "could not find a single in-
stance in which the Americans appointed a Leftist Korean to any responsi-
ble positionoll 9 
One of the major programs through which the U.S. exercised its power 
was the Korean National Police (KNP). Established by the Japanese, these 
police, according to official historians of the occupation, "possessed 
a breadth of function and an extent of power equalled by few countries in 
the modern world .. " According to Cummings, the KNP structure was retained 
because "there were no other forces that were at once cohesive and deter-
minedly opposed to the Left .. " Hodge believed only the police were capable 
of disbanding the KPR and the People's Committeese A revealing quote comes 
,from william Maglin, ~J\m9rican director of the KNP: "We felt that if (the 
KNP) did a good job for the Japanese, they would do a good job for USa" 
American accounts list the KNP as having been responsible for "all politi-
cal activities, news, magazines, public morality, strikes, foreign affairs 
and religious activities." Parades, demonstrations, publications, plays 
and movies all came under KNP jurisdiction. As early as October, 1945, 
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the pro-KPR Maeil Sinbo newspaper was ordered to cease printing. Rapic:D.y, 
"the police force had grO'..nt from a few ~espised men in hiding at the t:iJne 
of Japan's defeat to a belligerent force of 25,000 enthusiastic to aid 
. .. . . 
10 
the United states occupation and the political ambitions of' the Right." 
Meanwhile, the Occupation .~ove.~nt wa~ imposing its ideas of economic 
freedom on South Korea, with disast~D"'$ results 0 Within a month of its 
arrival, the .American Military Governnent (AMG) removed all controls on 
production, collection a.'ld distribution of rice and imposed a free market . . .... 
on prices and distribution. "The MG is restoring the prinCiple of a free 
market, giving every man, woman, and child his just and fair share of the 
. . 
great wealth with wMch this beautiful nation has been endcrtred," read 
-the directive. This led to a massive profiteering, hoarding and hunger, 
despite · a 6riI> increase ~ crop yield over the previous year. Rationing was 
reintrodUced--a.t one half the wartime levels the Japanese had set. Inna-
tion was rampant, with prices outstripping wages in their increases by a 
4-1 ratio by November, and after a law freezing wages but not prices, almost 
a 6-1 ratio by March. The price of a bushel of riC. rose from 9.4 yen 
in September, 1945 to 2,800 yen in September, 1946. Whi~e speculation 
made fortunes for the already weal thy', the AMG declared the KPR's redistri-
bution ot Japanese It'Op~rtgr Ule~l and di~s.s~~sed the peasants and worle rs 
on these lands. Quotas of rice and other grains were violently expropriated 
by the KNP. After the first three months of occupation, Hodge concluded 
in a report that he reco:rJ:\m3nded Itserious consideration" for the agreenent 
with the U.S.S.R. for si.trlllltaneous troop withclrawq(: this would "leave 
Korea to its own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval tor its selt-
11 
purifica tiono" 
Repression co.'ltinued. On May 14, 1946, Ordinance 972 made the following 
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punishable: "any conduct in support of .". an organization or movement 
dissolved or declared illegal by or contrary to the :interests of the occupy-
ing forces"; printed ll"aterial "disrespectful" to the occupying forces; and 
12 
refusal to give information to a -pe!"sonwith the authority of the MGo 
After a year of American rule, the State Department concluded "It 
seems to us that all evidence of the past year clearly indicates that 
Koreans are not psychologically or technically prepared to undertake self-
\ 
government ••• we feel thp,t no encouragement should be given to the Koreans 
to think that abandonment of trusteeship is or may be feasible. n13 
The autumn of 1946 saw peasant uprisings throughout the Kyongsong 
and Cholla provinces, and other regions of People's Committee strength. 
"Nothing in the three years of the Occupation so shook Americans at all 
levels as the autumn upriSings of 1 946" .. There was a general strike 
on September 23 involving 8,<XX> railroad workers and 16,000 students. 
This soon became a general strike involving 295 enterprises in Seoul alone, 
30,000 workers and 16,000 students. 251,000 workers throughout South 
Korea took part in the strike.. Mass arrests and battles with strike~breakers 
ensued. In Seoul, 1400 strikers were arrested on SepteMber 30. On Octo-
ber 1, the strike turned into a general insurrection, with crowds attack-
ing policemen. 38 policemen were killed in Tagean on October 6. 
lan<D..ords and police were victims of attacks in many villages and cities. 
Entire police departments were destroyed in Yongch'on, Kwni, Waegwan, 
Songju and elsewhere" The Americans declared martial law and set about 
violently crushLl1.g the rebe~lion, which had slogans such as "Return the 
Korean Government to the People's Committee". Police, troops, and right-
WLl1.g organizations were not able to put down the rebellion until mid-
November. Over 200 policemen were killed, and over 1,000 rioters. Around 
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30,000 were arrested. The Left turned out to be "the biggest losersll, as 
the KNP has consolidated its power in smashing the Left's worker and 
14 
peasant base. 
The official American reports wrote these events orf as communist-
directed and Ifin no sense spontaneous,n but this simply does not fit the 
facts. Rather than a structured revolt that the Americans "kept looking 
for and not finding", there were unS'Jstematic, spontaneous uprisings. 
, , --
"Taken one at a time t~ey were the products of a thousand local fru'stra-
tions. Taken as a whole they amounted to a lusty shriek of dissent over 
the arrangerrents of liberated Korea," concludes Cummings.. "By the end 
of 1946... the United States had fostered in its zone in Korea the develop-
ment of a regime as ruthless and oppressive as any 'be:> emerge in the post-
w,s.r . world" ~ Kolko argues.1 S : ''- ." , . ".: " . .' ~ .:; . ,.'.. . 
~·.',j,:Whri1ugh a series of disagreements over the structur ?and 
fom of future Korea's govero..ment, the U.S. and Russia were becoming increas-
ingly estranged. The U.S. proposals would have w::ighted the unified govern-
ment heavily to the Right, the Russian proposals heavily to the Left. The 
. 
breaking point was the election of 1948, in which the Soviets refused to 
participa.te--not unreasonably, from their point of view. Reports from 
UN 'obse·rvers"7 in the &>uth spoke of "considerable clifficul ty w:maldng 
contact with the left-wing organizations, certain of whose representatives 
were found to be either in prison, under order of arrest or some form of 
police surveillance 0" Rhee celebrated with a large rally in honor of the 
UN commission, at which several leftists were mutilated by Rhee's thugs. 
The elections were held on Yay 10, and, with both the Left and significantly, 
the nationalist Right (who saw elections solely in the South as dividing 
Korea iEsO facto) boycotting the electio~s, Rhee's candidates were practically 
the o~ ones r~J1ing~ In the ten days preceding the election, 323 persons 
were killed in riots or police raids, and more than 10,000 arrested. 'lhe 
State Deparw.ent history concluded the election was "characterized by 5" 
public approval and enthusaism." As Kolko concludes, "against the express 
wishes of all political groups save an extreme contingent of the right-
wing, an independent government was established in the southern half of 
Korea." 16 
Many questions remain about the outbreak of the war. 'Vllien 10 F. Stone 
.. 
wrote "The Hidden History of the Korean War, fI in 1952 he could do no lID re . . 
than pose questions to be p!rsued, and point out interesting inconsistencies. 
Many of these questions remain unanBW'ered today. Was the attack a surprise? 
Is it likely that it could have been considering the 500 American officers 
and 700 civilian technicians in South Korea?, asks Stone. Even Stueck 
quotes an official ~ho claimed that by "late 1949, talk of a Nor.th Korean 
invasion was aIm:) st routine in intelligence circles." Was the attack ordered--
or even known in advance--by the Russians? If so, why was the Russian dele-
gate to the UN boycotting the assew~ly, and was thus unable to veto the 
, 
sanctions passed against North Korea. If the attack had been carefully 
planned in advance, why was it that only about half of North Korea's forces 
were l1X>bilized? Also, which side provoked the war? An arms race had been 
going on for some time in Korea. When U.S. occupation forces left Korea, 
they left $110 million in arms and h82 U.3. officials to train Koreans in 
how to use this equipment. Official American accounts show that North Korea 
be gan expanding its arm:r atter January t 19500 "AI though the North Korean 
mili tary build-up prior to June had always been interpreted as prodr of 
aggressive intent, 1..11 fact it was more a response to the military imbalance 
of power that Rhee and the United States had created during 1949 and 1950, 
the aggressive declarations of Seoul, and the possibility of further mili-
tary growth in the South," argues Kolko.1? 
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The most radica.l and coherent challenge to the standard view of the 
outbreak and early days of the war is Kolko t s. He argues that a vastly 
inferiOr North Korean force, bent perp..aps only on the capture of SeoUl, 
was allowed to lltake" large chunks of South Korea in order to provoke a 
reaction 0 This reaction would allow the opportunity for personal glory 
for Gmera1 MacArthur, provide a cause that the "Asia-first" senators and 
Congressmen had wanted since the "loss" of China, and would create a 
"necessary emergency" ~-necessary to get "numerous global projects 'and appro-
priations out of an unfriendly Congress. rt nNo one can say what would have 
come of these projects if the North Koreans had not marched south ••• If , 
said a senior official in 19510 BotJ;l MacArthur and Rhee deliberately 
and repeatedly exaggerated the scale of North Korean attacks, and the 
amount of ground lost. Seoul even announced Russian troops were involve do 
Even the conservative London Time~ became openly suspicious of the informa-
tion it was receiving. But, Ko1ko argues, there was a method in this 
apparent madnesso Continued retreat, MacArthur and Rhee knew, faced the 
tr.S o with the alternative of defeat or massive cormnittment. Rhee was 
• 
claiming that tbree-quarters of his army had been lost" which was blatantly 
untrue. Towns were abandoned without resistance, U.S. planes "repeatedly 
struck defending ROK unitso" By the beginning of August, the North Koreans 
were substantia1lJ" outnumbered and out-equipped, and still advancing. When 
-the Americans sent in 65,000 troops in early August, this was almost as 
many as all the North Koreans, who kept advancing until September. Mean-
w'hile MacArthur "\-las busily exaggerating the North Korean troop strength 
bya factor of broo By September 1, l-'.acArthur had 180,,000 men in Korea, 
as opposed to 98,000 for the North Koreans, about a third of whom were 
fresh recruits" By October 1 MacArthur ordered a halt to strategic 
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bombing in North Korea because there was nothing of importance left to bomb. 
30,000 North Koreans escaped behind the 38th parallel, followed by 230,000 
UN troops, supported by 100,000 U.S. navy and air force men. "Whether 
consciously or not t MacArthur had transformed a civil war, intensified by 
what was likely a pre-emptive attack into a greatly expanded American involve-
18 
Eent in the Far East," concludes KOlko. 
The history of the remainder of the war is better known, less contro-
versial, and will <. be flushed out in the following chapters. Therefore 
only a brief sketch of' the military history of the war is necessary here. 
On September 15, 1950 MacArthur's landing at:;Iri.~'h'on turned .. the tide 
of the war, and by the end of the month UN forces were approaching the 38th 
parallel. In early Chtober, South Korean troops crossed into the North, 
with American troops follOwing a week iater. MacArthur received orders 
on September 27 whioh included the following: "under no circumstances ..... 
will your forces orOBS the ~mnohurian or U.S.S.R. borders of Korea, and 
as a matter of policy, no non ... Korean ground forces will be used in the north-
east provinces bordering the Soviet Union or in the area along the Manchurian 
border .. tt19 
Between Chtober 8 and October 14, Cllina repeated its warnings in its 
domestio press and intelligence reports suggested Chinese troops were mass-
.' . 
ing near the Yalu River. China also··.comnmniCated warnings through' the 
Indian ambassador. On October 25 at Onjong--Iess than forty miles South 
of the lI.anchurian border--SOuth Korean .Arnv units made contact with Chinese 
"volunteers. 1l Soon, hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops entered the con-
th 
flict, pushing the UN troops back past the 38 parallel .. and well into the 
. . 
Sou th by mid-December. 
th 
By January 25 , however, the U.S. Eighth Army-, 
tmder Matthew Ridgway, began ptlshing back in the offensive dubbed "opera-
tion killer .. " On Parch 15 the UN forces retook Seoul, and by April 1951, 
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the two sides were again fighting roughly around the 38th parallel. 
The firing of General 1-1acArthur in April, 1951 has been the subject 
of much discussion and writing. 'lb what extent the General was exceeding 
the purely military authority he was given is still difficult to say. On 
the other hand MacArthur was clearly trying to fornula te the overall stra-
tegy and policy of the war--if not Asian policy in general-independent ~r 
Q({U~.h . . the 1m and,~~:h~ , :iTr' ,s,., 
, . .. .. -" ',Y,"i This ranged from MacArthur's meet-, 
ings with Chiang Kai -5hek to his obviously more nili taristic view of the 
Korean war, which fairly clearly included attacks on China. 
The offensive which prompted MacArthur's firing was his Itpeace planlt 
of March 24. This plan included the warning, "the enemy ~, ; 
must by now be painfully aware that a , decision of the United Nations to 
depart from its tolerant effort to continue the war to the area of Korea, 
through an' ex:pa.n~ion of our military operations to his coastal areas and 
interior bases, would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military col-
lapse...'! ' Even Matthew Ridg..ray writing in 1967 had to argue that this ,'''so , 
obViously suggested a radical shift in V.S. policy that it is hard to ima-
gine anyone's pretending it was merely, as some said, an expression of a 
willingness to accept a military surrender." And "even a call for surrender 
implied a sudden harden:i.ng of .the VoN. line.1t 'lb make matters worse, this 
' 21 
plan undercut a different plan that the UN was about to bring out. 
Truman viewed this as outright insubordination, and fired ¥..a.cArthur, 
and Ridgway took over as UN commander. More broadlY$ the firing of MacArthur 
can be seen as an assertim of civilian control over policy deciSions" and a 
victory for those who believed in l~ting the Korean conflict, as opposed 
to those who favored attacking China. 
The war then settled into two years of long, drawn-out stalemate. 
Negotiations proceeded remarkably slowly, and the majority of the concessions 
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were ultimately made by the Communists. A settlement was finally reached 
when the Communists compromised on the issue of forced repatriation of 
prisoners of Wq1? .... -a point that they had previously strongly insisted on. 
Korea would remain divided: an acceptable compromise for Russia and the 
u.s. 
To understand U.S. policy at this time, one must look at the period. 
The U.S. in 1950 was domina ted by an extreme cold war mentality. 'Ihe 
"betrayals" 0,£ the Yalta agreements, the Berlin crisis, the Czech 'coup, 
, .. 
and perhaps especially the "fall" of China were heavy on the minds of 
U.S. officialso '!he tendency was to bla.roo everything on the communists, 
and to see conspiracy of a vast monolithic communist block everywhere. 
-' 
Another outgrowth of wt-12 was the new-found role of the U.S. as the world 
policeman and defender of liberty e",:",erywhere. Thus was 'spawnedNSC 68, 
containment and collective security_ U.S. 11 credibility" suddenly became 
a major issue. aUT credibility was on the line in lCorea, and, it seemed, 
O'UX credibility--or lack thereof--b.ad awesome implications. Director of 
the office of far eastern affairs John Vincent worried that if the Americans 
left Korea, J?-pan would "question America's strength of purpose and seek 
an accomodation with the Soviets. Stueck agrees that "American prestige :; 
was already extensively committedo For the United States to acquiesce . 
th 
in a" "Communist victory below the 38 parallel 't-lOuld call into question 
American reliabilitYolI America's new role had a domestic side too: "We 
must be better armed and equipped than we are today if we are to be prot.ected 
from the dangers that still face us .. 0" , said Truman, "we must continue to 
increase our production for military purposes •• and less to civilian con-
sumption." Perhaps most telling of all was General Van Fleet's speech in 
1952: "Korea has been a blessing. There had to be a Korea here or in 
some place in the world.1I One may well wonder to what extent this sort of 
- 49 -
thinking was a self-fulfilling prophecy.22 
Many of the same assumptions that have colored .American foreign policy 
have also colored the writing of its history. A history of ' the Korean war 
which does not emphasize that war's indigenous Korean roots, and prefers 
instead to view the confiict only as a super power confrontation is inherently 
ethnocentric. Also, mu.ch of the history that has been written of the Korean 
war is far too uncritical: for example, Stueck is content. to cite a 
MacArtl'mr quote about "Well-trained and well-indoctriIiate.d " ~sats,tance·iiltil:~ 
trating from North Korea" in 1947 as fact. Dobbs at one point argues 
that during an entire set of negotiations, "it is clear that of all the 
groups involved, only the U.S. sincerely sought compromise." David Ree~'5book 
on the Korean war t~ quite famon:$" . Yet, it is sonewhat limiting to frame 
questions such as, "Speculation as to communist motives for launching the 
invasion must still remain largely conjectural. Why was the invasion 
chosen so unsportingly in Korea ••• ?" (emphasis mine). 23 
Over 1,000,000 South Koreans died in the war. Communist losses were 
put at 1,500,000. 2.5 million South Koreans were homeless or refugees at 
the end of the war, and 5 ;inillion'were· on 'relief. North Korea was literally' 
levelled. Rhee at one point forcibly rounded up 400,000 men for potential 
- use in his army, and sent them to camps where 50,000 died of d1-sease"or 
. starvation, and the majority of the remainder became physical wrecks. Mean-
.. . . 
while, 9h,ooo UN troops, 34,000 of them Americans, were killed.24 
Korea was a small country undergoing what could well be called a civil 
war, caught up in U.S.-U.S.S.R. cold war superpower politics. And it should 
be stressed here that the fact that this chapter has focussed on U.S. policies 
is not meant to suggest that the Russians or Chinese were acting with any 
greater moral scruples. It was the Koreans that paid the highest price for 
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this struggle, however: in terms or lives lost, the devastation of their 
country, and the continuing division of Korea. 
It would be foolish to expect that points of history about the Korean 
war that have only been brought to light recently by radical historians 
such as Cummings and Kolko should have had any great influence in shaping 
the opinions of .Americans during the war. On the other hand, the extent 
to which Americans did not lmow and more importan-6;r did not care about the 
origins of the Korean war fur~her back than the :invas len . itself was a 
significant sign of· the timeso No issue was seen in the war other than 
the superpower confiict, and no further look was needed to determine which 
side was right and which side was wrong. It is interesting to note that 
generally speaking the only people who were investigating the histor,r of 
,- . , '-. . , -- . - ..-
Korea 1945-1950 during the war 'were pacifists and other opponents of the 
war. And often those who looked found a surprising amount. 
'lli.is division is represented in the historiography of the Korean war 
as well. The more conservative historians usually begin their account of 
the war with the attack from the Borth, and the more r~;eal historians 
tend to give 'more attention to the "liberation" periodo Ultimately, one 
does not have to agree with all the conclusicns of a Kolko ora Cummings 
- to argue that it is frequently they,no;t! ithe more traditional historians, 
who are asking the right questions. A number of these questions would be 




"This is not a time for pacifists to withdraw from public work and 
witness, or for the pacifist movement locally or nationally to contract 
its activities." 
-Peacemakers 
"Our pr.q;r.am tor the Korean War is STOP THE WAR.1f 
-A. J. Muste 
Although the Korean war period was in many ways exceptional for the 
American Peace movement, the distinctions made in the previous chapter still 
provide the best framework for analyzing the movement at, this time. There 
were religious groups, social activists, world federalists, and women's 
peace groups all activethmughout the war. The war even provoked cri-
ticism from the right, but as will be shown, this ambivalent and ambigu-
ous position was completely divorced from the peace movement, and thus needs 
to be dealt with senara telyo ~-li thin the IOOve ment itself, and wi-thin the 
different major ideological categories, there were, as always, significant 
differences between groups bOth in position--from conservative approval of 
the 'war, to moderate criticism of it, to radical opposition to it--a.nd in 
the tactics espoused--from individual witness to letter-writing to public 
rallies. Although the movement in this period was relatively isolated from 
the mainstream, it remained a rich and vi tal source of ideas and informa-
tion. And especially considering their small nmribers, pacifists at this 
time could be surprisingly active. Beyond merely enduring, however, the 
American peace moveIl2nt during the Korean war was able to offer pragrna. tic, 
insightful critiques of American policies. Their opposition had a factual 
as well as moral base and, in a number of cases was arguably as "realistic" 
as the positions of those who, priding themselves on their sophisticated 
and practical- worldview, supported the war. 
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Of the Religious groups, the WRL, perhaps because of its traditional 
role of' being at least somewhat political in outlook, was the most divided. 
lhe divisions were not over the war as such, as the WRL was pledged to 
oppose all wars, but their internal splits were indicative of the political 
climate of all the'tilnes. The WRL reported that Abe Kaufman, long-time 
WRL Secretary, had resigned over the WRL' s decision to send an observer to 
the Sleff'ield-W'arsaw Peace Conference, which, in Kaufman' swords, had "des-
troyed l the Leagueb usefu:t.i'less as a genuine antiwar group, olearly" opposed 
to all totalitarianisms." In a 1975 book, David Dellinger noted that this 
resignation was due to the WRL's adoption of' a "more anti-impeii.al.ist" posi-
tion an~o re~ than Kaufman had wanted. '!he WRL lost members over this 
issue and also over the part~ political question of' haw "absolutist" the 
WRL should be. If this were not enough, 'evan. Thomas reSigned, reportedly 
beoause of "profound disillusionment" with the paoifist movement~ 1 
The l-1RL was in fact clearly opposed to oomrmmism: "We are under no 
illusions concerning the grossly anti-paoifist practioes of' Soviet and world 
COIllJlDlnism ••• " they wrote, and they even printed a whole sheet on "Relations 
wi th Stalinists and Stalinist Groups," in,whioh they annomlcad that:.'member-
ship in the WRL was not opeq to those "willing to f'ight for the Soviet 
_Union," and that organizationally, theWRL would not support or oooperate 
wi th stalist groups 0 2 
As a religious pacifist organization, the WRL spent JIIllch of' its time 
working on behalf of conscientious objeotors, opPoSing the Universal Mili-
tary Training bUls, and opposing war and militarism in general, without 
reference to ourrent confliot. But they also kept up a strong opposition 
to the Korean war. '!hey printed Gallup Poll statistics showing public oppo-
sit ion to the war, and, at their most politioal, argued that Asia was under-
going "a series of revolts with a determination to throw off' the white man's 
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exploitation and humilitation.1I3 
Mo at of their opposition to the war, howe'Y-er, was on a IIX>ral and ethical 
basis.. They reprinted this part of' a report from the Manchester Guardian: 
' IIA napalm raid hit the village ••• and nowhere have they buried the 
dead because there is nobody left to do so ..... the inhabitants were caught and 
killed and kept in the exact postu~ they held when the napalm struck--a 
man about to get on his bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage, 
a housewife strangely Ut"ltliarked, holding in..her hand a page torn from a 
catalog-,,4 
The WRt argu.ed tha. t uOpen Warfare has all but destroyed Korea." An 
advertisement they took out in the Natiol1 read, lithe original rights and 
wrongs ·in Korea are already' submerged in a maze of bestiality and horror 
unmatched in all the human Bt0r.1oh5 
In fact the~ WRL ·even 'accepted the prevailing view, and argued that the 
Korean war had begun with rrunrorgivable .... North Korean aggression," but they 
equally opposed u.s. policies. They called for an L~diate armistice, and 
mediation for the war, and individual non-violent resistance at home. The 
\-TRL was also deeply concerned with the rise of domestic repression, and 
warned that, "The rapid militarization of America, accompanied by a grow-
ing hysteria towards minority positions may well lead to repressive measures 
directed against expressions of pacifist viewpoints ,now needed more than 
ever before.. At the same tiroo it becomes increasingly necessary that paci-
7 
fists support each other and act together .. " 
The -rlRL was both a victim of this external repression, and or inter-
nal splits. Both were symptomatic of the tim3so '!he WRL claimed to have 
a growing roombership during this period, but also complained that declining 
contributions were causing a financial crisis for the organization. .. -,. 
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Although their hearts and spirits remained conimitted to an active religlous 
.. -. . . 
pacifism, they remaitled fairly ineffective and isolated throughout the 
Korean war, trapped by the tims. 
Generally less disturbed by political debate was the religious paci-
fist American Friends Service Committee. It too involved itself in the 
traditional protection of C.O.s, and opposition · to UMT. In its own tradi-
tion, the AFSC worked to provide "Quaker Relief" to Korea. And JIDlch of 
the AFSC's opposition to the war was verr general, and religirusly basedo 
Btlt the AFSC had a political side as lrell. 
'Ihe most political tract the AFSC wrote during this period was their 
1 951 publica t.i.on "A QUaker view of U.S. Foreign Policy. t1 In the section on 
. - . 
lisa, the AFSC claimed UoS. policy there bad .fidled because it had not 
given "surficient weight to the economic, social and political realities of 
Asia." The U.S. had failed to understand the Jlleaning of revolution and 
civil war in Asia--here the AFSC draw parallels to the American Revolution 
and Civil war. 1he AFSC noted that As'~ had suff'ered "a century of' humi-
lia tion and exploitation of proud people by' wbi te imperialists; they clainied 
that the Korean war had alienated Asia from the U.S.; and they argued that 
China f S actions were understandable--" Any .American should be able to under-
stand by' imagining lJ, i'.:>; own reactions if an international army under Ibssian 
command and largely composed of Russians were rapidly advancing northward 
through Mexico ••• " But, they concluded, "American mistakes in Asia are 
dUe largely to a miS'tUlderstanc1irtg and are not irreparable.nB 
While the AFSC was capable of such insightful. political analysis, they 
did not indulge in it often, nor did they encourage political action. They 
opposed the Korean war, occasionally criticized domestic racism, but, asidd 
from. their Ralief program, and a number of small "Seminars for Peace,1f the 
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AFSC remained very nruch Itturned inwarcD.y" during the Korean war. But it 
was not the same for the AFSC as it had been for the WRL, who had in a 
number of ways been unhappily forced into that position. The AFSC was 
content as it was: holding its small IDgetings, defending conscientious 
objectors, and quietly continuing the Quaker tradition of indivldual wit-
ness., 
Of the religious pacifist groups, the Fellowship of Reconciliation 
produced the most prolific and spirited opposition. Alfred Hassl~r and 
• 
A.J. Muste were undoubtedly more concerned with the political issues and 
historical background of the Korean war than the rest of the membership, 
but the whole of the usually staid FOR could and did express a clever, per-
ceptive positiono For example, when the P.ro~ssive editorialized in favor 
of the Korean war and against pacifists who were incapable of seeing "hOI'''' 
meeting force with force can result in anything but war," the FOR responded 
wi th a ditty worth reprinting in its entirety, to 00 .S'..mg to the tune of 
the "H.M.So Pinafore": 
"Thing are Seldom What They Seeln" 
"Things are seldom what they seem 
Battles are an icD.a dream 
Bullets fly imaginal'7 
Men are killed, but not so very 
Very true. So they do. 
Tanks go rumbling on at peace 
Filled with men who are police 
If they chance to roll in gore 
Still it can't be called a war 
Yes we know. That is so. 
When a pilot drops a bomb 
He lets it go with great aplomb 
If it kills a poor Korean 
Still there's no war on the scene 
Certainly. • That could beo 
Rines blaze and cannons roar 
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In a Peace that looks like war: 
Pity the pOor pacifist 
He sees but the casualty list 
Oh how sadl Oh too bad! 
If this seems a'. trine queer 
Facts are tac ts and very clear 
Peace is war and war' is peace 
And the Army's but Police, 
Never fear! It is clear!9 
The FOR publica tio~ .';t;hEt FellowshiP. remained throu~hout the ~ an arena tor 
,- -
SPri~ly debate" and suggested a ~rie~Y' ot anti-warpositions and activi-:-
ties. The FOR called for economic aid" rather than military intervention, 
. ' 
tor both North Korea and China; deplored the popularity of the war, and 
.' c _,. 
pervasiveness at U.S. militarism in general; worked long an~hard tor 
C.O.~; detended tax res~sters ,(al~ough :t;h~ FOR itself did not necessarily 
endorse ~ resistanc~); wrote on the history o~ the Korean war; l>!Otested 
the U.S. arms buildllpj and printed a number ot politically sharp c~ticisms . 
... 
ot U.S. policy. 
The most acute political critiques were written bY' A.J. Muste and Alfred 
Hassler. In September, 1950, Hassler wrote "Cops in Korea." He began by 
noting the popularity ot the war: n~~ .usual apo~ts tor power politics 
have been joined by all sorts at anti-war stalwarts.'! 'lhesa included .the 
Federal Council of Churches ,-.the Church Peace Union, the }Jnerican Council 
ot the tobrld Alliance for ~tern.ational Friendship, the S:>cialist Party, 
the Progressive, and others. "Communists, pacifists, a.nd a handful ot last-
:dj..tch isolationists have constituted virtually the only" vocal opposition," 
he commented. Ra.ssler vigorously disputed the "police action" analogy, 
and argued tha.t the war had to be seen as part ot the cold war power strug-, 
glee He denounced the U.N.' s refusal to seat China, and argued that without 
Russian or Chinese consent, "what the 'police action" really means is that 
a truncated UN has been conscripted as an ally- ot the thited States in its C.Q;"''lrQ;~·t') 
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against the Soviet Union .... " Also, he charged, the U.S. "throws her 
strength behind every anti-colll1llUnist government in the world, regardless 
of how reactionary it may be".If" Hassler sharply criticized Syngman Rhee, 
and concluded with a call for the U .3. to give up war, and to promo te del11O-
10 cracy abroad. 
In M:trch, '51, Hassler wrote "Call off the Cops," which argu.ed even 
more strmgly against the police action analogy, again stressed the Fast-'West 
conflict, noted that the countries which had voted to condemn the' "aggression" 
of North Korea and China represented only 5q( of the world's population, and . . 
again advocated admitting China to the U.N. Hassler argued that a It securi ty 
force" that worked to protect the status quo was undesirable. America nmst 
once again "take the leadership of the revolution," he con~IUded.11 
A.J 0 Musts was a figure of such significa.nce that he will be dealt 
with separately later. For now, it should ' ~be noted that his contributions 
to the FellowshiE made many of the sane points made by Hassler~ Also worth 
noting here is Mus te • s critique of Taft, since J as Muste himself put it, 
"At the outset it may be well to dispose of the idea that Taft may be a sort 
of leader of a peace movement in this century." Taft was an old isolationist, 
at a time when isolationists were a vanishing breed, and he represented the 
rightnwingschool of opposition to war, with all its traditional flaws, 
including the a tti tude that once America was in a war, America should try 
to l'Tin it. Muste began by pointing to the Senator's extreme anti-co:mmunism, 
and quoted his willingness .. to intervene militarily in a wide variety of . . 
places including Japan, India, Africa, Australia, and many others. Muste 
also pointed to 'fuft's quote: "Communism has introduced a new spirit of 
aggr-ession into the world, Hi t has adopted a combination of deceit, propa-
ganda, and strongarm methods ••• Now we are forced to adopt the same methods ••• 
. . , - . 
or be swept away." Finally, Muste pointed to Taft's declaration that if the 
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u.s. were going to fight the Chinese, "We might as well have a declared war. 
It would untie the hands of our military conrnanders. tr (Alfred Hassler 
referred to this as Th.ft's program It to end the Korean war by moving it 
12 
into China. lI ) 
The rest of Muste's thought will be discussed later. What the above 
d.emonstrates, however, is the extent to w~ich the peace movement had rejected 
even the most minimal feelings of common purpose with isolationist right. 
For the rest, the FOR concerned itself with the traditional concerns 
of religious pacifist groups, as noted before. They did, however, print 
other articles which gave the history of the war, and specific oritiques 
of U .. S. policies before and after the rTar's outbreak. They espeoially . - . 
stressed the repressiveness of Rhee, and were harshly critical of l.fa.cArthur, 
whose policies, they claimed provoked China's entry into the war~ Also, 
. . . 
stories of. experiences · in Korea were re gularly . printed to show the horror 
of the l-Tar.. The FOR called for mediation and an immediate end to the fight-
ing~ Additionally, t.l)ey argued tha t "rle shoUld help Asia free herself of ... 
all imperialism." 
'.[he FOR was also ooncerned with domestic censorship. They reported the 
banning of !,lternatives-a. radical pacifist magazine .for which David Dellinger 
wrote--for an advertisement it ran that the government claimed encouraged 
"draft dodging"; also the F'ellowship ()Dt~ that a number of prestigi0tls new~­
papers, including the New york Times t had refused to run an ad from the Central 
Committee for Conscientious Objectors--a moderate group that solely worked 
with C.O.s· ... -an ad that simply announced the existence of the ceco and the 
C.Oo option; lastly, they protested the fact that Cecil Hinshaw, member of 
both the FOR and Peacemakers, was denied permission to speak on the campus 
of Ohio State Uni versi ty c 13 
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'!he F~lowshiE also served as a forum r~r a wide varie~y of vie-ws, and 
a rather humorous debate took place in its pages between lert~st groups. The 
debate began with a letter from a pacifist in the Socialist Party, writing 
to defend the pacifist credentials of the SP, in spite of its support of 
the Korean war. The letter claimed that the SP had "more pacifists in 
proportion to its membership than any other party J II had a pacifist national 
-- -
chairman (Darlington Hoopes), and was I1very democratic" and thus open to 
change. :r.Ia.turally, the Left being what it was (and is), this PromPted 
responses from other parties, ~nd soon read~~s_,'>.~,theFellCMshiR were informed 
that the &>cialist Labor Party, the World Sooialist,':Party, and the Liberta-
- - 14 
nan Socialist League were all "more pacifist" than the SP. 
Finally, although the FOR opposed the war articulately and intelli-
gently, both because of their religious bent and because of the times it 
was hard for them to c?me up with a strategy, or even any plan of action. 
And this bothered them. In May, t 53, they conclu~d an article with an 
especially revealing and painful admission, which must have summed up the 
feelings of many pacifists ~ of the period: uWha tcan a few thousand paci-
fists accomplish to reconcile the Pentagon and -the Presidium? Beyond writing 
a letter to a Congressman to oppose UMT or holding back fifty dollars from 
a $50 billion budget until the government finds tire to come around and 
take it, what can one do but wait around, shifting from one foot to the 
ot.lJer, for Armageddon?1I15 
------_._--_. __ ._ -- .- --- --._-.. _ .... -._----- ---_._------- -_._._ .. _-----_._---------
________ .............. _ .. _--'" __ .,. .. ___ .... _ ....... _ .... __ ....: .. ___ ..... __ M'UI' .... __ .. _ .... _~_~ __ ... ' __ .... ______ ...... _ 
Complementing the work of these religious pacifists were groups that 
worked practically exclusive1y with conscientious objectors, such as the 
CCCO and the National' Service Board for Religipu_s OBjectors __ While the wor.k 
o£ these groups lies primarily outside the topic o£ this paper, a few points 
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shoul d be noted. 
The best source for statistics on C.O.s. was the ccco publication 
News Notes. By the end of the Korean war, they reported, over 200 C;.:O.s 
had been convicted under the 19h8 Selective Service Act, and this figure 
. . 
did not include Jehovah's Witnesses or Muslims. A statistic to be~ in 
mind here is that in 1952" 43 of these prosecuted, received sentences of 
between five and ten years.1 § 
Certain C.O. cases could raise political points. A letter from the 
-p;:uoents of JL-rn George, "a 19 year old C70.who was sentenced to two 'con~ 
currently-running three year sentences, argued against the police action 
analogy, and noted that the Canadian courts had ruled that drafting men for 
the UN army v.Tas unconstitutional, since the Korean war was !:2i a police 
action017 
The most famous C.O. case of the Korean war was that of Robert l1i.chnero 
An 19 year old Quaker, Michner was given a ten-year sentence-.. the heaviest 
given anyone lL.'"lder the Selective Service Act up to this time, iroluding 
draft dodgerso 'Ihis was a year after Michner had finished serving a year 
and a half for not registering, and the fourth time in all that he had been 
tried and convicted for similar offenses. This even bothered the conscience 
of the Scripps-Howard Washington N~~ which edi. torialized against the sen-
tence: "We' .. think this nation is strong enough to survive with 11i.clme~ out of 
jail ..... and booked to serve as aCaDo, which he is .. .. " they concluded. The 
18 
sentence was eventually reduced. But "second prosecutions" and stiff 
sentences continued throUghotlt the war. 
Concern with C.O.s inevitably meant a strong opposition to Universal 
military training.. The National Council Against Conscription defended C.O.s, 
spent even more ef'f"ort opposing UMT, an~ also, unlike .. ~:ups such as CCCO and 
the ~lSBRO, made serious political criticisms of UoS. ':involvement in Korea. 
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The NCACts position on the Korean wa r l.v'as that neither ·the . ·U~S •• nor 
Russia was "completely guilty or completely blameless.1t They believed 
Russia had known about and endorsed the North's attack beforehand, but 
they also pointed to the belligerence of the ~uth. T'ney quoted South 
Korea...Yl Defense Minister Sihn Sung Mo I s November, 1949 boast about the 
readiness of his troops to attack North Korea: nIt we had o~ own way, 
we would have started up already, but we had to wait un~il they (the Ameri-
can govefn.nent leaders) "V!ere ready. They kept telling us, 'No, nb, no, 
wait. You ,are not ready. tit NCAC's publication, Conscription llew-s, criti-
cized the UIIS. for concentrating on military aid to Korea as opposed to 
economic aid. They referred to "crumbling morale in the South Korean army, 1t 
"the unpopulari~y of the Syngman Rhee government," and the "questionable 
reliability of the (South Korean) Arm:r and police force." liThe American 
policy of armed intervention :m KOrea is dangerous for both peace and deroo-
cracy, II they concluded. '!he NCAC was also concerned v'ery early on with 
the possihlity of Soviet or Chinese involvement in the war. Opposing lthem-
selves firmly to communism, the NCAC worried that possible U.S. bombings 
of Korean cities ""'ould "aid Russian propaganda about American militarism, 
iMper.ialism, warmongering, etc." A bit more nobly, they also were con-
cerned with the reconstruction of Korea, and the spectre of vcrld War 
Three.. The NCAC called for the formation of a UN truce commission; a UN 
appointed mediator or commission of nediation, for "the permanent settle-
ment of differences,"; the admission of China into the UN; a "fresh approach II 
to disarmament; and a global economic recovery programo 19 
Interestingly, the NCAC was one of the most anti-co.mmunist groups in the 
Peace move:rrent during this period; certainly the~ were the most .anti-commu-
nist of the groups that actually opposed the war. They were constantly 
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WOI"'ried about communists "penetrating" the Peace movenent, and published 
lists of groups which theY' saw as representing "efforts to get communists 
to work with non-communists." or the groups they so charged, the only' 
one that will be discussed here is Committee on Peacef'ul Alternatives, and 
as will be shown later the NCAC's charges were blatantly unfair. The NCAC, 
however, continued blithely on, devoting pages of Conscription NeW's to 
. . 
quoting the Daily Worker, which they noted, on April 27, 1951,. called on 
communists to work in broad peace organiza tions aI"C!~d the demands of end-
ing the war in Korea, admitting China to the l!N, b~g the A-bomb, and 
negotiating a "Pact of Peace" among the Five great powers. Surprisingly, 
the NCAC never accused American Women for Peace, whose poli tics-as will 
be shown later--were closer to the "communist line" than any other major 
group of the ti.ne. NCAC did note that the Chicago Peace Conference, 
which was being spcmsored by the J\JIIerican Peace Crusade, with which AWP 
was affiliated was given a large advertisement in the Daily librker, but 
the NCAC never accused either AWP or the APC. "While we must decline to 
be fooled ••• in connection with peace fronts," they concluded, rather 
too virtuously, "vTe l!Ust do oUr utmost to avoid contribution to anti-
communist hysteriao •• n20 
The NCAC also oppoSed the increasing domestic American militarism. 
They wrote angrily a~inst mobilization and the M<?ney i t co~t in art~cles 
with titles like ' "More Money for Munitions Makers." '!hey printed a number 
of outrageously militaristic quotes, for example the follo~ng rrOl1l~ Marine 
Brigadeer General Lewis: "We are the most fortunate of men. '!here was 
a time when a professional soldier had to wid t twenty-five years or so,: '. ;~\ 
before he ever got into war. We only had to wait five years for this one ••• " 
'!he NCAC was also concerned with the psychological etfects of war, and 
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printed articles with titles, iike "War Results in Mental nlness"-~fAlread.y 
out of Korea nearly a thousand mental cases have been hospitalized." On 
t,he ot.~er hand, they lept at the news that only a m:inority of combat troops 
actually fired their weapons, ' in a article titled "Combat Soldiers are 
Not Always Killers ... 21 
Most of the NCAC's time,howevar, was devoted to opposing UMr. Alt.'1ough 
most of their arguments on this issue were very broacD..Y ,cmti-mili tarist" 
and did not deal with the war spe?ifically, they did argue ~t tl;J.e Korean 
war proved, that UMT training did.:~6t prepare nen for ~attle", No gener~, 
mandatory program could ever'prep'~re lOOn for real war, the NCAC argued. 
- -
The NOAC also charged that the A.r'rrw had been giving its regular troops :in 
-, - ,. ' -
Korea training w:h:i.ch "had been weakened by the Arm;r's atteplpt to conVtince 
the nation that the Army and its proposed UMT program would be an extension 
, . , 
of a boy's public education. 1f But, the NCAC continued, losses in Korea 
had prompted a. reappraisal, with one high~ranking officer commenting that 
"We've got to get over this damned coddling and babying of troops.1f On 
the other hand, t.i.e NCAC pointed to battles in the Korean war in which 
, . ". . -
units with more and better training suffered more casualties -than less 
wellnotrained troops. They even argued that the Korean war showed that with-
out UMl', limen could be trained faster than weapons could be produced and 
transported,1I thus demonstrating that there was no need for UMT.22 
UltL-nately, the NCAC put the blame for U.S. failures in Korea on 
bad planning, intelligence, judgment, and even bad equjpment. The latter 
issue covered everything from lack of winter uniforms to lack of tanks: 
. -
"At the beginning ~f the Korean war, the U.S. ArlT\Y' ~ent foot sol~ers to 
fight against ta."lks, with high casualties resulting. The ~ deliberately 
did this .1123 
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The NCAC represented a combinatiOll of influences:pri.marily, they 
were a single issue group working against 011'1', but they also could speak 
out against specific U .. 8 6' policies in Korea unlike other single issue 
groups like the NSBRO and the CCCO. Also unlike these groups, the NCAC 
suffered from a certain am:mnt. of anti-communist paranoia. In general, 
their war opposition was on~ general anti-militarist grounds. They con-
tinued in the same style after Ul.fi' had been defeated and the Korean war 
ended.. "The Korean truce has brought no public clamor for ternrl..n1ition of 
the draft or a headlong cut in defense spending,tI they wrote in October, 
1953; perhaps, they hypothesized, this .,-ras ~e to a "feeling of fatalism 
about military control over the natio:a. Whatever the reason,u they con-
cluded, with renewed committment, "it is impor~t for opponents of peace-
time conscription to begin to express t.~emselves."24 
The fucial Activists in the peace movement were split over ::theJ{"orean 
war to a surprising extent~ As will be discussed later, a wide variety 
of traditionally antiwar progressive thinkers, ranging from a spectrum 
of liberals (who will be examined in the next chapter), to the formerly 
pacifist and still socialist No~P Thomas, supported the war. Speculation 
as to 'tfl\v certain parts of the peace movement did ~ exist will be given 
Mfice to say for now, that increasing na tional conse 1"-
vatiBm, ari"j:.i-communism" and the "lessons" of l'iti II had influenced the think-
ing of progr:-essives to a tremendous. degr~e. But social activist pacifist 
ppposition did exist during the Korean war, and it covered a range of ideo-
logy f'rom·,the fairly moderate to the quite radical. 
Devere Allen and the v.~ Interpreter for which he wrote and edited 
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remained surprisingly conservative during the Korean war years, and Allen, 
who had usually found ,himse~~. ,~~g the ~re radical pacifists in pz:e-
vious years, became ~eot the most moderate critics of the Korean war 
in the Peace movement. Interestingly, Allen gr~ more critical of the 
war as it went on; this was a pattern of most left-libera~s, .including 
those who originally endorsed the war, but not of' other pacitist gt"oups, 
who tended to have either an unchanging opposition to the war, or an unchang-
. . 
ing support of it. Nonetheless, Allen and the Interpreter became increas-
ingly critical of the war over time, targeting e~cially UoS. fore~gn 
policy, increased militarism at home, and syngman Rhee. 
Deapi te his socialist background (or perhaps because of' it), Allen 
subscribed heavily to cold war ideology • . Butbeyond that, .. he was capable 
of writing, in a reIl'.lS.1-kable .'cdi.spl~y of cult~al chauv;aism, "Democracy can-
not suddenly be handed to the Koreans; it must ripen from within.1t Bnt 
beginning with China's entry into the war, the World Interpreterbecane 
increasingly critical of the war. Ea.rlie~, th~ Interpreter had warned of 
,the danger of provoldng the Chinese by .fighting close to a hydro-electr1c 
plant on the Korean side of the Yalu river. The plant, the. !!!,.terpreter 
clatmed, supplied :1 ,.500~OOO ktlowatts of power to Manchuria.2.5 
The InterPreter blamed MacArthur, his "get tough 'philosophy," and 
his lIusual lack o.f political judgementn f;or provoking the Chinese into 
entering the war. But still, the InterPreter maintained a comparative 
consetvttliism. When Alternatives was banned In the fall of 1 ~o, the Interpreter 
. . " 
commented that the banning "could harcD.y have been avoided," and harshly 
criticized Alternatives for encouraging draft dodgingo The Interpreter 
concluded with the hope that pacifists would avoid "such harmful extremism 
in the future." They also did not back down .from their ,cold war position. 
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In December they stressed that Mao was subs~rvient to Russia, "just as 
Mussolini in 1940 was a p~isoner o~ ~tler ••• " liThe Sov:iet. people undoubtedly 
want peace;" they added. on the next page, "but their conditioning in 
hatred must be faced.,,26 
The World Interpreter did oppose the wa~,and called for a t!ease fire, 
withdrawal of troops, mediation, Korean disarmament, general elections, and 
a five year period in which a unified Korea would be a "ward of the U.N." 
On the other hand, they .. were capable of ~rguing at the same time that China 
should not be admitted into the UN-"In practical politics, let alone mor-
als, Communist China can ~rdly be atimi tted to the IDl soon, in view of its 
recent behavior. eo" 'lhis stand was unique among anti-war groups in the 
peace movement. 27 
However, the Interpreter was shifting. In April, 1951, they noted 
Thurgood Marshall's report on discrimination in the army (this will be 
discussed in detail latero) In July they admitted that some of Korea's 
trou?les before the war w~re the fault of Syngman Rhea and his govern-
ment. In December J they wrote angrily of mass torture and executions in 
South Korea before the war. Victims of both sexes were executed witl'xJut 
fair trial, often after their bac~s had been broken with rifle butts, 
they reported, and charged that 1,200 had been killed at one time out-
side Seoul in this manner. In the same issue, they also wrote, "It may 
disturb you, bUt if you go back over the negotiations step by step, you 
. . 
will come, I'm afraid, to an inescapable conclusion: that in recent 
weeks the eneIlW' has made more concessions than the UN side ••• .,28 
Still, they were capable of bizzare and unique arguments. In June, -52, 
they suggested that the communist prisoners might not have to be repa-
triatedo The Geneva Convention required the repatriation of prisoners of 
war, they admitted; but, they continued, "is the conflict a' war or a 
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'police action'?" They also ~oted that neither the North Koreans or the 
Chinese had ever declared war.29 
But on the same page, their growing anger with Rhee was evident: "Pre-
siden t Rhee, in typical style, has been arresting members of the Assembly . . . . 
he could not silence otherwise, and defying the UN's request for more mature 
democratic behavioro" Later the InterpJ:"eter was to write of Rhee that near 
the end of the war he was "formulating Bome ot the truce teams most impos-
sible offers," and that "how to handle him is likely to become the UN's 
n~~er one problem.,,30 
~ its anticommunism, its rejection of China as S~l~'s puppet not 
fit to sit in the UN, its bizzare stand on repatriation, and its generally 
, " 
... 
conservative (for social activist qpacifist~) outlook, ,the ~T()rld Interpreter 
ironically subscribed to a variety of the very cold war ideology that 
, . . . 
was contributing to the rising American militarism they so deplored. The 
final sentence of a paragraph ~heX wrote on American militarism ra~sed a 
question that the Interpreter itself might have profitte<i" fro~ answering: 
"The European ••• tends to see American belligerence as bordering on madnessooo . - ,.-
is it this that accounts for Washington's almost pathological fear of' 
peace, theetern'al toughness that goes on losing, friends ••• Or have we 
simply plowed a furrow of fear so deep that we can no longer climb out?1I31 
'!here were, of course, more radical social activist pacifist groups 
during this period. The National Council for Prevention ot War and the 
Committee for Peacef'ul Alternatives were two active and vocal examples 
of this type. 
The NCPW' too}: a radical tack at the very begirming of the war. In 
July, 1950, the headline of their publication Peace Action proclaimed 
"We Get Bogged Ihwn in Korea." The article referred to our military 
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involvement in Korea as "one of the worst things that could have happened 
to us." They warned that ther~ wo~d be "no glory for ;the .. U.S. in a mili-
tary victory over the North Koreans J It <:'-S bombing as Asian people would 
inevi tab1y associated with European imperialism. Moreover, they argued, 
the conflict was a civil waro And, they charged, "the . people of' 
South Korea • • • -- . are unwilling to die fo~ ime .Syngman Rhee regime, 
whereas the North Koreans shOW' enthusiasm and devotion to their -cause 
however mistaken theY'~y be as to it.s rut~e. frui:tS.1I32 
In terms of tactics, the NCPW sent a statement to every member of the 
House and Senate and a number o~ other government offic:t.al.s cal~ing for a 
negotiated tmce!and seating China in the UN. The letter argued that Korea's 
postwar misery would promote communism, that the U.S. was appearin~ imper-
ialistic to As ia, and that negotiations-Itwithout appeasement"-with the 
Russians were urgently necessar.y.33 
The NOPW' kept up their opposition in the pages of Peace Action in a 
"' . . . 
stream of articles with t~tles li~ "New-est Bungle in Korean War," "Daily 
Heaines ShOll We A~e Losing Asian~,1t "Our 'Liberation' of Korea .Not An 
Inviting Spectacle," "How Long Must '!hey Die NeecD..essly," and etc. lbey 
. . - . 
were consistant1y anti-co1onia1ist, and quoted Justice William O. Douglas's 
-argument that ItWhat is happening in Asia is a series of ~volutions against 
oppre~sion and povertyooe their origin is not communisteoothey call tor a 
201i tical appro~ch ueo more t.mn a military plan of actionon (emphasis 
in the origi.na1o). '!he NJPH drew parallels between the Asian situation 
and America's own revo1utiono "The revolt is against tyranny and intoler-
able living conditions," they wrote, and they argued that the UoS. govem-
ment--"bom in revolution" --shauld "align itself with the people" in a 
peaceful ~lay J as opposed to "undergirding with arms an unjust and unheal-
thy status quo. If 34 
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The NCPW was also very concerned with the role of the UN. TheY' hotJ..y 
disputed the "police action" analogy: police applied law to individuals, 
not nations; were not su,\)jectto I'tempora17 shifts in power politics"; 
did not '''blast and bum whole sale It ; and took orders from a single recog-
nized sovereigntY', which did not exist on a world scale. Mlre fundamentally, 
they a~gued that "the UN is ,a peacemaking :agency, and not a warmaldng 
agency." It "must hot be lis~d:bY' .any Great Power tC?rits own p1,!rpose." 
Showing insight remarkably rare to the times, theY' concluded that "bombs 
bearing the UN tag will alienate and divide rather than unite the nations 
of the world." Fin~llY', theY' noted tha. t . although UN endorsement was sup-
posed to make America's cause morallY' right, Uto the surprise ot m.any, 
both sides are tighting with equal conviction that theY' are 'in the right 
- . . . 
and defending a principle 0 o. the Chinese and North Koreans have gi van their 
lives as freely to expel the 'imperialist inva~rs' as our side .J:1asfought 
and died to repel the 'communist aggressors' o.oeas a consequenc9eooall ot 
Korea, North and South, has been devastatedo,,35 .. . 
By- March, .1953, the NCFt'l, "after many JDOI!-ths of pondering over the ••• 
known facts," concluded that it was It probable 0 0 o that the Penta.~n deli-
beratelY' provoked the Korean war." The NCP'W accused the U.So government 
of having "bunt fear of communism in order to rearm; noted the · previous 
. - - .. ' 
animsitY' between North and South Korea; the withdrawal of UoS. troops in 
1949; the public mistrust of the U.S. towards South Korea's military' inten-
tions; and Acheson's om ission of Korea is his "line of defense" speecho 
The NCP'W charged that "This whole affair was deliberately planned as a 
calculated risk.oo,,36 
The NCPW opposed mrI', the war econoII\Y, and the mre brutal excesses 
of American troops in Korea, such as napalm raids on villages, and 
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"Operation Killer." (The latter, according to New York Times statistics 
the NCN reprinted, "put out of action 134,616 Chinese soldiers of which 
only 616 ••• have been made prisoner.") The NCPW was perhaps weakest in 
proposing specific strategies and tactics. They did print four "Peace 
Plans" by four different authors in successive issues .of Peace Action. but 
these plans were extrerooly Vague, and did not call for much concrete action. 
However, the NCPW frequently argued against the war and domestic mili ta-
o 0 , 
rism clearly and ~rtic~ately, refusing to be swept away by the dominant 
cold war ideology. "If we are wise as well as. brave,"theywr?te, "the 
same eagerness with which we got the UN to bless us into the Korean war 
can be llsed to get out of it. If UN sponsorship can make the U.S. inva-
sion of a foreign country a moral act, then UN sponsorship can make nego-
tiation and withdrawal acts of moral heroism. 
"We shall have to discipline some of our passions and suppress many 
small and foolish prides, it is trueo But if we donft~ we may forget that 
the big thing is the effort for peace and not a temporary victory on an 
obscure and regrettable battlefield.,,3? 
The National Corranittee for Peaceful Alternatives was another articu-
late and fairly radical social activist pacifist group_ The accusation 
by the NCAC that the NCPA was influenced by communists, however, was quite 
, . , ... 
unfounded--the NCPA, in their own words "impartially and sharply criticized 
both the Soviet Union and the United States." Their positions were not 
even as radical as other groups at thetiloo. But their opposition to the 
war was consi stent and intelligent.38 
lilt is uilworthy of our traditional generosity and national creative-
ness that we give Asia no alternatives save communism or the Bo Dais, Rhees, 
and Chiangs ••• " they argued, and added that "Asia's anti-colonial ideas 
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stem directly from our American heritage." '!he NCPA called for recognition 
of China, a halt to the war, and Korea's future to be uregulated by interna-
tional agreement in concert with the Korean people. 1l39 
The NCPA argued that containment was provocative, self-defeating and 
inconsistent. They held that Russia was not illi~erently expanSionistic, 
despi te her "internally dictatorial system.n They addressed economic 
issues, using the standard pacifist technique of writing up an alternative 
budget. Politically, they called for self-determinatio~ in ASia!\ More 
globally, they argued that "The American people have been offered two 
choices,. One is the so-called 'preventive war' oeo:the second is 'armed 
cold wart.eothe first means global war-~ow, the second threatens global 
40 war--latero" 
The NCPA l-TaS also a fairly active group: "proj ects are better than 
meetings," they wrote, and they took on a number of projects including 
post-card campaigns, rallies, and even attempts to put "Peace Planks" in 
41 . 
the plat~orms of the ~TO major parties in the 1952 election. 
The NCN was a practical, articulate critic of the war. They were 
not divorced from the moral aspect of war opposition; for example they 
quoted a Korean living in Seoul as saying to an American, "Thank you, I 
am liberated. IV wife is dead, rrIif children are ma.:L-ned. '!hank you, I am 
liberatedo" More indicative of their philosophy, however, l~as their con-
clusion that "In future cases where aggression is charged, we urge that 
the UN first explore all peaceful means, including mediation and negotia-
tion, before :involci.ng military sanctions. 1f At the time this was a radical 
.d 42 
1. ea. .. 
'I'w'o individuals without group affiliation that made sigmificant con-
tributions to the more radical social activist cause during the Korean war 
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were David B. eho and Stuart Meacham. eho was a Korean studying in America 
at the time of the war, and M3acham had served for ten months in 1947 as 
labor advisor to Lt. General John Hodge, who was then in charge ot t.l-].e UoSo 
occupation torce in Koreao Both men wrote strongly and intelligently about 
the war" and their writings were reprinted in a vast number of Peace move-
ment publications. 
In hts 'mo~~ quoted piece" Meacham began" "Americans 'will be required 
to make an enorxoous contribution indeed to Korea IS well.;.l)eing it .she ever 
is to wipe out the dest~ction which she has felt to to .be her duty to 
visit upon Korea in 1950 • . He then gave andmmerisely detailed history of 
Korea" dating back to 1904" when Theodore Roosevelt's nediatio~ of the 
Russo-Japanese war eventually put Korea under Japanese control. "Thus 
in this tirst Korean crisis, A..TJlerica's contribution was to deliver Korea 
into the hands or the imperialists,," Meachaln charged. M3acham continued, 
giving a thorough account of the U.S. policies in Korea that supported 
landlords, Japanese collaborators, the unretormed ,and "ruthless" police" 
and the repressive Falee governmento or the nature of that scrrernment 
M3achamwrote j "Newspap~rs have been suppressed, students ha~ been spied 
upon and jailed,tracle unionists have been beaten, terrorized" and . impri-
soned, and even JOOmbers of the National Assembly who became un,?omf'ortably 
vocal in their criticism of Rheehave been arrested and jailed." Mea-
cham charged Rhee with failing to implement any of his promised retoms, 
and noted that in the May, '50 elections, Rhee's party could only keep 
40 seats out of over 200 contestso "The biggest question ot all," 
Meacham concluded, tlis whether in this third great Korean crisis in which 
America has played a role our part will be that ot the true defender ,ot 
the Korean people, or will we again be deaf . to their needs because of 
the larger considerations of power politics.n43 
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The other outstanding individual, David Cho, made a strong case for 
Korean self-determination, and was harshly critical of Syngman Rhee. Cho 
. . 
wrote that he was "sympathetic" with American intentions in Korea, but 
he argued that "American goodwill toward Korea is being distorted ••• 
because of the unpopular, corrupt, and ~pressive ruling gr'oup ~ Korea." 
"'lheRllee . re~ has been regarded as ••• rascistic and terroristic" by the 
JlBjorityo£ .the Korean people, he . ~ontinu~d.. Cho stressed theimpc>rtance 
to Koreans of a unified goveJ:'Illl18nt, and · po in~t:!- to th~ agreenentsCJ(if 
Northerl'l.:1and :Southern leaders (leading the Southern dele{;ation was . the 
moderate Kim Kiu Si~) at a,. ,North-SOuth Gonf'erenoe held May 1, 1948. The 
terms of the agreements reaohed at this oonference included: (1) a uni-
fied government; (2) opposition to the establishment of a dictatorship, 
including a dictatorship of' the proletariat; (3) opposition to monopolis-
tio oapitalism, but a reoognitio~ of the right of' p~ivate property; (4) the 
unified government to, be fO!'m9d through eleotions in"all Korea; (5) pro-
visions for the withdrawal of foreign troops and bases. i'he, 'gr?!lPthat 
blocked this agree~nt, Cho argued, was lheels "ultra:ri~tistsoIt49 
The IOrean conflict, Cho continued, was a civil waro ~damentally, 
Koreans should have the right of self-determinationo Quoting Kim Kiu Sic, 
_Cho wrote, "If we Koreans are . to ~fer, . l .et, it bE:l by our hands; if "'19 
are to prosper, let it be by our own ef'forts.lI In conclusion, Cho wrote, 
"It. is evident that military intervention of the foreign powers does 
settle the problem of Korea, but rather does lead the Korean people from 
frustration to frustration, and to a misttust in their liberators.n4, 
For the most part, truly .radical leftist influence on the social 
activists in the Peace movement during this period was nd.nimal. ntis was 
due in large part to internal and external problems of the Lert which will 
be discussed later. One exanple of' such opposition, however, is the 
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writings of Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy of the Monthly Review o "T'ne 
Korean itTar shows our rulers are leading us a~ong the road to national 
defeat and disaster,," they began, in a special pa."!I.phlet they wrote on 
Korea. ContL'"luing, they argued that, "The U.S. govemm3nt in efrect 
invited the North Koreans to attack, then made no plans to !reet the attack 
when it ca..'l'fe." Rejecting as "nonsense" the idea that the~e was a "hideous 
't-Iall Street plattt to blame for the war, they did argue that "al1oost the 
entire Amerioan · ruling class has seriously misjudged the forces at work 
in the world today-oun Although Huberman and Sweezy were sickeningly 
sycophantic to the Soviet Union ('.I;Fhstern European countries are governed 
h"t.r eastern Europeans; it was Czech communists with the support of many 
~ .. ' . - " .., 
Czech social democrats who took over in Czechslovakia in 1948 ••• " they 
claimed), their .progra.'1l 1-TaS comparatively moderate: stop the Korean war, 
admit China to the UN, cease support of Formosa, and allow Asian nations 
selr-determinatio n, with the U.S. adopting a policy of friendship with the 
new natio'ns, whether they had ch~s~.I}- _?.~~italism, communism 'or socialism. 
Still no ot.1ter group in the peace~n.:t ';would rna tch Huberrran and Sweezy's 
radica.l rhetoric, although as we will see, American Women for Peace caJOO 
46 
close. 
To, continue looking at the Peace !>bverent during the Korean war, it 
now becomes useful to separate groups into 17NO further sub-categories":-
sub-aategories which had their origins in trends described in the pre-
vious c,hapter. These sub-categories are: (1) Those whose ideology was 
a roughly equal lU of religious pacifist and so cial . activist pacifist 
ideologies, and (2) Large, radical women t s peace groups. 
The first ~ategory was .compo~ed primarily of religious pacifists 
who had come to take an increasingly poli tical view of the world without 
- '( ) -
ever compromising their absolute pacifism.. The positive side of this 
combination was that it led to well-infornJ?d and morally powerful 1var 
opposition.. The less positive side was a certain con...f'usion over tactics; 
the tradition of individual witness and that of political activism were 
SOIrel'1hat contradictory. Still" some of the JOOst ~ginative,intelligent, 
and imaginative opposition to the Korea war came from pacifists in this 
group. The two outstanding exa."lIples of this type were A. J. Muste, and 
the organization Pea.cema,kers .. 
, 
Tne Peacemakers were a radical pacifist group vl~O~ membership included 
such notables as Muste and David Dellinger. Peacemakers -SUcce.ssful-ly" ~ 
blended a moral, absolute pacifism with speclfic critiques o~ U.S. imper-
ialism, white supremacy, and of U.S.-UoS.S.R. power politics. They called 
for the seating of China in the UN and an immediate cease-fire in Korea •. 
Strategically, they worked on everything from fasts to rallies, and ~ 
good number of things in bett·men" 
The rhetoric of the Peacemakers could get quite strong: they ref~rred 
to U.S" imperialism; U.S. "warmongersll aicliilg "fascist" countries; etc. 
Peacemaker Ammon Hennacy wrote "T'nere is a class s ·liruggle and ••• we live 
under a capitalist dictatorship.1t However, the Peacemakers had no illu-
sions about Russia, taking care to condemn flboth Thlssian and American 
imperialism.1I One of their members in -a letter even accused the Peace-
makers of becoming at times "too anti-Russian .. o" Finally and most embarrass-
ingly, "subversive-exposing" Scripps-Howard columnist Frederick vloltnlan 
, . . .. 
dismissed Peacemakers as a Quaker pacifist organizatio~, ·a£filiated with 
the FOR, which was "even mo~ c~servative than Peacemakers." -This brought 
an angry denial of Itconservatism~ from the Peacemakers, who responded 
that their program was quite radicalo "We are ashamed that our presentation 
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has been so weak that it is conceived a.~ conservative," they wrote. 
The Peacemakers endorsed a wide range of activities, renecting the 
differing influences on their ideology. They fasted, worked on political 
carnpaigns, held rallies, encouraged tax resistance, attempted to send a 
delegation to Eastern'1llrope, worked against racial segregation, tried to 
promote "spiritual develOPment," .and called for the creation of . a world-
wide "Satygraha peace force." Their r~llies and meetings were compara-
tively SllBll, but that was in keepin~ with the style ~fa religiously 
based paCifism, primarily intent on keeping the faith. Still, over 200 
people attended an anti-Korea~ wa~ rally Jul~H, 1950, at w:hich !'luste, 
Dellinger and Igal Rooden~ spoke. At the sane t~, I?ellinger .a.nd four 
others,.undertook a two week fast in protest of the wa~. The Peacemakers 
continued both sorts of activities throughout the war.48 
Tax resistance was also pra,cticed by . Peacemakers: 59 of their members 
refused to pay par'!; or all of their taxes. A. J. ~ste, with his usual 
panache, sent the IRS a copy of the Gospels and . 'lhore~u' s . II El3say ,on 
Civil Disobedience" along with a note explaining why he could not pay his 
taxes.49 
en the political ,si~, Peaoe,makers sponsored a "vote for peaoe" cam-
_ paign durin~ the '52 election, which·. featured a "peace oaravan" and massive 
leafiettingo Sone 31,000 "vote for peace-how?" leafiets were distri-
buted around the campaign headquarters of the major candidates. The leaf'-
let advised which candidates running in ,the elction "pacifists may support 
with a clear conscience." 'lhese candidates were: Darlington Hoopes, SP 
- . 
nominee .and also FOR and WRL member; Eric Haas of' the Socialist Labor Party'; 
H.C. Ibldridge of the American Rally, Ua mixture of vegetarians, money 
reformers and ex-Trotskyists If; and Fred Proehl of the Greenback Party. 
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It was not a good election year for the Peace movement. Peacemakers would 
also picket around campaign headquarters of t~ ~jor candidates with 
signs proclaiming such zoottoes as "Wars will cease when men refuse to fight,," 
and "Vote tor peace with Thoreau and Ghandi.,,50 
Peacemakers, however, always seemed a little unsure of themselves when 
it care to tactics. At the end of an article on their campaign work 
they asked, "ls this the type . of project Peacemakers should.spend 'more 
time on? Is this one effective.wa~ C?f gett~g our Dessage across: And, 
JOOst important, what should Peacemakers be doing now as a grouP?" '!heir 
; 
actions ranged from an approving article on Senator Ralph 'Flan.q..~,rs' Senate 
. . ... - . . ; ' .. 
speech ~hi.ch favored "broader J?f3ace terms," to ~ unsuccesstuJ. attempt by 
Peacemakar:Fyke Farmer to subpeo~Pres~dent Trwnan to a Kansas .city federal 
court to show tha t the Korean 'War had been a result of "illegal policies 
and "a':misuse of the United Nationso,,51 
Peacemakers could, on the other hand,. carry on a serious political 
dialogue. '!hey stressed the repressive nature ,and 'lttlpopularity of th~ 
Rhee government, oJ?Posed imperial~~m, and emp~s~zed the j~stnes~of national 
self-determination. They called nl'Jt for "the -reVOlutionary- nationalism 
, . . . - . 
of the local elite," but ra~he:r for the "r~volutiorary- nationalism of the 
,-majority of Asians." They were concerned that neither ~he U.S. nor 1,the ' 
U.S.~.R. ,impose their "system" on the Koreans. Domestically, th~y worked 
against .racial segregation, against UMr, and in support of C.Oos.52 
The Peacemakers were an active, intelligent organization. They could 
and did denounce with equally moral and informed authority the brutalities 
and inhumanities df Korean battles, as well as the policy mistakes that 
- . . " . 
helped provoke the -w:ar. Peacemakers also SIlffered from a considerable 
amount of police harrassment, ranging from detentions to ,arrests to actual 
pol ice assaul ts on their members, and remained undauntedo However, it 
remained unclear exactly what they wanted moSt, to be doing. '!be religious 
and political parts of their ideo~ogy agreed on opposing the war, but pointed 
in different strategic directio m. "This is not a tire for pacifists to 
withdraw from public work and witness," they wrote, "or for the pacifist 
movement locally or nationally "fjo contract .its ac~ivitieso vle suggest 
that wherever possible pacifists in local communities, "preferably ~s ,groups, 
openly'reai'firm their continued.fideli ty ,to the non-violent·:~way, state 
their position with respect to the present war, and do all in: their power 
to secure consi<:leratio n of non ""'Violence as a true way for the nation and 
for individuals." What exactly that meant, especially during the difficult . - . . 
years of the Korean war, was hard to define. 53 
A.J. J.fuste deserves a section all to himself. Once identified as . . . . . ,. 
IfAmericats #1 pacifist." Musuwas ~ctive in the FO~, the ~, Peacemakers, 
and did a considerable amount of l-vriting on his own. Hi~ pacifism was 
factually detailed, morally powerful, and uncompromi~ing. "~J?rogram 
for thiB;~generation is NO MORE WAR," he wrote, "Ollr program for the Korean 
war is STOP THE WAR.II'9 
Mustefs pamphlet "Korea: Spark to Set a World Afire?" first publislled 
in July, 1~O'by the FOR, was a detailed indictnent of U.S. policy: it 
gave a comprehensive historical background. to the war, criticizing .American 
- policies and Syngman ~ee's repres~iveness; it derli.ed the war simply 
began with North Korean a~gl'ession; denied ~e war was a "police action"; 
and argued that the conflict was in fact a civil war that had been caught 
up .in a power struggle between the U.S. and the U.S~S.R. Mlste argned 
that the U.S. looked worse in Korea than did Russia. l-hlste called for 
an immediate ceasefire, mediation, and for the UN never again to serve 
as a war agency. Not only did Mustefind the idea of the UN serving as 
such a "police agencY" in the future objectionable, he also argued 
such a concept was a sham: "The UoS. is increasing its military budget 
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by billions of dollars.. There is no pretense that these vast new forces 
are even nominally UIi contingents or brought into being as a resul t of 
mr deliberation and decision." He concluded this 32 page pamphlet 
with a call to deal with the "real spiritual and economic causes of lIar 
in thismodern loTOrld.u55 
"Korea: Spark to Set A World Afire?" was qne of the outstanding 
anti-l'lar pieces of the Korean war. Muste ma~ .similar arguments in his 
shorter pieces, such as the short pamphlet "The ?-1eaning of Korea," and his ... . . . .. 
article lTWhat Really Happened in Korea." Muste f s influence was obvious 
in the II Statement of American Religious and Peace leaders on the Korean 
Crisis, July 19500" Muste was the Secretary of this group, and the anti-
war eta tement produced, which used many of . Muste f s arguments, was endoresed 
by 30 leading pacifists and sympathizers, including Dorothy Day of the 
Catpolic ~"orker, a number of religions leaders, and prominent members of 
the FOR, vlRL ~ .A.FSC, Peacemakers, and the t-lomen t s In term tional League for 
Peace and Freedom. The statement was especially critical of UoS. defense 
of Formosa, and stressed that the Korean 1~ar had been caught up in super-
pOiier struggles, l-Thich deprived the un of lithe moral force which it 
might exercise.,,56 
11uste kept up a steaqy stream of wri tinge against the war throughout 
the w·ar1s duration, and even after itlflS over. He remained the most 
articulate and proli~ ii. " individual critic of the war in the peace .. movenent 
and, arguably, in the country as a whole 0 Knowledgeable and compassionate, 
some of his eri ticisms ring true for a number of other periods and 
places in the.history of American foreign policy: "f!ncle Sam the exploiter 
and soldier has to get out of Korea," he argued, II .. ein order t~at Uncle 
Sam the friend and the skilled worker may enter and be lielcomed." Although 
- 80 -
Muste's religious orientation influenced ?That tactics he chose to advocate--
primarily individual witness, internal education, civil disobedience, .. :.l'tith 
an occasional letter to ~ representative thrown in--his arguments were 
sharply political. The leading individual pacifist of the period, A.J. 
Muste was absolutely crucial to the peace movement during the Korean war.57 
_ ._--------- ----
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Not all groups in the Peace lOOVeIll8nt opposed the Korean war.. Moti-, 
vationsfor;:support: df ' ~the war in various "peace" grouJ>.f3 ranged frome~treme 
anti-communism, to unTtTavering belief in the UN to general conservatism .. 
These. , gro~psdid share, however, a notable lack of knowledge of and/or 
int.erest in the backgrollt'"ld of the Korean war in Korea. This category 
~cluded the United World Federalists, the American Peace Society, and 
the World Organization of Mothers of All Nations eo 
One might very '-Tell be able to guess what the perspective of the 
United vlorld Federalists would be on the war just on the basis of knowing 
that the UN had endorsed it. And sure enough, on the cover of a 1952 
UWF publication, there was the following Abraham Linco~n quote: "With 
firl1'll'l.ess in the right as God gives us to see the right,.<let ,us strive 
on to finish the 'tvork 't-Ie are in ••• n The UtalF was in fact very weak during 
the Korean war period, and their demands were equally palid. They supported 
the tolar, but as a ~ture solu~ion called for ,,-vorld disa~nt, and a 
UN police force that would prevent nations from rearming. The police force 
would arrest individuals in the government of any offending nation and 
a vTorld Court would be set up to try the offenders. The UN was to be 
, . 
given the pm-Ters to create and enforce the above condi. tions. The T,;'WF 'Was 
equally astute on superpower relations: "There's going to C0100 a time 
- 81 -
when we will have to settle some things with Stalin--serious political 
things,1t they argued, without going into any greater detail. This was, 
of course, hard to diSPute.58 
Al though the trvJF was not openly enthusiastic ~bout the Korean war J 
and called for negotiations with the Soviet Union-""whenever possible 
without appeasement"--the UN endorsement of the Korean war ensured a matching 
endorsement from the miF.59 
Another group one .IlJ.ight have suspec~d of supporting the war-since 
it rarely opposed any war--was the American Peace Societyo. 'Ihe APS did 
in fact support thE:' \ltl"f in Korea; they also opposedrecogl'lition of China, 
claimed the war had "ren tatlized the .UN," and were generally obsessed 
by anti-communism. 
The APS pUblication ~lorld Affairs reported the outbreak of the war 
as t1when the solemn agreerr.ent to maintain the 38th Parallel in Korea was 
broken and heavy tanks and hordes of foot soldiers poured down the open 
roads of South Korea upon a weaker but more enlig.'1tened people, just as 
Hitler had invaded Poland in 1939." On the bright side , "The Korean crisis,," 
they lVTOte later, "dramaticaUy and opportunely. transformed the United 
Nations into an active and ci,y-namic organization_,,60 
The APS at one point admitted that rtAJ. though our interventions 
in the East have been generally well rreant, they have, ?n the 'Whole, nei-
ther benefitted the people nor established our security.~f But this is as 
far as they evel"' lrent, blinded as they were by anti-communismo "Theories 
expounded by Karl Marx have been converted by Russian revolutionary con-
. . . . 
spirators into a gospel and instrument for seizure, exercises and exten-
sien of power. Their gospel calls for world domination," wrote the APS. 
'!hey added that "allover the world, in every culture, every way of life," 
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communism was "mald.ng war" on God and human freedom. With this perspec-
tive in mind, the APS divided the nations of the world into three cate-
gories: "free people~," such as citizens of the UoS. and western lhrope; ~ 
lIenslaved peoples," i.e. those)iving in the communist countries; and those-
such as the 3:>uth ,Koreans-"asp;iring to freedom" but "in grave danger of 
becoming enslaved. ,,61 
The APS , supported the war to the very end, utterly devoted to cold 
war ideology. , In the S'Ul7Ill1er of '53, as the war was ,ending, they wro~, 
Itpeace is one thing and securitZquite another. , Peace ,might be 'restored' 
in Korea by first an agreement to suspend fighting there and next an agree-
ment in terms of a settlement. But such agreements if brought about by 
concessions to the aggressor would give neither real people nor any secu-
rity.n This may sound like an odd argument for a "Peace Society" to 
make, but coming from the peace Society't-lhich hardly ever opposed a war, 
" 62 
it "is, not that , surprisi:n~. ' 
en the "other Jmrid, a group that ·one might well have expected to oppose 
the war ~hat did not was the Socialist Partyo The SPwill be discussed 
la ter when the poverty of thought on the left during this time is examined, 
but is mentioned here to stress the fact that ,up until the Korean war, the 
SP had had such a strong pacifist tradition that it co~~legitim~ly 
lay c~ to being part ,of the traditional pacifist ' 
was nQ1led before, this tra:dition was sufficiently strong that neither ' 
the SP or SP leader Norman Thoms could bring themselves to support the 
Allies in World \-1ar IIo However, the SP during the cold war (and after) 
were rapidly and harmfully anti-cornmunist" A clue waS given i.z:t a sp~ech 
Norman Thoms gave before the outbreak of the war, in February, 1950" 
Ti tIed by the socialist paper the Q!ll an "eloquent plea for peace," the 
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speech .. Tas essentially traditional socialist pacifism. But it contained 
a brief yet ominous hint of 1-That .. Tas to come: 1I}la.rshall Stalin,tt Thomas 
warned, "we do not promise any appeasement to you, we do not promise arry 
abatement of our struggle against :injustice, but we tell you for your 
sake and your people that the world cannot stand the decision of its 
quarrels by the blind destruction tmro.rds ~hich 'i'e race.1f Four months 
, do h 63 later, Thoms would en rse t e Korean war. , 
A ma~or reason f~.p Thomas's surprising shift was simply extreme anti-
communism~ At a League for Industrial Democracy torumduring the war 
(LID was basically an SP organization), Sidney Hook spoke of "the nature 
of the total dedication of the Sbviet regime to the destruction of free 
, , . 
institutions every'f'lhere.1f 'Ihus the SP, potentially and traditiornlly 
an articulate and active ally of the' peace movement~ was lost to the 
cause.64 
Some of the strongest and rrnst active opposition to the Korean .. Tar 
came f;rom large, radical wo~nt.s pacifist groups. But not all women's 
groups .. rere necessarily ra~cal. .. The "'arId Organization of Mothers of 
All Nations (l-rOMA...iI1), in addition to having a. redundant narne'loTere one 
of thellDre conservative groups of tm period. The lesson that 1-101-00Ldrew 
from the Korean war was that the UN needed "strengthenin~'--which meant 
abolishing the veto, and creating a st~ong world,police force~ 
An outstanding feature of ,1eMAN was their anti-communism. They argued 
that Itvlorld domination!! was Hitler!s "concept of how to get permanent 
peace--and the stalinist ideal, as far as peace is ~oncerned, is the 
sarr.e." 'Ihey argued for a UN world police force on anti-co~:i,.st ' lines, 
claiming that "such a force offers the best, if not the only feasible 
solution to the problem of defeating the communist campaign for ,the control 
of all the lmman racso" Not only was ~vOMAN anti-communism as it referred 
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to existing systems, they even went so far as to deny that "a more just 
distribution of the world's resources" would help prevent l-Tar. "Rich 
, . ~ 
states as well as poor have waged aggressive war,u they pointed out. . 
WOPiAN call~d for "an enlargement of ~he Security C01l..'1cilj a law a~inst 
aggression and preparation for aggression; an internation Supreme Court ••• : 
an international police force to move if th.e ~urt' so:r:ders were not accepted; 
and the waiving of the veto in case of aggression or preparation for 
aggression." This pr?posa~l-Ta~written up a~ ~ Congressional Resolution 
(S. Con. Res. #104, ~. C?n.Res. #253-271, Aug~ 25, 1950), and had 21 Senate 
and 19 House spo~sors, covering a political spectrum from Hubert Humphrey 
to .-]lichard Nixon .. 
WOWlU never o~~s~d.- the Korean't-rar, but rather draw "lessonsll from it. 
'Ihe lessons they drew and the actions they took were conservative and 
drenched in the anti-communism of the day~ But, as is about to be shown, 
this was quite different from what other women's peace groups were doing 
at the time. 
One of the largest, most radical, most active, and mo~t wide-ranging 
organizations opposing the Korean TtTar was American Women 'for Peace. AiVP 
was a natiooal umbrella network of women's groups, formed during the Peace 
Delegation to Washington, August 5, 1950. Its membership included a 
number of Progressive Party and American Labor Party members, so the A1VP 
was quite radical, not only on the war, but on domest~c economic and race 
issue s as well. Still, AWP identified itself strongly as a' "women's" 
peace group in the traditional sense: "Let the war forces knO"N" that Peace 
will be guaranteed by garnering the strength, enthusiasm, fearlessness 
and genuine love for humility which women in an independent movement 
for peace can bring to the overall peace movement in our country,'" they 
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proclaimed, "Homen are the strength of the Peace mov.enel'lt in America ••• 
in addi. tion to thi~ women have throughout the history of this country 
played a militant and leading role wherever great social progress had 
taken place.,,67 
In the first issue of their joumal, Peacemaker, in October 1950, 
AWP began by asking for mediation of the Korean confiict, and for the 
seating o~ Chil!a in the U.N. But as the war dragged .o.n, the AWP became 
more impatient. "Peace is~he 01'D.:~ Victory41 became their slogan in 
December, 1950. "Chanuhkahoe ~Christmas 1950,11 they editorialized, tiThe 
fighting continues in Korea ••• the fear of war--of greater war--darkens the 
lights of CHanukah, clouds the star of Christmas eo ." !heir demands were 
" ••• cease fighting in 'Korea, seat the legal government of China, ban the 
. , 
Atom bombo" Still maintaining a rather ideological view of their 'Woman-
hood, th~y aI-so wrote "We reject the idea that Americans must kill Koreanso 
We hold that a mother's tears are just as real and bitter whether _she 
be an .American or Korean, and so we feel that we are fighting not only 
for our children, but for the world's childreno" A year later at Christ-
mas, AWP wrote angrily of "the hypo -cr~s.y of a campaign for clothing 
for Korea; for clothing for those whom,we -:have bombed and tor.tured 
. - . " , 
and driven out of their homeso This is what we haveooeinstead ot homst 
and speedy negotiations in Korea, instead of a Five-Powerpactoo.1I68 
Disillusionment had set in e arlyo Referring to proposals from Hoover 
. -
and Taft tor withdrawal trom Korea, bIlt "no slackening in American rearma-
ment," AWP responded "We do not want an armed truce, we want~aceooIs 
this the best that our statesmen can offer to the people of the world: a 
lull in the fighting while our country ~urns all its magnificent potentia-
lists into preparation for a bigger and bet-lier war?" By February of 1951 
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AWP was indulging 1."1 some of its most radical phrasemaking: "Last month 
the U.S. clearly revealed its war policy when it forced through the u.~ro 
a resolution branding the People's Republic of China as an aggressor .. o 
do our military men forget that while killing their. enemy and devastating 
the land, our men are also dying: Or don't they care, so long as profits--
fantastic profits--.f'or corporations keep piling up?" On the same page 
"A Message Addressed by the Korean ,-romen to the '-{omen of the World" 
showed~ . ~n the words of AiolP, "The indomi. table courage of the (Korean) 
peopleoeowho, no matter what the cost, will .drive the imperialist aggres-
sors out of their countryo,,69 
Their criticism continued ~ll:~~stently, and occasionally shrilly. 
ltlcArthur's firing prompted a ba~age of simpl~stic rhetoric. According 
to AWP, reasons why "the President decided to get rid of the Napoleem 
from Toky,?" included: 
It (1) 0 Both men are attempting to plunge the U.S. into another 
i-lorld War, but their~iming is differento MacArthur wants to declare war 
now, Truman wants to .wait until the U.S. has more atomic bombs (and) 
an even larger anny 0 •• 
If (2). Dumping MacArthur gives Truman an opportunity to pose as 
a friend of peace. By deluding the people in this way J he hopes to 
sell wavering liberals on his war program. 
It (3). MacArthur is in fawr of t dumping' EuropeoooTruman believes 
it would be folly to fight without England and Franceo 
It (h) 0 MacArthur believes the U.S. can win a 'cheap' victory , mainly 
through air and sea power. Truman is surfecing from no such delusion. 
Therefore he wants to build America's ground forces. 
" (5). Finally, there is good reason to believe that Truman needs 
a scapegoat to account for kl~ica's failure to win a quick victory 
i.11 Koreao By dumping MacArthur, he hoped to take some heat off the 
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administration. Both men favor a war policy. They merely disagree on 
the best way to do the job.n70 
This tone continued. In July t 51, the Peacemaker reached its radical 
height, taking another crude leftist stab at the U.S. again in five points" 
"v.1hy is the U.S. so intent in keeping troops in Korea?" 
11 (1). '!Wo weeks before Truman sent GIs to Korea. South Koreans 
voted to oust Syngman Rhee. Unification with the North was the next logi-
cal step. 
ff (2). Millions of Americans dollars are invested in Korea" Unifica-
tion would endanger them" •• 
(3).. A 'national emergency' is needed at home to maintain our inflated 
II 71 economy. 
Yet not all they wrote was grim or propagandistic : "There is better 
hope for America and mankind," they insisted, 1I~'1ere is hope fOr" peace, 
and the fruits of peace o There is the possibility of agreement between 
all nations .... we must demand of our government that it use our resources 
for the benefit of our people; for schools, medical care; for soil conser-
vation, and the construction of projects similar to the Tennessee Valley 
Authority; ,'for 'housing, for adequate nutrition; for culture. Ours is 
a beautiful country, rich in people, rich in resources. Those people 
must have peace; those resources must be used for peace!" A later editorial 
concluded, "" .. I know that our fight l~ill be won ••• No matter what obstacles 
are placed in our paths, our figh t will go on." "our fight will be wono" { 2 
The radicalism of the AWP was not solely confined to the fight±qg 
in Korea. Economic and racial issues were stressed heavily and often. 
Economics brought out the traditional "women-oriented" side of AWP, 
in contrast to some of' t.'1e polemics above. /on article noting that from 
June to December, 19S0 wages had increased 5t while prices had gone up 
I Ii n 
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31% made the following plea: IlBillions for I-rar leaves little left for lamb 
chops. Let's tell our President and Congressmen to make peace in the 
world--tell them that lamb chops are more American than bombs o " Their 
examples, even when quantifiable, tended to be "homey." Don't let anyone 
tell you that farming to the teeth' is a cheap price to pay for peace. 
vIe women know the true oost ••• we know from first-hand experience, coming 
home from shopping with a market basket lighter than it should be, and 
. , 
wi th a purse much emP-tier than ever before. It Tflis table was gi w .n to 
illustrate price rises: 
1940 1950 
Apples ••• ~~~ ••••• b¢ 12'¢fb. 
Banarias~~~ ••• ~~~~~ 24¢ 52¢ doz. 
Lemonso~~.~;~~~~ •• 25¢ 45¢ doz~ 
Oranges ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~. ~ ~ • ; ~ 30¢ 35¢ doz. 
Cabbage~ ••• ~~~~ ••• 3¢ 7¢ lb. 
Carrots.o ••••••• ~o 5¢ 10¢ bunch 
Celery.o •• o ••••••• 9¢ 18¢ stalk 
"Since August,n they continued, If CarL'1e d vegetables, butter, to!natoes and 
some :treats have hit new highs. As for coffee, you know what's happened." 
After complaining about higher taxes, AWP concludes "We can see that part 
of more 'preparedness' has led into 101-rered living standards 0" 73 . 
Another Id.nd of economic statement was made in the October, 1951 Peacemaker. 
The AWP noted that a bomber plane cost as much as. a new school, and llmili-
tary installations,1I as much as lI,the development of all our River Valleys to 
provide cheap power and control floodso ll "Wllich do you want?1I they askedo 
Also, the ATNP continued throughout the war to link war spending with infla-
tion. AIso-- in a true sign of the times--A~VP felt it necessary a num-
ber of tines to argue that "war and war spending" were not lithe only alter-
native to depression:74 
Racial issues, both at home and abroad were also stressed by AWP~ 
Willie McGee, Dr. vl.E.B. DuBois, the condition of blacks in the army, peace 
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movement links with negro wOllen, dotrestic racism; ,and the case of Leon 
Gilbert were all given considerable attention. Gilbert was a combat com-
mander of the all black 24th Infantr,r Regiment. A decorated soldier in 
VJfN' 2, was courtmartialled and sentenced to death in Korea for alleged "refu-
sal to lead his troops into combat.'! '!his was despite the fact that Gilbert 
had been without sleep for six days and nights, was in a state of' shock 
and was suffering from dysenta.rY'. His defense counsel put up no defense, 
and told Gilbert that if he were to take the stand, things "would go harder 
on him." None of' Gilbert's wi~nesses .wer~allowed ~ testify, and he was 
sentenced by an all-white jury. (This case, and a number of' similar cases, 
, \ 
would become a cause celebre of the Korean War, especially wi thin the black 
. '.. 
communi ty, and will be discusse d in detail in chapter fi ye., ) 
AWP reported the above facts of Gilbert's case, with appropriate com-
mentar,r: "Feeling that the fight for Peace and the fight for Justice for 
- .. 
all Negroes in our armed forces is inseparable, and that without full equality 
and justice for all the colored peoples of the world there can be no last-
ing Peace, American vToman for Peace have w:ri tten to Presi~nt Truman demand-
ing his intervention in this gross miscarriage of justice, and to Mrso 
, '. . 
Gilbert, saluting her and stating that American Women for Peace are with 
her in her heroic fighto" Truman eventually commuted Gilbert's sentence 
to seV'enteen years, and Mrs. Gilbert",was Guest of Honor at an AWP Roosevelt 
Memorial dinner, January 31, 1951 0
75 
Closer to home, AWP stressed the critical importance of "unbreakable 
. . 
ul'lity between Negro and White wotren ... "Hhite women must realize that they 
have much to learn from Negro women, and that there is very little they can 
teach themo.o~~e rotten corruption of national White Supremacy.o.stands 
between us and a democratic, peaceful Americao" They were also concerned 
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with the " growing racist brutalities agajnst the Negro people at home." The 
Harriet Tubman Committee for Peace and Freedom had Itdistributed and sold thou-
sands of buttons bearing this slogan, 'Bring the Boys Home to fight Jim Crow. r" 
reported AWP.. Also on the home front, the AT"fP devoted considerable space to 
the trial of Dr. W.E.B. DuBois. DuBois, and others in the Peace Information 
Center which DuBois headed, were being brought -to trial on the accusation that 
they were · acting as "foreign agents." "Peace is under attack,!! announced AWPo , 
"The indictment of the scho~arly Dr. DuBois is not only an attack on the forces 
of peace, but an in suI t to the Negro people. uPeace is not treasono" AT.,{P also 
reported on a vigil in Washington of 132 black women on September 29-00'00001' 1, 
19510 The rally liaS orga~ized, in the words ,of the protesters, to allow them 
"personally to address their government for absolute immediate and unconditional 
redress of grievances," including Korean 'far issues . Additionally, AWP co-spon-
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sored an "inter-racial Peace Festival" in Harlem, November 30-December 2, ,.9510 
MacArthur's firing brought charges of his racism from Aw~--justifiable 
charges, in light of what Thurgood Marshall and some black journalists had 
found. "MacArthur is fired, but Harlem shed no tears ••• " the~ wrote, "to the 
Negro GI, he represents the status quo of hated Army Jim Crow. MacArthur's whole 
concept of the 'oriental mind'--the Igook'--is a terrible expression of vfuite 
Supremacy all too well undel"stood by the Negro people." The bulk of black 
opinion at the tine did indeed view :t-facArthur as being a racist. Quoting New 
York Councilman Earl Brown from the Amsterdam News, AWP ~oncluded, lI}facArthur 
is gene;-good riddance.,,7? 
AWP could get fairly radical on this issue. They reprinted an entire 
letter sent to the Pittsburgh Courier by 54 black soldierso ttWhy are we in this 
army? tVhy is this country fighting in Korea?" the letter began, and it went 
on to describe the discrimination and segregation blacks were exposed to, both 
in the Al"I11'.1 and in America. T'ne A\fP lIemphasized the interconnection of the drive 
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toward war with the increased oppression of the Negro people in the IT.S o , 
pointing out the similarity betw'een the attempt to conquer the colored people 
in Korea with (1) the 'judicial murder' ••• of 7 negroes in ¥Artinsville, Vir-
ginia on alleged charges of rape. (2) The sentence of Willie McGee in Mississippi ••• 
(3) '!he Criminal action of the N.J. police and courts which, under tor.ture, , 
extracted confessions of murder from 6 Trenton Negroes ••• (4) The imprisonment 
of Hrs 0 Rosa Lee Ingram and her two sons for defending herself from the assault 
of a white man. 1t At its most extreme, AWP once wrote, '''-Shoot Kvery'tlUng That 
MOves.' This is the order given to U.S. troops in Korea. Such an order would 
.. --
not be permitted were it not for our policy of terror against the Negro people 
at home.n78 
Although the propagandistic style of the AWP could become irritatinglysim-
plistlc, when they were at their best, they could connect the issues of the 
. , 
war, domestic economics, and racism in a very eloquent fashion. An example of 
this was the testimony of the AWP Chair Clementina Paolone, speaking before the 
Salate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committee. Much of this bears 
reprin tin g: 
"What is five million dollars-~vhich is what a good Federal medical ser-
vice would cost--compared with 72 billions now' being appropriated for war? Death, 
it seems is 14 thousand tiJOOS more expensive than the continuation tJf life •• 0 . 
"The schools that build healthy minds, the:,.:playgrounds that build strong 
limbs, the houses that make for unity and security in the family, and the hos-
pitals that heal the sick--the budget for these have been rutI:Uessly s~ash~~ ••• 
"In the Far 'East, our young men are dying, it is said, for democracy ••• 
But are they fighting in democracti<?<7~ly fomed units? Does too Negro Soldier 
fight in a discriminationless army? •• To bring full democracy abroad, we must 
first practice it :'here at home. 
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"The 72 billion dollar question I submit is: shall we meet with the otm'!' 
nations of the world around a United Nations table, sanely, as responsible h~man 
beings striving honestly for good-~ll among nations--and all the decent things 
which we, as free people, have as a cherished heritage: llie anS'tfer, from 52% 
of the American population--the women of our country--:-Ioud, clear, firm, is 
Y Ilt 79 es. -
The A1tfP was not just an ideological organization, howevero They successfully 
promoted a great deal of activity, especiall:r in '50 and '51 ~ ~ey' .sez:\t a aelega-
'tion to the State Department,ln August, 1950; organtzed a 1000-no:nen protest at 
' ." .. . " 
the u.n., October 24, '50; helped organized a "Peace ~rusaden to vTCl:shington of 
2500 people; protested at t~e U.N., a~ain in April, '51; momted numerous post-
eaI'd campaigns; canvassed and polled; mounted a massive drive of "peace h8:Tlots"; 
participated in the Chicago Peace Congress of 1951, which boasted 5,000 dele-
gates; wrote Trygve Lie regularly; printed leaflets; participated in pickets; and 
even entered "Peace Floats" in parad.eso Also, they sent a delegation of women 
to Korea. Thi~ level of activity was unmatched in this period, 
On October 24, 1950, "1000 woman went to Lake Success and Flushing Meadows, 
in orde::- to urge. the representatives of the various nations to media~ the Korean 
Qonflict, and ~causes of international tensionso" A,tFI~shing l1ea~ows, a 
small group of leaders, including DrQ Paolone, heard Truman give what they called 
his lion the one hand we must disarm--on the other we must have arms to guarantee 
peace" speech. At Lake Success, Trade Union leader Esther Letz pro,c::laimed, "The 
fight for Peace is no easy. thing, but if peace is subversive, we are guilty of 
of that charge." A petition in support of Leon Gilbert with 500 signatures was 
presented by a Philadelphia hou~~w.tfe,. and the program concluded with the reading 
.of the Lord's Prayer, and the singing of ItAmerica .. n80 
On November 30, 1950, 2500 women \-Tent back to Lake Success. Overnowing 








organize ,its delegations." "Peace is the only victo;oy," read their banners, 
and, in their words, '''Peace! Peace Now I' was the thene of the women, old and 
young .. 0" Delegations were sent t~ Prime Minister Att~ee, Warren Austin, Sir 
Gladwyn Jebb, Robert Chuaval, Andrei. Vishinsky, and "Dr~ 'Vlu, of the People's 
Republic of China. The message to the delegates began, "We, American Woren 
for 'P eace, mothers , wives, swee thearts of the men who are fighting this war--
wonen passionate for peace--wonen who dread the gold star, the barren grave ••• " 
. . ~. . .' .
and ended by asking "the representatives ot all nations: is it JlX>re important 
. ' . . . 
to fix the blame for aggression than to mediate peaoe? Is it not indeed more 
noble to put an end to war, lest unborn generati0l"!-~ . curse the men now living 
who brought about the destruotion of civilization? .. oWe call upon all govern-. . . ' .. . 
ments to end the war. We urge you to use your great infl.uences and talents 
towards that end. If The message to Austin demanded "leadership for peace of 
- . . . - . 
the American delegation •• oWe call upon our government to end. the war--coura-
._geously, unilaterally, if need be. We ask our government to bring our boys 
81 
home. for Christmas." 
Postcard campaigns were another tavorite device of AWP. "Bring our boys 
homes,'; read a December,. '50 card they distributed. "Give us a Christmas at 
peace. II Over 50,000 such postcards ~ere distributed~ through "labor union 
and neighborhood peace organizations." 'lhese car~s added, "Mr .. .. Pre.~ident, for 
five months our homes have been disrupted, our security threatened. ~ The end 
is not in sighto We fear for our loved oneso We urge immediate mediation in .- . 
the U.N. and an end to the fighting in Korea." The campaign continued into 
the next year, with postcards calling for "Cease Fire in Korea.,,82 
In April, '51, AWP took part in the P~ce Crusade to Washington, which drew 
2500 men and women from 36 states. Delega~ions were sent to the State Depart-
ment and other government officeso AWP representatives went to see Anna 




only wom~n senator" --and brought fruit to K?:rean war . casual ties at Walter Reed 
Hospi tal 0 A telegram was sent to Truman approving of the dismissal of MacArthur--
. . ." 
a "first step in the reversal of a disastrous foreign poliay which has lost 
us prestige allover the lvorld, and the love and respect of the people in the 
world. it The telegram continued and urged Truman to bring abou~ "the immediate 
cessation of hostilities in Koreao.oand a negptiated settlement of all out-
standing differences.,,83 
The AWl' also went door to door, with petitions and poll~. In the early 
winter of 1950, they undertook a massive "Peace Ballot" petition caUJP:B.ign; 
their goal was 50,000 signa~res,and by November Los Angeles alone had pro-
duced 10,000. Meanwhile, they took opinion !lolls on the -y,rar. While the ques-
tions below, asked of 200 citizens in Syracuse in March, 1952, betray a certain 
slant that might have prejudiced the answe~s, as Mueller has shown, even ffres-
pectablelt polls such as the Gallup Poll showed a surprisi;ng lack of support for 
the war. Thus, theAWP's polls cannot be totally dismissed as meaningless. 
The S,rracuse poll, taken by going door-to-door in several neighborhoods gave 
the following results: 
Do You Favor 
Immediate Peace in Korea? 
Withdrawing all foreign troops 
from Korea? . . 










In March, 1951, AWP claimed that "6&f, of the American pe·ople ~~~~ peace aIi.d 
84 
our withdrawal from Koreao" 
The AWP also actively opposed Universal Military Training and the 18 year 
old drafto 200 of their members went to Washington February 1, '51 to present 
their cases to Truman, Vice-President BarJdey, and various Congressmen and 
Sana tors. liTo draft our sons and brotm ~s at this tender age means . robbing 
the nation of its manhood," they claimed. AvTP demanded that "Youth ••• be trained 
at Peacet1metasks,: and concluded with a ~.equest for "peaceful negotiations, 
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trade, and friendship with all nations.: An AWP "Picket Line for Peace" in 
Los Angeles a t the sane time featured the sl~~ans, !!I Didn't Raise My Boy 
to Be a S:>ldi.erlf ; "World in Peace--Not in Pieces"; Don't Draft nw Daddy, I 
Want Peace"; IIWives, not WidmTs"; and "Draftsmen for Peace, Not Draftees for 
85 
Waro" 
Finally, the largest event AWP took part in was the Chicago Peace Congress, 
-
June 29-July 1, 1951 • . 5,000 delegates attended, over~lf of whom w:ere wonen; 
included were "housewives, farm women, trade union women, prof~ssionals, mothers ••• 
women with sons in Korea, Negro women from the North an.dSout~, Puer~o Rican 
women, Protestant, Catholic a.nd ~ewish women, all in enthus~stic uni.ty, _ ~ter­
mined to extend the peace zoovement in an even more vigorous way than at any 
, . - . . . 
time up to now." Haloia Moorhead reported on "the orga~zation of hundreds 
of local women's peace conmittees throughout the .!country9 the many and varied 
programs for Peace carried out over last Mother's Day, WOll2n t s participation 
in organizing U.N. delegations, the initiating of Peace petitions, postcards, 
and thousands of neetings around the issue of Peace and the iInIoodiate settle-
112nt of the Korean Waro ll ~cific exaJl'¥lles given included 5,OO(K'Catholic 
Women who prayed for peace on May Day, '51; a "P~ce Parade" in Los Angeles, 
". '" . - . 
which featured 2,000 people and 400 cars; and a number of the events described 
earlier. An enthusiastic conclusion of the Women's ~brkshop of the Congress 
proclaimed that soon "we will unite hundreds of thousands of women to guarantee 
peace, freedom, and a full life for our Children.,,86 
Organizations affiliated with AWP, such as New England MinuteWomen:for~eacef 
Philadelphia Women for Peace, etco worked on activities similar to those reported 
by the AWPo Additionally, the NEMWPspent considerable time and effort on build-
ing the American Intercontinental Peace Conference which took place January 22-
27, 1952. '!he II call" to this conference proclained "the common will for peace 
:1 
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has forced the initiation of armistice negotiations in K~~~, thereby.winning 
the first victory for the spirit of neg~~~ations ~ver"me~odso~ force." 
AlIIong the signers of this call outside the U.S. were: Noble literature prize 
winner Gabriela Mistral of Chile; . Three members of the SUp'rerne Co~t of Ecuador; 
the President of the National Congress. pf Gu.a.temala,~ber'.~entes; the ma.~r 
of Panama City; and the former Vice-President of Peru. lhdorsers from the 




Eftilacre~ph:ta-'s 'ChaPter reported on what must have ~en one of the more 
humorous moments of the Peace movement during the Korean war. PVlP members 
appeared on a panel with United World Federalists at a ~ convention on June 21, 
19520 After noting that the UWF backed the UN in Korea, and that one of the 
panel rr.embers addressed the audience as "we Anglo-Saxons,n PWP indignantly com-
. - . . 
mented that n the speakers spent undue time criticizing the courageous women t s . . 
peace delegations that have appeared before them, stating that they were jea-
lous of lt10rld Federalists because they included so manY Phi Beta Kappas. The 
member of Philadelphia Women for Peace who spoke from the audience made f{>ecial 
point in announcing her organization to note that she is a Phi Beta Kappa •••• n. BB 
AWP, and i t.s many affiliate d organiza tionsdisplayed a high, unparalelled 
level of radicalism and activity during this period. They focussed on anum-
ber of domestic issues, and on the "traditional" concerns of women's peace 
groups. Somewhat surpriSingly, for ·such a political group, they said little about 
the events in Korea that let up to the war. This omission, was,however, by no 
means unique to AWP. 
Al though some of their sloganeering tended to be overly dogmatic, the AWP 
could at least claim an uncompromising radicalism at a time when so many of the 
social activists in the Peace movement had either given in to cold war ideology, 






in the thousands at a time when the rest of the peace movement was lucky to get 
dozens. 'tWe IIlUst be worthy of the pledge tM:t we have taken," they.wrote, 
"the pledge to the wonen of the world to continue the fight for peace no matter 
how difficult that fight may be. It is only peace which can give us those 
things our hearts long for: quiet days, security, and a .good life for our 
children--an end to f~ar ••• an end, too, to high prices, h;igh taxes. An end, 
above all, to killing. 
"For Peace is the only victOl"Y'oll89 
The other important large, racn.cal Wonen t s group was the Women's Interna-
tionalLeagu.e for Peace and Freedom. Free of the dogmatic rhetoric which 
occasionally plagued Av.IP, the WILPF remained one of the largest, l\X)st politi-
cally sophisticated, and insistent opponents of the Korean war. '!hey connected 
the war with domestic economic issues and increased militarism; provided a 
. - . ~ . 
detailed historical background of the war; criticized Syngman Rhee} opposed 
MacArthur~ supported Nehru's attempts at nediation; opposed UMT; called for 
civil rights for blacks; opposed U.S. support of Formosa; opposed war atro-
ci ties of both sides; and insistently called for a cease-fire and a mediated 
solution 0 Strategically, they took great pains to encourage and coordinate 
letter-writi rg campaigns and petitions to a'wide variety of government repre ... 
sen~ tives and ,officials. The v1ILPF even put out two separate publications 
dUring this period: 'Four Lightl!.1 which was their general jourmil, and Washington 
NE'Msletter. which solely addressed political events and strategy. 
The WILPF stressed increasing domestic mili tarism, poin~~g to headlines 
in the New York 'I'L-nes--all appearing within a month of the outbreak of the 
war: "War speeds Arms Aid Bill"; "House Votes 315-4 to Prolong Draft-Korean 
Crisis Breaks Deadlock"; "Draft Fiktension , ~nt to President--8enate Passes 
Measure 76-011 ; "70 Group Air Force Favored by Senate"; "Korea Crisis Spurs Senate 
Vote of 66-0 for Arms Aid for 2nd Year"; and etco The WILPF opposed this 
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increasing militarism, opposed UMl', and even sold tax protest sticker~. '!hey 
redistributed the $70 billion defense budget into a "budget tor peace.n90 
The WILPF provided a good deal of historical background, including a 
reprint of David B. Chots article, an approving review of I.F. Stone's "The 
Hidden History of the Korean War," and a good deal of their own analysis. The 
WILPF labelled the confiict a civil war, and wrote Truman arguing that Itif the 
United States insists upon Syngrna.n Rheets government a bad situation in which 
we are acquiring the reputation ot imperialist ••• will become worse. '!he WILPF 
dug up an especially revealing quote lromRhee (o~iginally inU.S. New-s): 
"We were beginning land reform in the South when the war began," the South 
Korean leader explained, II This. land reform law will ~ extended to the North. 
We will do nothing about it during harvest this year. lht next year We will 
91 
take away the land given to tenants and return it to the lancUordo ll 
The "IILPF saw the Korean war as being caught in superpower politics, and 
criticized both UoS. and Russian policy evenly. They took great exception 
. . 
when Jacob Malik claimed that the WILPF supported his stand on Koreao '!he 
statement Malik was referring to was a general call f'or settlement of the war which 
tb~ .. WILPF s ertt to: representatives of all the relevant parties. "Under no 
circumstances could our correspondence be construed as 'fan mail ' except by 
, . 
deliberate distortion of our motives," the WILPF wrote angrilyo Criticism 
of both sides continued evenlyo The wn.pF blasted the Russian delegation tor 
its opposition to certain peace overtures in the UN in an article titled "Russiar 
Tips its hand .. " On the other hand they also quoted with disgust U.S. General 
Harrison's sta tement that "The most important thing in dealing with a Communist 
is to remember--and never forget--tha t you are dealing with a cornmon criminal. 
. . . 92 
You do not believe anything he says ••• " 
The vJTLPF also printed an article by Justice rTilliam O. Douglas, in which DOUglRS 
Asian revolutions to the American revolution, and complained 
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that the U.S. had been put "in partnership ~th corrupt and reaction~ry gr~ups 
whose policies breed the discontent on which Soviet communism feeds and pros-
9.3 
perso ll 
T'ne 'VlILPF calle d for a casefire, wi thdra,",l of foreign troops, me dia tion, 
and unification of Korea. They urged their members and others to write to the . . - ., .. 
President, the SecretaI7 of State, Senators an~ Con~ssmen" and even to the 
editors of local neloTspapers to protest the war. The WILPF also wrote mes-
sages to Congress at thebe~ng- ,cjf,eachsession. "The u:.~~ should willingly 
enter into efforts for negotiation of the st~ggle in ~r~a ••• " began their 
message to the eight-second congress in 1951. '!he message _to the' e:;igh,ty-third 
Congress called for "an immediate cessation of hostilities.,,94 
The WILPF acquitted itself admirably during the Korean war. Throughout 
the war" they offered sensitive and perceptive critiques of U.S policy. They 
were especially good at providing detailed news from the U.No at all stages 
of the war. If their activities were no t as varied and colorful as those of 
the Peacemakers, the WILPF's tactics were more realistic and consistentc If 
their rhetoric was not quite as radical ~s that of AWP" it wCls more. responsible. 
T'ne vlILPF remained politically practical, but were still idealistic. _ And des-
pite their knowledge that they were in bad tines, they retained their optimism. -
In Februar.r, 1953, they quoted a postcard written by W!LPF leader Emily Green 
Balch: II A world of equal opportunity based on good-will and peace is not · just 
a drea.'Il, .: it is not just a pious aspiration. It is the object of a determined 
purpose. It is a program, a promiseo It is also in the nature of things." It 
was this sort of commitrent that the best groups in the peace movement shared, 
that was needed to live in America from 1950 to 1953 and oppose the Korean war.95 
-~------~--------------------~-----------------~-----~-------------~-----~--------






splintered and isolated is ,not ' to be saying an;y"'thing stU!'~"1ing or newo For 
various internal and external reasons-,~.any of which can be seen from the above 
cnapter--the movement during the Korean war was quite weak. These problems, 
and other reasons why parts of the moven:ent did not exist will be discussed 
more fully in the final chapter. 
B.lt for too l()ng, the efforts of the individu~is and groups.~hat opposed 
the Korean war have gone unrecorded. It is not the ',thesis . of this cha~ter th~t 
during the Korean l,Tar there .existed a massive politically powerful peace rnove-
. . . . 
ment--although it should be kept in mind that the American peace mo,!ement during 
ti.l'res of war has rarely been either massive or politically powerful. Rather 
the ' point ;nere is to show that there wa s a peace movement during the Korean 
.' .. ~ . . 
l;rar; that a sizable number of groups and individuals oppose~th~ war with argu-
ments and analyses that had a factual and historical sophistication not only 
beyond that of many of their contemporaries, but also beyond much of l-rhat 
has been the conventional wisdom about the Korean war since its end; that anti-
war activities took place ranging from the fasts of several indivi~Jals, to 
rallies and conferences involving thousands, to anti..:war petition drives involv-
ing tens of thousands, 'ton'th myriads of smaller rallies, petitions, postcard 
and letter-writing campaigns" tax resistance, etc .. ; and finally, that even in 
the depth of the war, the peace movement was winning victories, such as the 
defeat of Universal Military Training, the reduction of Leon Gilbert's sen-
. . . 
tence, and the reduction of the sentences of Robert }uchener and other C.O.s~ 
Beyond the activities of the peace movement itself, although it is a debated 
point, a number of historians have argued tha~ Eisenhower's pledge to end the 
war was a :maj or factor in his Victory in 1952 .. 
It vTould be convenient and perhaps satisfying to conclude by arguing that 
the peace IilOYBment during the Korean war "sowed the seeds" for the Vietnam anti-
war movement, or something along those lineso It would, however, not be true. 
Despite the overlap of certain individuals such as Muste and Dellinger, the peace 
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movement during the Korean was not the beginning of' the mOV8IOOnt of' the '60s . 
The m:"rement had its "seeds" in the anti-nuclear and civil rights protests 
of the late t 50s. Nor was the Korean war the end of' the previous era: that 
era had been destroyed by vTorld 1..Jar Two, and buried by the f'irst f'ew years 
of' the cold war in the late '40s. The Korean "Tar was in fact a Dark Ages f'or 
the Peace movement, between the ~10 bigger and better periods of' the')Os and 
the '60s. Yet beyond merely surviving the period, many in ;.the .,pacifist movenent 
acted .nth ad.'1lirable honor and ihtegrityo Had America taken more seriously 
some of the better ideas of the peace movement at this time, t~s COlUltry 




"Is the N EM Ret>ubliq,' s policy now 'ni;rcountr;r 'right or wrong'? •• 
vlhy is there not one liberal rrAgazine willing to let soreone speak . 
againstfntervention?1I 
--letter to the New Republic, Jan. 1, ~951 (1)- 4). 
Liberal response to the war took a very .<l1trerent form t~ pacifist 
opposition. ~'Ihat 1ibe~~ opposition th~re :was ~:vt?lved. over time;. _~ll 
major liberal organizations and periodicals endorsed the war at its 
. . ,-, .- "' - ' 
outset. Hen-rever, disenchantment with U.S. policies w~uld emerge as the war 
pcogre.ssed t usually beginning with l-lacArtlmr's drive Peyond the Yalu 
." 
and China's entry into the 1-Tar. Liberal oppo~ition ~~er~y expressed itself 
S1,lbtly. '!here were no cries of "U.S. out of Korea:'now." Rather, 
liberal opposition took the fo~ of 1ncre~sing criticism of UoSo policies 
and increasing insistence on peace. Liberals in the 1950s were moving 
tOtfard a new, more rig.'1t-'t.nng fOrm of liberalism, a li"'?Cralism defined 
as being the political center rather than part of the political left. 
This doctrine of the llvital center" provided the theoretical frame-
work for What has less charitably been called Itcold war liberalism." A 
salient feature of this ideology- was its extreme anti-communism in for-
eign affairsc Thus the organizations and periodicals that flocked to 
"vital center" liberalism--such as Americans"'for Democratic Action and 
the NerN,;Leader--firlrJ.y endorsed the Korean war for ~ts entire durationo 
'Vlhat liberal opposition there was came from the comparatively "left" 
liberals who clustered around the Nation, the New Republic, and the 
Progressive. And even these were quite caught up in the cold war ideo-
logy of the day. Thus their critiques of the war were often ambivalent 




significantly as the war went on. 
Any opposition that was to errerge, hOlV'ever, .. ras going to require 
a marked shift in the perspective of the left liberals. The Prcgressi~fs 
endorserr1en t of the ""Tar and condemnation of pacifist opposition was noted 
in the last chapter. On July 3, 1950, the N8i>1 Republic, the most conser-
vative in this group, argued that the Soviet Union was behind the North 
KOrean aggression, and concluded that the most important thing for the , 
U.S. to do was trto upho;'d the authority of the U.N.II In the issue after 
that, the. New Republ!£:. proclaimed, "The mood of. pathetic fatc:liSI!l vanished 
as American came together in an almost unprecedented moral unity." The 
Natiop., which would be the rr.ost skeptical of the \V'ar in this group, admitted 
that the Syngman Rhee regime was "olle of the most repressive police 
states ever to enjoy our favor," but gave broad approval to the inter-
vention. "It must be plain to all that u..'11ess this aggression is stopped 
neither the U.S. nor the U.N. will any longer be a barrier to the Commu-
, 1 
nist ' conquest of Asia," they concluded. 
The Nation reserved a few doubts, however, warning that the U.~. must 
not appear imperialistic to Ai~~ Another concern was that it appeared 
that Itthe South Korean soldieru 40 doe s ,not want to fight, perhaps .because 
he has re~tively little to fight for.f~ TIle article concluded with a 
call for the U.S. and the U .. N. to give to Korea "the concrete pledge of 
2 
national freedom and economic reform." 
'!Wo strains of thought ivould ererge in the 'h'1:'itings of the left 
liberals. The .~ prominent strain was dominated by anti-communism, con-
siderations of U.S. security, faith in U.S. "leadershipll of the world, 
and a generally conservative sense of "realism.1f The minority strain 
stressed peace, anti-imperialism, concern with the Korean people, and 
general support for economic and social urevolutions" in Asia. The 
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story of left liberal "-thought during the Hal" would be the story of the 
second st.rain trying to emerge out from under the first. 
One example of t.l1e pervasiveness and povsr of post-World War Two 
It realism" and anti"'Communism was the extremes often taken by the ~ 
ReEublic. It is hard to imagine another period in which left liberals 
could so easily be persuaded to throwaway their traditional values at 
the first call of the bugles, and so bitterly oppose as IIdefeatist" 
arguments that in a different time they Illight well have made them'selves: 
"Defeatism has an armory of pooerful arguments," the New Republi,c wrote in 
August, 1950, "~ve backed a regi,'T'e and system in K~rea whose rottenness 
inv"i. ted attack; 'tv-by sh<?:uld "'Te fight to reimpose it against the desires 
of the Koreans themselves.?' Were we not to blame in keeping Conmrunist 
China out of the UN, and isn't, the UH action ille~l at heart without 
Chinese participation? Isn't there an eas.y way out, that can spare U.S. 
lives and the mud huts of a prinutive people used as a pmm in a con-
flict between great p0v.ler? 1!!~_ ,?ame J?lausible argwreilts were adv~nced 
when the_1~;<)cists w~re. te~ti-£& up the lvo,rld before t1!.e
w 
l~;!i w,er ... n 
(emphasis mine) ,.3 
Liberals during this time, however, saw themselves as the beleagured 
upholders of enlightened liberalism, navigating between the shoals of 
- -
u1 tra-right isolationism and communism. The Nation in its strong oPPO-
sition to both extrerres even tITrote, "it is sometimes difficult to dis-
tinguish bet~een the rantings and rav.t~~s on the left and the ravings 
on the right,,11 In two articles en-liitled ~IIMan Bites Dog," the Nation 
lumped together right-wing publications such as the Chicago Tribune with 
left-T;ring publications such as the Conmrunist Party's Dail;y· Worker in one 
amorphous mass" characterized, ironically, by nopposi tionll to the Korean 
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war~ It would appear odd that the Nation co.uld or would not distinguish 
between the Stalinist party line protests that South Korea had actually 
attacked ~orth Korea, and the partisan, anti-limited war approach of the 
far right. But this easy equation of two political extremes was very nmch 
h 
in keeping with the doctrine of the liberal "vital center." . 
The event that began to tUrn the Nation--and to a lesser extent the 
, . 
New' Republic-toward increased criticism of the war was MacArthur's drive 
northward" 'and the Sllbsequent involvement ~f China in the war. Following 
a pattern strikingly similar to that of De~re Allell and the T;\brld Intererete£J 
the Nation reported suspiciously upon hearing the first reports of MacArthur's 
. P __ . .' . , . ~ " ", . - . " 
advance. Later comments would be less restrained. It was "ludicrous" . . . 
to think that the decision to cross the parallel was made by the UN high 
comIrand, the roTation wrote. The tactic was a MacArtlmr plan II to increase 
, ~ - . 
the authority and prestige of Syngman Rhee," which, they claimed" showed 
American intentions to rrinstall the distasteful Rhee reg:ime as the 
government of all Korea." '!his "ras all IId.isastrous~y inept. ,,5 
The New Republic did not follow this line of reasoningt> They argued 
that both the U.S. government and the U.N. had "taken for gr~tedthat 
General MacArthur had co~lete authority to send his forces anywhere in 
K.orea that was necessary." 'Ihe protection of the hydro-electric plant 
near the Chinese border did not seem to the New Republic as a legitimate 
reason for the Chinese to suddenly intervene, since it could already be 
' 6 
"destroyed at any time. 1f 
In fact" e:ven tt.te entry of China into the war did not sway the ~ 
ReE:blic immediately. At first they belittled the Chinese al"1l\Y. Later, 
as the U,;lif. forces were pushed back, they expressed Sllrprise andrather 
belatedly pointed to tl tragic blunders" in U.S. policy. fut they remained 
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completely unsympathetic to China. "Aggression is not made legal because 
it i~ announced in adyat?-ce," they argued, "whatever mistakes have been 
7 
made, our cause is just." 
However, in that very issue, of the ~ Republic, a new line of argu-
ment appeared. In an article that represented a complete departure 
. . . . . 
from what had previously been written in the New Republic, Harold Ickes 
argued that intact the U.N. t~op~ shollld have , ~lted at the 38th pc\rallel, 
as "the arIl\Y' of the U.N. had achie:ved its .ori~al objective, wlll:C?h was to 
clear South Korea of enemies." Previous~' ;ii<? this." the , Nar ReP'!blic had 
insisted that such a policy was inadequate. Ickes also criticized MacArthur 
, . .-
for maldng ties with Formosa, note~ China'.s warnings" and argued ~at 
MacArthur "had been deliberately inching not only the U.S. but the U.N. 
forward into a war which did not have to be fought and from which we could 
" . ". - . - _ .' ... " -
not hope to disentangle ourselves for an ~predic~ble period." This 
signified a moderation of the, New Republic. In the next issue they wrote 
that "Nehru, who was proved right on Korea, deserves our fullest support," 
and called for negotiations. The NevI Republic even wrote sympathetically 
8 
about recognizing China.-
The Nation responded to the Chinese entry into the war with an angry 
_ "We-told""5'"ou-so" article, and called for an immediate " reassessing of' the 
whole situation." The next issue featured an analogy- which, although 
betraying certain ~onvictions as to the origins of the war, was nonethe-
less basically syMpathetic to the Chinese: liTo understand the Chinese 
point of View, it is only necessary to imagine American hysteria if a 
predominantly Communist force under a Russian General were approaching . , 
the Texas border after we had encouraged a North 11exican arnv to liqui-




that t~e drive North ~d been a "monumental military blunder based on 
appallingly bad intelligence." . But beyond seeing the drive north as 
merely a tactical error, this event prompted a new, more serious look 
by both the Nation and the New' Republic into U.S. policy in Korea.9 
'lliis look generally meant a greater concern ,for Korea itself', and 
a more sophisticated view of the Asian situatim. This had already 
begun at the Nation as far back as July 29,_ 1950, when Stewart Meacham 
in a book review provided a good deal of historical back~ound, similar 
to what was quoted in the previous chapter. Vera Micheles Dean in the 
August 26 issue, argued that the world was in "revolutionary forment," 
and the U.S. was giving the impression that it was "prepared to resist 
all change and become defenders of the status smO.1I lliese revolutions, 
Dean argued, we;re due to centuries of "misery, maladjustm::mts," and 
colonialism, and were independent of Russian comnrunismo The U.S. had 
to redefine its opposition to "socialist" poli ticies such as land reform 
in Asia., Dean even brought up the "wh~ te supremacyG. issue, and argued 
10 
for better treatment of blacks at homeo 
These ideas gained increasing force. In mid-December the Nation 
wrote, "we are either struggling to lay the foundations for a real peace 
in Asia ••• or we are merely trying to thwart the Russians at this point 
or that point. There is a big difference.~ ,In a separate article 
Freda Kirclrffey gave ~re pre-war history, and then stressed the nature 
of the conflict in terms of the U.S.-U.S.S.U. world power strUggle. 
"Both North and South knew that reunion was Korea fS Bingle hope, but 
in termS of the Cold ~Tar, reunion could only mean conquest of one by 
the other." Kirchwey denOlD'lCed Rhee and MacArthur, then continued with 
the broad critique that "in the present stage of Alrerican political 
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development l-le seem almost incapable of doing ,,,hat needs to be done in 
countries ripe for revolution ••• we must accept revolution as the dominant 
inescapable facet of our t:i1ne.l~ Concluding, she argued that "we must 
become the ne,., sponsor of revolution, helping the peoples of the world to 
win all that conmnmism provides--p"+us liberty.!1 Significantly, implicit 
in the arguments of both articles is the assumption that it l-Tas the 
duty of the U.S. to do somethin,g to Asia. A third article was more ex:pli-
cit: rr The world r shope . of peace re sts, a t t~s mo~nt, upon thei rapi d 
emergence of a new, affirmative, American leadership.f1 This concept of 
benevolent American interventionism had been a staple of twentieth-
century American liberalism since Wilson. By late 1950" horsver, left 
, 11 
liberals were beginning to question our methods of intervention • 
. " . . 
The NetoJ' Reeublic too softened its line somewhat. 'Ihey quoted Justice 
Douglas's calls for reform ~~d even support of revolution in Asia in 
their January 15, 1951 issue" In that same issue they wrote of the U.S., 
"In hardening ourselves to the bitterness of the Korean campaign, we 
have turned aHay from a search to the alternatives to war. ll At their 
most radical, they printed an article by Victor Purcell entitled "U.S. 
mocks Peace. If The New Rem;bli<? put a sli,ght disclaimer before the 
article, stating that ;; they were "not wholly in a~ement" with it, but 
felt it was "largely right." The article argued that China's interven-
tion was justified, that N'acAr~hurt s policies had robbed the U.N. of any 
moral justification it mi&ht have had, that to Asia the U.S. appeared 
as the aggressor in the war, and that it was "hard to believe" MacArthur 
12 
'TrTaS not seeking world war. 
The first half of 1951 brought up another mjor issue: the firing of 





The Nation. in a series of articles begirm:ing in mid-February, 1951, 
warned against trying again to dr:i.ve through North Korea. They stressed 
not only the strategic aspects of such a plan, but also the potential 
cost to the Koreans. They also noted the reluctance of other UN allies 
to pursue such a strategy, and the potential for the war to degenerate 
into a permanent, bloody stalemate. They approvingly quoted General 
Ridgway's remarks that "It l-Tould be a tr~ndous victory for the U.N. 
if the war ended with our forces in control ~:p to the 38th para,llel," 
and "we'didn'tset out to con~er China,we set out to stop Co~ism." 
13 
1-lacArthur "Tas depicted unfavorably as want:ing further conquest. 
, . 
RapicIly, the Nation became very ' critical of what they per-
ceived as being MacArthur's more warlike positions. The Nation scoffed 
at MacArtlmr's "peace proposal" for explicitly ruling out discussion of 
, . . 
Formosa and China's seat in the U.N., and for containing overt threats 
against China. They also noted I'Tith alarm the way in which . MacArthur 
seemed to be usurping the government's power to make policy. t1The Presi-
dent's patience with General MacArthur's meddling policy and the virtual 
:insubordination has ceased long ago to be a v:i.rtue,u they wrote in mid-
April 0 Hhen Truman fired MacArthur, the Nation was jubilant. "The recall 
-of General MacArthur accomplished several things that urgently needed 
- .. 
doing,'! they wrote, Among , these things was the assurance to "a doubting 
world, that American policy still favored settlemen t of the Korean war 
by negotiation." . Other articles in the same issue echoed the sentiment 
'14 
that the firing represented a step toward peace. 
TIle New Republic l-TaS also critical of HacArthuro Harold Ickes 
contributed a piece sarcastically titled "MacArthur is Always Righto" The 
New Republic also scoffed at "MacArthur's peace offer, if i .t can be called 
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tha t& ... 11 , . and they criticized HacArthur for poli tical interference, and 
for taking stands ccntrary to U .. S .. and U.N. policies. en April 9, they 
accused HacArthur of "deliberate insubordination.," The Net.; Republic 
heartily endorsed the recall of HacArt.hur: liRe l"TaS the head of an open 
conspiracy against the policy of the government he lias mioro to serve." 
They concluded that "nO"l-T that he is out o~ the Hay, efforts to end the 
war on an honorable basis can be pursued •• Dthe desire of peoples allover 
15 ' 
the world for peace has seldom been so great." 
This changing perspective on the war was not limited to the N'a tim 
and the Ner.v Re..E.~blic_o The Prom::essi~ was following a ' very similar 
path .. For this reason it would be redundant to quote from theProg£essi~. 
at length, but it is worth showing that by January, 1951, another 
journal which had endorsed the Har was seriously questioning U.S. policy. 
The p£og£essi:,,~e note.d that calling the North Koreans nag~essor,n but 
not a.ppl;ying this label to the French in Indo-Ghina was contradictorry .. 
"~"e say we' fight only to trepel agg-cessiotl,jl t but He claim the right to 
define 'aggression f to refer only to COT:1."'TlUIlist ,activities," they argued. 
They also claimed that U.S. policies were promoting not a genuL~e peace , 
but a peace "imposed lYJ force," and backed by a certain bloc or nations. 
Noreover, lido 'VJe r~~lly want peace? Or do i>fe just want to fight COIll.;"TlU-
nists?1I they asked... The P.rogressj.v~ also docTh11ented the destruction of 
Korea, and concluded, "Americans may feel--and have a right to fee1--
tha t we would prefer to die and to have our cOllntr"J totally destroyed 
rather than have a communist government heree But have 'VTe really the 
right to ,inake __ this terrible c1ecision for other peoples?" In February 
the !:r,?llressiy,£ published an article by pacifist Homer An Jack describing 
an eleven-hour "prayer vigil for peaceI' that had attracted 1,000 people 
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in Chicago on December 6, 1 950~ TheLrog,r~~sive l.;ould continue to 
chart a course similar to that of the Nati.QQ. and the llirw Republi,£ for 
16 
the remainder of the war~ 
The JVJa.cArthur firing had prompted further reflection on the Har. 
Not coincidentally, irrnnediately follo'\oiing the firing, t..~e Ng~f Republic 
began a series of articles aired. atflrevealing hOif special interests 
- ' . 
are profiteering on our national defense program." An article in }tay 
t-Ta'Scri tical of the bru tali tie s of the South Korean goverrl1"llen t, and even 
noted that South Korean sol·diers were defecting to the Northo E'-ven '{-Then 
the ~ReE.'ublic slipped back a~~t, as they did i.D.th t~eir cover story ., 
on June 25,1952, tit.l~~,nKorea..,.A Year of Achievemen~,n they stil~ called 
for a negotiated settlement of the war, and for the reconstruction of 
Korea.17 
The calls for peace grew stronger in the Nation after the firing. 
"Peace by negotiation u.TOuld be something to offer the American public, 
something better tp~n indefinite stalemate in Korea--and better, too, 
than tpeace I by expanded war," they wro te in ¥Jc3.y 0 In June Fre cIa Kircrrwey 
declared that " if the 'limited war' in Korea is to end'td~hout burgeoning 
into an unlimited war, the JOOment to try to end it is now .. " Calls for 
peace were combined with an increasing impatience with ~gman Rhee: 
, , . 
"Rhee's declation at Pusan on June 12 that the world should beware of 
a tphony peace' in Korea clearly registers the fears of a dictator 'who 
senses that ' time is rtmning short .. " This l'TaS a hint of what was to 
'18 
come later. 
Both the New Republip. and the Nation also took time to criticize 
Senator Taft. Again, 'lihe point l-vas to shO"N that Taft was hardly an 
anti-'t.;ar spokesman.. '!.he Nation noted that although Taft had questioned 
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the consti t utionality of sending the troops to Korea, he had also said 
at the tiJne, lIsinca I approve of :the charlges nOli made in our foreign 
policy, I , approve of the general policies outlined in the President's 
statelT1."mt.,1I In their next issue, ;the Na"tion quoted Taft's initial res-
ponse to the sending of ground troops to Korea: tI~.fuen you're in, you'v-e 
got to go all out .. " Tne New Republic. also made this point about Taf'{j, 
quoting him to the effect that Tr1L'1J2.n and ~cheson had recalled l'1acArthur 
because the latter "i-J'anted to vTinTl the I'mr. Later, the Ns-J' RePu1J.lic 
wrote.t "Taft has ahmys ' supported the Korean war. Truman f s position ,in 
- . 
entering the 'V-Tar, Taft has said, I-ms 'unassailable Q 11119 
Both magazines continued to call for negotiations throughout the 
su~2r, although both shared a h~althy skepticism towards Russia'sinten-
tions. This isperr.aps best shmm in a series of cartoons in the Nation , 
depicting a character labelled "peace ll being misled or tricked by a charac-
ter representing the Soviet Union. Their antipathy for cO!lmnmism com-
bining wi,th their generally more liberal outlook led them to some rather 
torture.d analyses: "80m3 straight thinklng about China is necessary,If 
they 1-/TOte, "As long as Chinese arnri.es are killing Americans and other 
U .. N. troops in Korea,9 we can hardly recognize Hao Tse-Tu .. "1g's regime or 
consent to its admission into the U.N. But any A.'1lerican diplomat who two 
years ago 'V-TaS no t f considering' recognition should have Deen. fired as 
incompetent.. He should still be ' considering' recognition as something 
that may seem more advisable when the Korean fighting is over.," 'ilie ~ 
Re~J.bllc alt..~ough no less mistrustful of the Comnnmists, took on a mJre 
~ ..- .-
concilliatory tone, t~Titing in ~uly, "Does Russia want peace? There is 
good reason to believe she does .. " In October the NertT ReEll;b)..;hc noted 
that "both sides have negotiated in good faith," a.'1d pointed out concessions 
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made by the communists. This continued to the end of the year, and by 
December 31 , they Here forced to ac1'7lit that IlIf there can be a criticism 
of the U .. N" attitude so far, it is tlt~t He hav'B acted as if we 'Here negotiat-
ing a military victory, not a Inilitary stalemate •• "the truth is that alrrost 
every concession in the negotiations so far has been made by the Commu-
nists.H20 
As the ~var ground i.lmcreasi..ngly to a long s talema. te in 1952, both 
magazines wrote considerably less about it. "Peace in Korea stands 
first on our agenda of hopes in 1952," wrote the New Repp.blic in January 
of that year, but both the Nev.r Reuublic and the Nation began to confine 
"' .... _- . ' . 
themselves to occasional short appeals to settle the war, at or around 
th 
the 38 parallel. The NatioJ1, hOi-rever, . c?ntinued moving toward a ;more 
sound, factually based criticism of the war. Tney printed an article 
by IeF. stone titled "1k'W Facts in Korea,1I in lv-hich Stone raised many 
of the questions about the origins of the Hal' that he later raised in 
liThe Hidden History of the Korean 1'lar .. " Arthur Gray wrote an Ll1formed 
and detailed article titled "Korea: Steps to Unification," which argued 
for a negotiated settlement, peaceful unification, and neutrality for 
Korea" A nE;vf agency to oversee this process was needed, as liThe UN has 
become too closely identified with the United States in. Korea and is 
unable to play an independent role. It This in itself was a fairly impor-
tant a.cL"7lissiono Gray concluded ldth a description of the destruction 
of Korea--an especially c~mpelling statistic is that with the vTar only 
half over, Korea had already suffered five millien casualties out of a 
pre-war population of thirty million---and a call for "imaginative coopera-
21 
tion to save Korea from chaos.n 
La tel' articles in the &~i:Qa vTOuld continue this theme" II No country 
has ever been more completely laid .. ras-tie by war than Korea. ,11 began an 
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article by 1fal tel" 8u11i van in February 1951., t'li th a year and a half of 
fighting still ahead, .one out of nine Koreans had alreactr been killed, 
5,00,00 displaced, and 100,000 ~ children made orphans~ The Nation con-
sistently called for peace, reunification (unoer neither Rhee nor Kim 
II-Sung of the North), and reconstruction.. II A Korea left divided as well 
as ruined 1'1ill have gone through untold agony to no avail, and the United 
Nations't'1ill have fought for nothing," they concluded. 
quent events, ' this is an interesting analysis.22 
In view of subse-
, 
The New Re:e~lic remained remarkably silent on the war during most 
of 1952 (although a significant amount of its slack was picked up by the 
Progre~sive, which followed a line similar to the Nation t s with perhaps 
a little more emphasis on the question of American imperialism)., The 
~~"public did oppose fO,rced repatriation, but expressed-increasing weari-
ness of the war $ They vrere especially cn tical of ':Ei.senhmrer t s handling 
of the war issue in the '52 campaign. The Korean War issue elected 
Eisenho,,,eI'", theY'V1rote, but the issue had never been adequately debated 
in the campaign. The ~. ReEubl.~.£ referred to Eisenhower's promise to 
go to Korea as nerely a glib gimmick, and as such was potentially counter-
produ.ctive" After Eisenhowerts election, their cynicism remained unabated, 
and articles appeared with titles li!.<e "Did Ike Delay Peace in Korea?1I
23 
The ~ongrew increasingly anti-..rar. In July", '52 they outlined 
a platform for the Democrat~c Party. Their section on the Far East con-
sisted of two paragraphs, one a quote from the AFSC's "A Quaker View of 
Foreign Policy," and the other a call by the Nation for the seating of - . . ... 
China in the U.N. after the establishment of a Korean truce. This was the 
first time the N~tion had been so explicit on the issue. The section in 
the proposed platform on Colonialism consisted of one paragraph, a quote 
from the }lILPF. The ~ for the first time was openly endorsing the 
f · I" " f t' "f· t "t· 24 orelgn po lCY V1.ews 0 an J..-war paCl l5 organlza lons. 
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This trend intensifiedo lilt is time to end the Korean fighting, 1t 
the ~ wrote in October, 1952.. In December, Robert Lynd wrote, 
III for one do not Imow why peace has not yet been achieve do II The Nation 
also shared the New Republic f s cynicism about the new President. lli..senhower 
had "suddenly promised to 'make a personal trip to Korea' in an effort 
to bring the war to an early and honorable end--but with no hint as to 
. '25 
how he would go ,about it,ll the Nation complained in No~mber. 
The Nation bega". to criticize a lvide variety of aspects to U,S. policy. - . . 
In December Robert Lynd accused theU .So of following a pattern similar 
to nineteenth century British imperialism. The Korean war was not "d8ll1O ... 
cratically responsible," Lynd concluded. On a different track, the 
!La tioll vehemently· opposed the idea of sending Chiang Kai-Shek's troops 
to fight in Korea--an idea that had great currency in certain right-
wing circles at the time.. The -tIatiop objected to this proposed prolong-
ment and extension of the war, which "could easily become a universal 
bloodbath-ell The Natiol.l also eJ...'"Pressed concern that policies be made by 
the U.Ne, and not by the U.S. unilaterally, revealing some fears of the 
potential manipulatio n of the U .. N. by the U.S. liThe U.N. was not estab-
lished to suppress any particular i<i:lology, or to promote the strategic 
interests of anyone nation," they argued" Finally, early in 1953 the 
N~ti0!2. published a series of "Proposals for Peace" by various authors. 
3)me of these plans were fairly vague, but they usually began with a 
demand for a ceasefire in Korea. T'ne better ones sug~sted'a broad 
range of measures to ease the cold war, including specific plans for a 
Korean peace settlement, and also proposals dealing with Indo-China, Germa.."'lY, 
economic cooperation, and a general easing of world tensions.
26 
The ~ati~ however, was a little slower in accepting the idea that 
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connnunists -were negotiating in good faith than -was the Net-l' Republi£. They 
tended to vacillate in their perspective, and as late as December, 1952 
they could writ.e, "It may well be true tha t they (the communists) • .ran t 
to end this war, but there has been no sign yet that they will consent 
to end it on anything but their own strictly interpreted tems. n This 
view occasionally degenerated into pure pessimism, in articles such as 
J. Alvarez Del Vayo' s ~~.Kore.a: No 1-vay Out"; another article remarked , 
sadly, "-what worries us . is the idea of the war in Korea becoming a 'way 
of' life' •• ",,27 
But by the sprL~g of '~3, both the Nation and the New Re~blic were 
. , C 4 . . . 
putting the onus of the failure of negotiations on the U.N. The death 
of Stalin (who was replaced by Georgi Malenkov) may have made this shift 
in perspective easier. "It is too soon to say positively, but apparently 
.Hoscow policies have changed," the N..~_Republtc wrote .in April 19530 In 
~ the New Reoubli~ denounced Eisenhowerfs peace plans as being unrealis-
tically one-sided: "The Soviet government thanks President Eisenhower; 
it is always Hilling to talk and has no intention of slitting its own 
throat," The ~~f Rep!!bl!c began. The article went on to argue that the 
28 
U"S. had to provide more realistic peace terms. 
The Nation went even further. "~SCOw is ready to go to almost fan-
tastic lengths to settle outstanding feuds," they wrote in April '53 .. 
This same article quoted a U oN. diplomat who remarked, "It looks as if 
Dwight Eisenhower f s campaign pledge to try to end the Korean war is now 
going to be fulfilled--by If.a.o Tse-Tung and Ma.lenkovo 00" The Nation -
accused the U.S. of unnecessarily "hunting booby traps" in peace orfers, 
and listed the long series of concessions made by the communist sideo29 
i ,' , 






In fac 't there had been no sudden, dramatic change in the communist 
negotiating technj.queso But increasing war weariness, and the grm-Ting 
list of comrm.mi st, concessions helped focus the anger of the left liberals 
on the U.S. side~ 
A t this point, near the end of the war, the Nation and the New Republic, 
began to direct all their anger and frustration at ~;ngroan Rhee. After 
the June 6 truce agreement, which still left much to be negotiated, the 
Nation cautioned that rt SyngmanRhee f s capacity for dangerO'J.s mischief is 
as great as his inOl~ity to drive the Chinese out of Korea single-handed. 
, . 
He can do a lot to sabotage the truce and obstruct progress towards peaceo" 
After Rhee engineered a mass escape of North Korean prisoners of war--
at a time when the issue of forced repatriation was still in the major 
stumbling block in the ne gotiations--both magazines were furious. Tne 
New Rep!!~.in a series of articles referred to Rhee as a "ward heeler 
cast as a 'statesman!! whose "action proves that he still cannot be trusted .. " 
lIS;yngnt..an Rhee's position is clear; if the U.N. does not place the whole 
of Korea under his rule, he will violate the truce," ~he New Re,E!!blic 
wrote. "Rhee would make a Il'..ockery of'f!..N. pri..'1ciples. Rhea is the 
poli tica.l deadwood that must be cleared away if we are to help create 
• A· f . . t· rr 30 J.n sJ.a ••• ree progressJ:.ve na J.ons •.•• 
The release of the prisoners also infuriated the Nationo~ In the 
space of two paragraphs, they referred to Rhee' s " infamy," called him 
ttthe evil old man of South Korea," and concluded that "to proceed with . . -
Syngrnan Rhee as a treaty partner is to put into this unbalance~,,_ sinister 
man t s hands a commi ttment that could be abused not merely to rekindle 
the Korean conflict, but, to drag the United States into another '''orld vlaro" 
- 118 -
This criticism continued as the negotiations dragged on through July and 
August. "The most popular spectator sport over the past few days has 
been the grim one of guessing ,.rhether Syngman Rhee would accept any truce 
formula that anyone else could accept,"the Nation wrote in July.31 
The final structure for any kind of support for the war were giving 
way.. The left Liberals had first endo17sed the war, then argued for its 
limitations; later, growing weary of the fight~ng, . they became increas-, 
ingly critical of the U .. S. and its policies, and 1Jega~ calling for .peace 
with increasing insistancyo Their criticisms ranged--fro?1cm increased 
awareness of the devastation of Korea, to the grudging realization that 
the U~N. side had been less willing ~ make concessions during the long 
negotiations than had the communists~ Finally, Rhee's record of brutality 
and oppression, and hi~ uncompro~sing and obstructive ~ehavior during 
the negotiations hadyrompted an outburst of rage and frustration from the 
left liberals~ "lor three ""Teeksthe United Nations has bea'l pa.ralyzed 
and the Korean truce blocked by the treache~ and intransigence of Syngman 
Rhae ,It wrot..e the New R~blic in July, 1953.. Then, after cataloguing 
Rhee's long record of political oppression and corruption, they concluded: 
"Rhee theanti-communist has pursued every communist -,technique of police 
ru1e.1132 
Implicitly, this brought much of the moral justific~tion fo~ the 
. 
war into question~ Freda Kirchwey articulated this in a different way 
in the E!.~: It§yg~n Rhea has dramati,zed the Sl.1l:~stion whether the UoN. 
will not have to reconsider the whole problem of hmf to deal with acts 
. . . I . 
2!_~ssion_and other threats to l!,orld peace." (~hasis mine.) T?is 
cannot compete in radicalism with the pacifist opposition in the previous 
- . . 
chapter" But it does represent the end of a long road of increasing cri-
ticism of the war, and increasing disillusionment with U.S. policies.. And, 
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al though it had taken the N..f!..J" RE:J2ublic and the Nati.9E, the length of the 
lolar to get to this point, the above quotes represent a serious q'uestion-
ing of the f1L.'"ldamental rationales for which the '"Tar had, in their viel-T, 
been fought)3 
The evolution of left liberal thought during the war followed a long, 
slOt-l, tortured and frequently convoluted path of inc,reasing criticism. 
Even these less "centrist" liberals still adhered to a fairly rigid cold 
vTar nevT of the world. In the spring of ,1951, even a~ter it hadQ,fre~d 
a number of criticisms of the war, the Ne'.-l ReEublic could still ~~a:p" , 
"the New Republic believes that the w:orld is divided by 'a basic struggle 
between dictatorship of the Soviet Uhion and Democracy.'! In the sense 
that these assumptions were alt'TaYs undex-lying liberal thought, liberals 
could never be more than, to use a term of Robert Fowler' s} II believing 
skepticsc,!34 
Tnis phrase cap~~res nicely the contradictioh_ in the ideology of the 
left liberals of the day: the contradicti.on of having liberal values 
along with cold war assumptions.. This contradiction manifested itself, 
as ,,-laS argued before, in 'fRIO conflicting strains of thought which were 
simul taneously embraced by left liberals. The mre prominent strain 
stressed anti-commullism, U .. S. lV'orld interests, and Ifrealismc"; the other 
strain stressed peace, anti-impe~ialism, and s.ympathy with the economic 
and social "revolutions" in Asiao Although often distorted by the former, 
increasingly the lat:ter perspective cc;une out, in the writings of the New, 
Republi~, the Nation, _a~d in similar periodicals such as the ProgreSSive. 
One ' could well argue that had the cold war ideology been slightly less 
dominant in this period, had the origins of the war not been so univerally 
assumed to be nothing other than sheer naked aggression, had there been 
a more vocal anti~'lar movement, or even if the war 1].a,fi just gone on longer, 
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-Chis increasingly sharp criticism of the war could have tlL"1"l1ed into 
intelligent and vocal outright and unequivocal opposition c The experiences 
of many left liberals during the next war America would fight in Asia 




"This \-Tar wi thifurea is no t the Ne gro f s ,far e!l 
--William Patterson 
Black opposition to the Vietnam Hal" Has (jiuite famouso Less famous, 
but still strong was black opposition to World 'IvaI" TwooThe~efore, it is 
not surprising to fin~ .that there was indeed black opposition to the 
Korean Hal". Because of their unequal status at hOll'e, black~ l-1ere less 
likely to view any war America bec~e engaged in as a war to promote free-
dom,democracy and equality abroad. America' s involvement in Korea was 
especially suspect for blacks; the war could be seen as a "whitell country 
fighting non""'i-Thite forces; and-moreover;.blacks were very suspici~s as 
to vThat they perceived as the overtones of colonialism in the "'Taro Some 
of the best examples of black opposition formulated on these gro11.'1ds C~'1 
be f011.11d in the pages of the Pittsburgh Courie:r: and the Cleveland ~ 
~d Pop.!!. In the mar..ner of the previous chapter, only these two will be 
quoted, but s1-milar attitudes can be found in other black newspapers of 
the times, such as the Baltimore Afro-A1'!!erica!1: and the New York A.."l1ster~ 
1 
~~ 
lrfuen the war broke out ·~he Calland Post expressed some ambivalanceo 
"America needs waste no sleep over the loyalty of its 15,000,000 Negro 
5'tlb-citiizens,1I they lon'ote on July 15, .1.9500 The black Il'an 'Would serve 
loyally, although IIbetter than most Americans he will be able to under-
stand the basic reason behind his nation's fumbling diplomacy in the 
realm of the darker races, and for all its strange and inexcusable pro-
testations of full democracy for 'foreigners' while c111\9;1\,9 desperately 
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at home to the principles of white supremacy. " They concluded t.,ith t-"he 
observation that until the ' U.S. granted full equality to blacks, it 
2 
could nev-er have credibility in Asian and African nations. 
This ,"laS hardly a ringing endorsement of the war, but the Pitts-
burg."h Courier, the most anti-'V'far of all the !l'ajor black newspaper, went 
even further. On July 8, 1950, they referred to the conflict as a "civil 
war." On July 15, columnist Horace Cayton argued that the U.S. had 
, 
ignored the cries of colonial na tiORS for freedom., and for several ye<l:~s 
A 
had used the "false thr'eatll of co~islll as a s,capegoat and a way of.avoid-
ing the issue. By delaying act~on, the U.S. had caused the co~st 
threat .to become real, Cayton argued, and the U.S. was "still unable to 
formulat.e a positive hope for the peoples of the world.'! JoA. Rogers on 
the ' next page argued that America was inheriting "centuries of evil wrought 
by white '!l'.ash;rraces, '" and concluded that "Asia, communist, or not, intends 
to be rr'ee of white dominance .. " In his next colurrm, Rogers gave some 
backgr01md, of the war" declared that the di-vision of Korea waS "a bad bar-
gain for all Koreans,1t denounced both the American and Russian role in 
managing the liberation, referred to SyngIT'.an Rhee as a U.S. I!puppet ... 
senile, incompetent, autocratic," noted Rhee's assasination or his poli-
tical rival Kim Koo, charged that South Korea was a "police state," and 
claimed that several South Korean Generals and "large nUIIlbers" of the South 
Korean .Army had defected to the North. "Though nevTS of the invasion was 
carried as if it 'Here another Pearl Har~or, both sides have been fighting 
on the border for years,1I Rogers pointed out. Finally, Uthe Communists, 
who had gained great strength in South Korea, thanks to Rhee's rotten rule, 
seem to have taken his defeat at the polls as a green light to come in and 
be welcomed," he concluded.
3 
Not all that 't-Tas to follow from the Courier and the Call and Post 
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would be cn tic ism" macks to some extent shared contemporary anti-
co~~nismo And, as the abov~ Call and Pos~ editorial indicates, many 
were willing, at least initially, to give grudging support to the war. 
Notable among prominent blacks who supported the war on general partiotic 
" ' 
grounds was A $ Phillip Randolph .. 
But what was perhaps the most positive aspect blacks savT in the Korean 
war i<1aS the promised integration of the Army. No longer liould blacks be 
relegated to servi,ce units; they would now bea:llov-red ,to fight ~'.on ::~he 
front lines, ultimately in integrated units. This desegregation was seen 
as: a constructive : element of the war by even the most critical black com-
rnentators. The fact that blacks were to be used as combat troops was 
greeted 'tn th enthusiasm. "Negro Combat Soldiers Prove HettIe in Korea--
Get chance to use Guns for Heapons, not Picks, Shovels," was the title 
of an August 26, 1950 Call. and p~~ feature story. Blacks were If getting 
a better chance to prove their fighting ability than they got in either-
v-Torld Ivar' One, lihen colored soldiers loTere assigned mostly to labor batta-
lions, or in vlorld 'VJar Two, when they had their morale shattere~ by being 
trained as combat soldiers and then converted, with few exceptions, into 
service troopse ll Black newspapers would follow the exploits of black com-
. .... ' .. 
bat troops zealously throughout the loTar, giving special attention to the 
all-black (excepting"officers) Twenty-fourth Infar:tryRegiment, whi ch 
had borne the brunt of much of the early fightingo4 
It does not need docume~ing here that by t~e Vietnam. war, much of 
the charm of being sent to the front lines had I~orn off. ~or blacks. What 
is worth.;noting is that blacks were beginning to get a sense of this by 
the middle of the Korean ,"'ar. A March 31, 1951 cartoon in .the Courier 
shows two black soldiers alone in a foxhole at the front: in reference 
to a white character not shown in the scene, one of the black soldiers 
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is saying to the other, "Say Cuz, why do you reckon Mister Charlie ain ' t 
been up here like he always do, to tell us to get back in the rear f cause 
hets the only' one allowed in front? You sfpose hers gittin' more demo-
cratic?"5 
The sentencing of Leon Gilbert to death, and the subsequent spate 
of court martials against blacks began to dim l-Thatever enthusiasm blacks 
had been able to generate about t~e war. These events took place from 
roid-october to mid-No~!f1ber, 1950.. Although Gilbert's case was t&.e IOOst 
extreme, it was by no lOOans an isolated incident. It~ve are being court-
martialed and sentenced to imprisor..ment for life--not one or two of 
us, but in groups of fours and fives," one soldier complained ~ the 
Call and Post. The soldiers requested aid from the NAACP, who after over-
coming in:i.ti,H resistance from MacArthur, sent Thurgood Marshall to Korea 
to do an investigation" 
. 6 
The results he returned ldth shocked many blacks. 
In the . .first place, many of the trials had been conducted extremely 
quickly. Three bla,?k GIs were given life sentences in trials that lasted 
under fifty minutes. Twenty-seven others were given severe sent,ences 
in trials of equal length, and none of the cases lasted more than '.fa 
fetor hours." Blacks had also been convicted considerably more often 
than whites, and gi van considerably stiffer sentences, as the follm-dng 
chart of court martial trial for October-NoVember 1950 (printed in the 



























' . . 
50 yrs. 1 0 
25 yrs. 2 0 
20 yrs. 3 0 
15 yrs. 1 0 
10 yrS. 7 0 
5 yrs. 2 1 
3 yrs. 0 1 
These "figures lead us to two possible conclusions,1f the Call and Post 
remarked dryly, "either Negro soldiers who in every previous war have 
dis-I;inguished themselves as excellent fighters have disintegrated during 
the last generation, or else they have been singled ~ut as scapegoats , 
for the poor showing .of. the U.N. troops." In its conclusion, the Call and 
Post added that "we are certain that fe ... 1, if any American . s?ldiers, ~lack 
or l-Thite, have any real knol-fledge of why they are fighting ••• in Koreao,,8 
~rshallts report also concluded that MacArthur was in large part 
responsible for the continuing segregation in the Army. It was with 
this in.mind that most blacks vieHed MacArthur's firing. Blacks had 
also not been pleased with certain remarks MacArthur had made, such as 
his prediction that an A..ryr:y with "clean uniforms and white faces" would 
scare the Koreans into retreato Hor.'1ever, HacArt!rJ.!' was not the only 
focus of black anger. lfuen he was fired, the Courier approved, hl.f7 not-
ing that MacArthur could not have been solely responsible for the con-
tinuing segregation in the A:rro:y., asked, "How about 'ousting some others?,,9 
The above typifies an important aspect of black opposition. Blacks 
had their own concerns in the war, and these remained fairly constanto 
The ups and downs, and even the important crises of the war held less 
interest for black commentators than for others e Blacks were more intersted 
in the underlying themes : they perceived in the l-1ar, such as colonialism 
and racism; also blacks could not consider the war without considering 
the sta tus of their race in the Army, and in the U. S II as a whole 0 
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Han~r blacks were unhappy with the thought that after fighting in 
a war to make Korea t1free,n they Hould hav'"e to come home to a n jimcrow" 
America" "He was good enough to fight, but his color isn't right," 
was the refrain ,of a song sent in to the Courier in August, 1950, that 
made this pOint. Along similar lines, in December, 1951, Courier 'columnist 
P.C. Prattis wrote an "open letter" to a Gr in Korea, which read in 
part: "Even w:~'filif'medals, Joe, and your uniform, you could never be sure 
where you .could buy a ~al or obtain a room in a hotel. They'd still 
have the nerve to tell you, Joe, that 'l-1e den r t serve coloreds.' II A 
letter from a black soldier to the Call and Post argued, "if our boys are 
.. . . . 
to die for this country, they are to share equally in its opportunities, 
not just its wars"n
10 
The fact that blacks were still the .victims of racial arrogance 
in the U.S., helped sensitize them to the racial implicat ions ofU"S. 
soldiers referring to Koreans as "gookso" The word Ilgook" was as bad 
as the word "nigger," Horace Cayton insisted" and the NAACP's 9,risis 
argued that " • ..,we will never l·dn the political war in Asia as long as 
Koreans and Asians are f gooks t in the eyes of our fighting meno" 11 
Not infrequently, black commentators actually expressed a certain 
ill-repressed glee at the victories of the non-"toJ'hite Koreans. J .. A. Rogers 
wrote in late 1950. "if the disaster in Korea can rid us of some of our 
racial and national conceit, and let us see things as they really are, 
i t will not have entirely been in vain." A letter to the Courier in 
1952 sUIrJTled up this sentiment" The lvrited admitted he had "a sneaking 
admiration for the mapner in which the Koreans were fighting the whole 
'--Torld, especially the white troops • .., 'Gooks, t defying the might of America . ... 
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which for the first time •• • has been robbed of a victory, and by a non-
white people ...... the battlefield of Korea is disproving a lot of nonsense 
12 
about the human race~1f 
Blacks also tended to identify with the Koreans by drawing parallels 
betNreen the status of Asia and the status of Africa. At the outbreak of 
the war the Courier began an editorial, 1I~1e knm-T how. ~~e peoples of Asia 
1/ 
and Africa are restive under the imperialistic system.. More directly, 
Horace Cayton wrote in 1951 that "What is happening in Asia now will hap-
pen in Africa ten years from now." This identification led to strong 
anti-colonialist beliefs: "We have teamed up with the world's maJor 
colonizers and exploiters to maintain in the world the old status quo 
13 
of imperialism," charged the Call. and Post in IvTA.Y, 1951 . 
The combin~d issues of white supremacy, the spectre of imperialism, 
and the poor treatment of blacks at home and in the army led many blacks 
to a rather unsympathetic view of tha waro As early as August, 1950, 
the Q211 and Pos~editorialized that nfrom a study of the backgro l~~d of 
erents since the liberation of Korea, it becomes increasingly apparent 
that a combination of administra.tbra ineptness, coupled with fwhite supre-
. 14 
macy' arrogance has led us into a war which would have been avoided." 
The Courier was more extreme.. It had at least seven regular colum-
nists reporting on the war in the editorial section, and at least five 
of these--J.A. Rogers, P"G. Prattis, Benjamin Hays, Horace Cayton, and 
Marjorie;; HcKenzie-·owere antiwar. 
The most vocal at the beginning of the war was Rogers, whose intiial 
reactions to the war were noted earlier. After writing that the U.S. had 
gi ven North Korea the !I green lightll to invade, Rogers continued wi t,.~ a 
stream of antiwar editorials. In July, Rogers quoted Lt. Col. Tho~as 
McClure (who had spent four years in Korea) on the attitude of South 
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Koreans : "They hate us," HcClure claimed, " South Koreans aren 't interested 
in fighting and quite a few of them are commuJ.'1ists~1I In April, 19)1, 
Rogers denounced the U.S. for backing rulers such as Chiang and Rhea , "who 
their own people didn t t want. 1I Rogers ey'en went so far as to claim 
that North Korea had enjoyed better rule than had the Ebuth. In Hay, 
Rogers argued that "America has permitted Russia to eme:rga as the cham-
pain of Darker HumanitY •• o~tr. Trum~n says the future of world freedom 
is being fought over in Korea. lvell, darker humanity agrees, but' not 
by the side Mr. 
. " ' 15 
Truman mea.."1s." 
F:L"lally, in late June, P..o gers explicitly came out for American wi th-
drawalo "Look at Asia, II he wrote, IImore than two-thirds of it is owned 
by Russia, and most of the rest of it is under her influence. Therefo:r,-e, 
let America pullout of it, and make Asia Russia's sphere of influence . 
America could t':1en devote herself to her own sphere of influence, the 
West~tf On September 1 J Rogers elaborated t his argument, noting that 
Russ1.a 'tiDuld "have her hands full with the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, 
Thst L"ldians and others over their own national integr'ityoll America could 
no t defend all of Asia and all of Eu.ropein any case, Rogers concluded. 
He "muld continue .vriting from this perspective for the remainder of the 
16 war. 
Rogers was not the only antiwar spokes~an, howevero Horace Cayton 
early in the war had suggested that the U.So press had played up the 
early victories of black troops because the U.N. side embarrassingly 
had no non.-.vhite nations fighting ",ith it. Cayton would continue to 
hold this cynical view of the war, giving special emphasis to its racial 
themes. By early 1951, he would write, "I donft think we canp..1.Jlice-
world. The Korean business was a terrible mistake." Cayton opposed " 
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broadening the war into China; he also stressed that he was not an iso-
lationisto Rather, he argued, America should use its p~ners to end colo-
t, .' • 
nialism. Military maneuvers alone would not stop communism, Cayton con-
cluded, the U oS must be able to give the peoples of the world" -especially 
17 
the darker peoples--a stake in democracy." 
Courier colunmist P.C. Prattisalso opposed the war. In early 1951, 
Prattis argued that the .war was in no way a 'police ,action, 'critic,ized 
both the U.S. and the SOviet union for having divided Korea against the 
will of its people, claimed that thew~ could n.ot '!!ruly be a legal U.N. 
action without the participation o~ Russi~ in the decision, and concluded 
that the conflict was in fact a civil war. In ~~h, 1951, Prattis 
wrote "this so-called police acticn is ~he screWiest and most costly war 
ever foistered upon the American people." Prattis continued his opposi-
'18 
tion to the war through to the war' ~ conc~usio ~ 
Other writers made similar points, and added some of their own, 
th 
BenJamin 11ays in 1951 applauded Truman for trying to settle at the 38 
parall~ but noted that Truman could and should have tried settling there 
earlier in the war, instead of driving north. At the end of the war, Mays 
made the sane argument I noting too ~ . ~he war was ending "only a few thou-
sand yards from where it had be gun eo owith Britain and India standing for 
a ne gotia te d peace, we have been forced to do what in 1951 and late 1950 
we might have done 'fith more grace o" This article went on to criticize 
Rhee, and U.S. policies in general. "It isn't ,popular to write like 
this," May-scone luded, "we are too close to it. o. but future historians 
will write in this ~Nay ••• Le t us hail the truce! ,,1 9 
Al though · the Courier 'fas the most, radical of the black newspapers in 
this period, many of the above sentiments were expressed throughout the 
black press. The Call and Post's desire for peace "lias eloquently expressed 
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in the following editorial from late 1951 : 
"In the tumultuous Far Thst there is great suffering and destruction. 
Millions in Korea among both our friends and our enemies are suffering the 
dire privation and despair that only a bitter war can bring. In our zeal 
to 'liberate' these so-called backward peoples from the threat of communist 
yoke, we have thus far only succeeded in disru.pting their normal way of li f e, 
d8stroyin~ : their homes and churches, and bringing them to the brink 
of destru.ction ... can anyone seek a more glorious present for the world 
, 20 
this time of year than a just and loving peace?" , 
The 9.!.ll' and Post also continuously reported on racfsm and racial ten-
sion in the army. They frequently stressed the destru.ction of KOrea, and 
the bankruptcy of the Rhee regime. They noted the white supremacy and 
imperialist them~s of the war, and consistently called ror'mediation. 
One of the best examples of their view of the wa~ (and ~lso the repatria-
tion issue) was their a~gry reaction to the Arm,y's detention of a few 
bl ack soldiers at the end of the war on the suspicion that they had been 
"brainwashed" by the communists: "there is a grea~ deal of fertile ground 
to be exploited in the minds of troops who have been thrust into the bat-
tIe ill-equipped, badly-trained, and. for a ~rpose that still has our 
- State D3pa.rtment fumbling to explain," fumed the Ca;,ll and Post; moreover, 
tithe smaring of these battered and suffering heroes is even more inexcus-
, . 
able ,in the light of our o~rn revelations that we have indoctrinated thousands 
of comrr~~ist prisoners with so much love for our own ideology that their 
refusal to go back to their homes is one of the principle stalemates 
in the settlement of the Korean war. How did we do it--with mirrors?u21 
The war also brought out more radical opposition. Both Paul Robeson 
and Dr. "'.E.B. ,·~Bois presented very leftist views of the war. "Unless 
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American intervention in Kor ea and the rest of the world is stopped," 
Robeson argued in July-, 1950, "Africa ifill be next in line. The meaning 
of the Pre 51 den t f S order tha t the live s of 0111' sailors and airmen must 
be sacrificed for the government's despicable puppet in Korea shall not 
be lost to the millions in the East, whose day of freedom is not far off. " 
In a somewhat different vein, DuBois in 1952 charged that "In Korea, the 
UoS. has coInI1'!itted every atrocity that man ever did to mano We have .... .. 
poured millions of gallons of flaming gasoline on shrieking men, l:10men 
and children, and tlL'r'Iled a helpless nation into a stinking desert." Dur-
ing the course of the war, a s was noted earlier, DuBois was tried as for-
- -
eign agent. Robeson had his passport revoked for his political activi-
tieso Radical criticism also CawB from the Civil PJ.ghts Congress: "This 
war 1vith Korea is not the Negro's war," argued CRC Exeeutive Secretar.r 
H1lliam Patterson in 1951, If the U. S.. should bring 1 ts troops home to 
22 
fight for democracy in this countr.r." 
Although this radical criticism is important, it is perhaps equally 
important to note that many of the ideas and principles that concerned 
the antiwar blacks also concerned the more moderate blacks vrho officially 
supported the war. For example, pro-war black leader Ralph Bunche in 
early 1951 warned the West to Itawaken to the fires of revolutionary natiorn.-
1 " "A" ,,23 l.5m l.n Sl.a. 
Hany blacks remained highly skeptical towards the l-lar. Although 
they welcomed the integration of troops, they remained sensitive to the 
continuing racism in the Army, and in America. Black commentators also 
saw themes of l-Thi te supremacy and colonialism in the war. Their s;}-"l7lpa thies 
in rr~y cases were more with the Koreans than with the Americans. ,\n 






"v1hat are we doing in ~sia? ifuy must '\-I"e be there? Ib the people of 
Asia "Tant us? Ib they Ivant" .... our "ray of life .. . 1 !)o they think we are their 
friends?o.Do they enjoy the spectacla of our defending them by waging 
war in their coun-t.ries? Are they \clilling to be the victi..'Tls of such a 
derense? 
"We don't believe the Asians want us" We don't believe they,want •• • 
our way of life. lve don't think they like USo They look at our record 
of arrogance and exploitation in the past, and they have a feeling of 
hatred for uS o This is as true in Korea as in Chhl8..,,24 
With this analysis, it -:.-ras only logical to oppose the Korean war. 
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Conclusion 
" Is there any point to which you would draw my 
attention?" 
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-
time." 
"The dog did nothing in the night-time. " 
"That was the curious incid.ent," remarked Sherlock 
Holmes. 
--"Silver Blaze", The Memoirs of Sherlock 
Holmes , Sir Arthur Conan-ooyle . 
, 
Significant sections of the American antiwar movement fai l ed 
'. . 
to materialize during the Korean war. Many of the traditional 
consituents of opposition movements during wartime were either 
unable or unwilling to protest U. S. involvement. - This "absence" 
cannot totally be ascribed to the nobility of the U~S.-Ga~se.in Korea . 
without making value judgements, it seems odd that World War Two 
generated more opposition from a wider variety of perspectives 
than did the Korean conflict ~ the enemy in Korea was less obviously 
"evi l"; the battlefield more obscure ; and the direct threat to 
America less obvious . 
For a variety of reasons independent of !he ~ar, t he creation 
of an antiwar movement in America from 1950 to 1953 was particular-
ly difficult. For their own individual reasons, as well as for 
reasons related to the general political climate, different groups 
did not join the antiwar movement. Although a thorough analysis of why 
some potential parts of the movement never came into existence 
i s beyond the scope of this paper , some discussion of this topic 
is needed . 
Two of the most important influences on American thought 
in the early 1950s were World War Two and the Cold war. As was 
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noted before, World War Two convinced many Americans that war 
could be the more moral option in a given situation. It also 
convinced them of the effectiveness of war; this perception 
was probably enhanced by the fact that America emerged from the 
war relatively undamaged, and with a revitalized economy. Another 
crucial lesson many drew from the war was that "appeasement" 
caused the war, and therefore "ap:reasement" had to be avoided , 
at all costs in the future. "Appeasement" rapidly became synono-
mous with any form of compromise, and the term "appeaser" became 
a vicious and effective smear word. 
The Cold war also had a tremendously debilitating effect 
on the peace movement. Belligerency from both the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union after the war increased world tension to a tremen-
dously high degree. Suddenly, the entire world had been divided 
into a giant game board with two competing players. The Soviet 
domination of Eastern Europe, the well-founded accounts of re-
pression in the Soviet bloc, and finally the "fall" of China 
made many Americans very nervous about, and hostile towards, 
their former allies. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that with the spectre of 
Hitler in their memories, many Americans simply equated commu-
nism with fascism, and drew conclusions from this perspective. 
Doctrines of "Red Fascism" and "vital center" liberalism which 
were prevalent at the time described ideologies which made no 
distinction between the totalitarianism of Stalin, and the to-
talitariansim of Hitler. Much has been written on the strengths 
---~-. 
- 135 -
and weaknesses of this analogy ; it is only necessary to note 
here that viewing the North Korean attack as equivalent to Ger-
many ' s invasion of Poland, as many commentators at the time did , 
seems something of an overstatement in retrospect. 
The effects of World War Two and the Cold war on l iberals 
were tremendous. In a study of liberals during this period , 
Mary MacAuliffe concludes that this era saw the development of , 
a "new liberalism"' , different from earlier forms of liberalism 
in the U. S. This "new liberalism" rabidly opposed " extremes" 
in politicspusually endorsed the foreign policy of the Truman 
administration, and generally redefined liberalism to fit the 
new conservative national mood and the Cold war. MacAuliffe 
argues that liberals in this period "abandoned many traditional 
liberal tenets--the belief in progress, in man ' s goodness, in 
popular democracy, and in wor~peace--replacing them with a chas-
tened , and in their view ' realistic ' philosophy which stressed 
man's sinfullness, the seeming inevitability of conflict among 
nations, and the dangers of democratic rule." Also unlike' pre-
vious liberals in America, the liberals of the early 1950s "'stressed 
the benificence of American pOlitical and economic institutions."l 
To a great extent not only "left" liberals but even socialists 
subscribed to the above ideology. The world had been divided into 
t wo armed camps ; any gain for one side would be a loss for the other. 
The socialists chose to support the side they felt had greater 
democratic rights. "Life would seem to me a much better place 
if I saw any social action that might have been taken June 25 in 
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Korea that would not in' its implications and consequences have 
been worse .than that which was taken, n Norman Thomas wrote a friend 
in 1950, "but neither in my own mind nor in the many statements 
which have come to me have I found any.alternative to what was 
done." And Thomas became a strong supporter of efforts to "beat 
back that aggre~sion. ,,2 
Another leading figure on the left who supported the war was 
Henry Wallace. Wallace broke with what was left of the Progressive 
Party on this issue, announcing that "When my country is at war 
and the United Nations sanctions that war, I am on the side of 
my country and the U.N." Angrily dissociating himself from his 
former supporters, Wallace oncewvote A.J ~ ·Muste that .. if our 
left-wing friends were interested in peace, they would write Sta-
lin to end the Korean conflict."J 
Earl Browder wrote concerning the Communist Party in 1956, 
' ''I am not interested in microbiology." It is with this view that 
one must approach the CP during ·the Korean war. It is signifi-
cant that Joseph Starobin's book American Communism in Crisis, 
which covers the CP from 194J to 1957 contains in its JOO-odd pages 
one passing reference to the Korean war. The communists in the 
late 1940s and early '50s simply had too many other worries. 
The party was devastated in the Wallace campaign of 1948; saw 
the destruction of their union base in the C.I.O.--eleven left-led 
unions were expelled in 1949 alone; had eleven of its leaders 
convicted in the Smith Act trials of 1949, with more to follow; and 
found throughout the early '50s a growing ideology in America 
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called McCarthy~m which fostered bo th the increasing legal repres-
sion of party members, and also the idea in the minds of many 
Americans that 
4 troubles. 
" communism" was the cause of most of America ' s . 
The CP lost half of its claimed membership in the year 1950-
1951 . Starobin's chapter on the party from 1948-51 is titled 
"Incoherence and Agony", whi ch is as good a way as any to describe 
the CP during the Korean war. Starobin argues that i.n this period 
the CP "turned inward", and even began internal "witchhunts" (for 
doctrinal purity ) of their own. Despite occasional rhetoric about 
"Korean people's liberation" and "the cOlonial . enslavement of all 
East Asia", the CP remained inarticulate and inactive on the war. 
To the extent that their "peace offensive" had any impact , it was 
in garnering 1 , 350 , 000 American signatures for the Stockholm Peace 
Pledge--a call to ban nuclear weapons that did not mention the 
Korean war. 5 
Opposition from the right is a slightly more subtle subject . 
Taft--whose positions are representative of " right-wing opposi-
tion"-- did critize the war. But Taft' s perspective came not only 
from the traditional " isolationist" school , but also from the 
" Asia-first" school which stressed the importance of Asia to Ameri-
ca . Taft ' s opinions were at many points inconsistent, but overall 
i t can be concluded that his objections were in the first place 
highly partisan, and in the second place not anti-war, but rather 
anti-limited war . 
When the war began , Taft blamed the Soviet Union for North 
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Korea ' s "outrageous act of aggression against a friendly, inde-
pendent nation." Throughout the war Taft, in his own words, had 
"no difficulty whatever in lining ... up with the general principles 
announced by General MacArthur. '" Taft denounced the administration 
for not bombing China, and for not using Nationalist Chinese forces 
in Korea. Again in his own words, Taft backed" an aggressive 
war" in Korea. This position cannot accurately be called antiwar. 6 
A more general conclusion about Taft and others in the Republi-
can Party is made by Ronald Caridi in ~he Korean War and American 
RQlitics: the Republican Rarty ~ a Case Study. The Republican re-
sponse to the Korean war "was neither consistent nor sincere." 
The G.O.P. supported the war, then grew critical of it, "then 
passionately associated themselves with the 'no substitute for 
victory' philosophy of General MacArthur." Apparently, the Repub-
licans felt it to be advantageous to criticize the administration 
on both s ides of the issue at the same time; the G.O.P. simultaneously 
referred to the .war as "useless" and called for its expansion. 
Caridi concludes that the Republican dissent was '~otivated more 
by political expediency than by a desire to provide a consistent 
and viable alternative to Administration pOlicies •• • n . ? 
Even black opinion was not as strongly antiwar as it might 
have been. In 1948, A. Phillip Randolph, who would later support 
the war, headed an organization called the League for Non-Violent 
Civil Disobedience Against Military Segregation. Randolph testi-
fied in front of the Senate Armed Services Committee that "this 
time Negro es will not take a jimcrow draft lying down ••• I personally 
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pledge myself to counsel, aid, and abet youth , both white and Ne-
gro to quarantine any jimcrow conscription system .. . I shall call 
upon all veterans to j oin this civil disobedience movement • • • if 
we must die, let us die as free men, and not as jimcrow slaves." 
Truman's order to integrate the armed serv:lces mollified this po-
tentially explosive opposition completely, and .Randolph supported 
the war, despite the Army's slow, inconsistent, and often only to-
ken attempts at integration. 8 
Finally, even pacifists were not immune to the peculiarities 
of the Korean war and its period As was noted earlier, the fact 
that the war was a U.N. action allowed.world.federalist pacifists 
to endorse the war wholeheartedly. UWF president Allan Cranston 
proclaimed that the joint U.S.-U.N. action "may well go down in 
history as the experience that opened man's eyes to salvation.,,9 
Beyond the U.N. issue though, pacifists were affected by the 
ideology of the times. In the external sense, this was reflected 
during the war by a number of pacifists being beaten up when distri-
buting leaflets, and by a number losing their jObs. lO 
But the prevailing ideology als·o ·influenced the waj':·paCi!ist~\ .. 
themselves thought. Charles ·DeBenedetti has sUmnlE~d this ·Uf> well, and 
his analysis serves as a good conclusion for this section. DeBene-
detti argues that after World War Two, with the intensification 
of the Cold war: 
" internationalists, progressives , and to a lesser extent , 
pacifists, shifted the focus of their anti-imperialist criticism 
from the United States and the western colonial powers to the So-
viet Union and anti-western revolutionary nationalists in Asia . 
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With surprising speed , after 1947, they adopted a kind of Cold war 
anti-imperialism that identified the main enemy of Asian peace and 
freedom no longer as systematic great power interventionism, but 
as an ideolbgy that masked the imperial interests of an ambitious 
totalitarian state ." l l 
And yet there was a peace movement during the Korean war. 
What was perhaps the most interesting feature of this'particular 
antiwar movement was that the most directly political opposition to 
the war came from groups which for certain reasons saw t hemselves 
as primarily unpolitical or , more accurately , saw themselves as 
being somehow "outside" the political struggles of the Cold war . 
The FOR automatically opposed the war , and, having no vested interests 
in solutions that were primarily political , freely and unselfcon-
scioL.:-sly published highly political criticisms of the war. The WRL, 
who traditionally had a more "political" outlook, suffered splits 
over t he political questions of the war. 
Blacks " to varying degrees, also saw themselves as " outside" 
the global power struggle. They tended to look at other issues 
b9yond the U.S.-U.S.S.R. polarization. And they often identified 
themselves with c'olonial peoples in Asia and Africa as much as with 
the U.S. Whether or not Asia goes communist, wrote one black critic , 
she intends to be free of white imperialism. 
Finally, both of the large women's peace groups examined in 
this paper, despite all their political work and radical phrase-
making , were always quick to stress their specific nature as women' s 
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peace groups . Again, these groups placed themselves outside the 
parameters of contemporary political debate. Women were simply 
inherently inclined towards peace, they argued. lft'easons for this 
ranged from concern wi th war-related inflation , to concern with the 
loss of life of husbands , sons and brothers. Both AWP and the WILPF 
stressed the importance of women and women's values to t he peace 
movement. 
Additionally, the periodicals of these organizations suggest 
that women ' s peace groups served social functions, and perhaps even 
functioned as support groups. AWP, for example·, frequently had 
picnics, teas, and similar events for its members ; comradery and 
mutual support was stressed by both groups. 
Finally, these organizations provided an outlet for political 
action for women in a time when few such outlets existed in "main-
stream" politics . 
One could sugges t then , that although AWP (lind the WILPF had 
a number of members who were politically l eft·'wing--in the Progres-
sive Party or American Labor Party sense--a good deal of their abili-
ty to form large organizations and motivate comparatively large 
numbers of people came from an appeal that was outside the politi-
cal framework: "women's" desire for peace, and an accompanying 
social network. These organizations then provided a political out-
let for acti vlst · ,; . . women who did not see themselves as being con-
fined to the field of contemporary debate . Such. groups produced 
a goo d deal of radical opposition to the war . 
Some of thi s is of necessity conjecture . But the basic theme 
that those who opposed the war were those who for some reason saw 
themselves as outside the prevai l ing political debate is s ound. 
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Liberals accepted most of the premises of this debate , and were 
therefore limited from the beginning. Blacks , many pacifists , and 
women's peace groups did not use these premises as a starting point , 
and therefore ended up with very different conclusions about the 
war than much of America. Ironically, therefore, it was these groups , 
and not the more traditionally "political" individuals and organi~ 
zations of the left and right, that provided the most consistent , 
factual , and polit~cal opposition to the Korean war . 
Cheer 
S greet d 
of. the fir e the annou 
sf peace talk neement 
5 _ 
Dear Congressm.an 
We appeal to you to help meet our deep need for peace 
and security. We ask that you ' do everything possible to 
stop further bloodshed and to speed up the negotiations 
for immediate peace in Korea. · 
Peace in Korea means the return of our loved ones. 
Every day peace is delayed ~creases the danger of war 
spreading throughout ·the world. 
Our families are hard hit by the heavy burdens of war, 
not only in the draft of our sons, husbands and brothers, 
but in our shrinking fcmlUy budgets as taxes and living 
cOsts keep soaring. 
The atmosphere of hate let loose by the war has led to 
mounting violence against the Negro people, bombings· of 
chu..-ches end synagogues, and threatens the liberties of 
cll Americans. '-
\Ve feel the best way to protect our families' lives and 
well·being is to have peace in Korea and peace in the world. 
We urge you to use your influence in Congress for a 
meeting · of the heads of the major powers of the world -
.the United States,. the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France 
and the People's Republic of China - to work out disarm-
Oment and a peace agreement to remove world tensions. 
' . ', . ..,~ 
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